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Introduction: Politics and Culture 
 
 
 On October 30th, 1975 Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón took over as head of state.1 
Francisco Franco was near death with peritonitis, lingering on hidden from view, which 
encouraged the question of whether he was even still alive. But he was, only barely, and 
by the grace of God held on long enough to die on the same day, November 20th, as José 
Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the fascist Falange and son of Miguel Primo de 
Rivera, the military dictator in power until a year before the foundation of the 2nd 
Republic.2 Together these figureheads of Spanish fascism and authoritarianism would be 
buried in the subterranean basilica in the Valley of the Fallen, a site consecrated with the 
bodies of la Patria’s most diligent and dutiful defenders.  Imagine: a towering cross over 
500 feet tall on top of a majestic mountain, an esplanade just below, which every 
November 20th could be filled with thousands of dedicatees looking down upon the 
majesty of the land and up above to the heavens, who could file in passing through the 
                                                 
1 See Paul Preston, Juan Carlos: Steering Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 313. He would officially be proclaimed King of Spain on 
November 22nd.  Juan Carlos had briefly assumed powers of state before, in the summer 
of 1974, when Franco was hospitalized for phlebitis, though this lasted less than two 
weeks. See Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London; New York: 
Methuen, 1986), 63. 
2 For more on the conjunction of these two figures, and an exploration of how Falangist 
fascism differed from or was similar to Francoism, see Stanley G. Payne, Franco y José 
Antonio, el extraño caso del fascismo español: historia de la Falange y del movimiento 
nacional (1923-1977) (Barcelona: Planeta, 1997). 
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almost infinite corridor replete with religious tapestries and military arms, then enter into 
the muted and shadowed nave to stand in front of these heroes’ tombs and celebrate at 
once both God and his earthly gifts of leadership and salvation.  
That such celebrants might carry out the task to keep Spain fixed upon the path 
blazed by Franco and Primo de Rivera fils was the wish motivating the heroic pomp and 
grandeur celebrating Franco’s place in Spanish history following his death. Yet, no 
matter how much mythologizing might be made of this date, or how much medical effort 
had been expended if doctors had truly kept his catatonic body alive to make the date, it 
was hard to ignore that on November 20th something had changed. Even those who 
desired that nothing would change would be hard pressed not to admit that with Franco’s 
death came the end of an era.  A new era was announced, not only by King Juan Carlos’s 
address on November 22nd to Parliament proclaiming his succession to the throne, but 
also by the substantial surge in the value of shares on the Madrid stock exchange leading 
up to Franco’s death, which followed the sharp decline experienced earlier in the year 
after the harsh repression and executions meted out by the regime: the new present of a 
constitutional monarchy and a free market economy.3   
With an ending, of course, there is always a beginning, or as Slavoj Zizek likes to 
point out often, quoting Schelling, “the beginning is the negation of that which begins 
with it.”4 In this case, the beginning would be the process of moving away from 
Francoism, the negation of which was imagined as a democratic State and society, while 
keeping intact the economic foundation of capitalism developed under the regime, now to 
                                                 
3 Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, 74-75. 
4 Slavoj Zizek, "From History and Class Consciousness to the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment...and Back," New German Critique 81 (Autumn, 2000): 109. 
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be deepened. After a series of stumbles, all part of a struggle between the holds of the 
past and clamors for a new present, a democracy would be firmly established by the end 
of the transición. This transition from dictatorship to democracy, 1975-1982, signified a 
historical turn when, using terminology provided by Cornelius Castoriadis, “new social 
imaginary significations” of and for Spain—the nation, the people, the place—were 
posited and articulated. The transición was a historical movement towards developing 
and filling out these social imaginary significations, a process to  
bring into being a world in which this society inscribes itself and gives 
itself a place...[and] constitutes a system of norms, institutions in the 
broadest sense of the term, values, orientations, and goals of collective life 
as well as individual life.5  
 
That is, the transición can be understood as a process of bringing into being a new 
society after the end of the Francoist regime, a new society both in terms of interpersonal 
relations and relations between the State and citizen, and in the values and norms that it 
would both promote and allow.  
The transición began at a historical juncture when there were demands for a new 
society by the majority of the left, and an acknowledgement by the majority of the right 
that Francoism as such had reached its end, which was made clear by the ‘rupturist’ and 
‘reformist’ political projects being proposed from the beginning, while the more radical 
demands of ‘revolution’ or ‘continuation’ were banished from the political domain by 
leaders from both sides.6 Both the leading opposition party, the socialist Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), and the majority party, the moderate right Unión de 
                                                 
5 Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Greek and Modern Political Imaginary," in World in 
Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, ed. David 
Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 84. 




Centro Democrático (UCD) who held onto power until the PSOE’s victory in 1982, 
worked together to cement the new State and society as a democracy. But what is meant 
by a ‘transition from dictatorship to democracy’: to a liberal democracy, a democratic 
society, or is it possibly something else all together?  
Does democracy signify an eventual reconciliation of societal divisions, which 
were deep given Spain’s not so distant past that included a civil war and a vicious regime, 
to be accomplished by means of a politics of consensus at the level of the State? Or, is 
democracy instead a constant rupture of the contingent social order imposed by the State, 
an emancipation of those excluded now to be included as parts of the whole? Another 
way of asking this is: Should democracy be conceived of as a ‘modern’ idea that entails 
an eventual end to antagonism after a long history, a universality achieved through 
progress?  Or, might it make more sense to think of democracy as a result of social space 
always being in flux because of the sheer contingency of how the demos is imagined and 
constructed, which makes progress a moot point because there is no final end to be 
achieved, a ‘post-modern’ idea?   
I use ‘modern’ in the sense that an argument is made for a universal idea of 
democracy promising freedom and equality to all, given that everyone is recognized by 
the other and all are able to participate. One example of this is Jürgen Habermas’s idea of 
“communicative reason” which “makes itself felt in the binding force of intersubjective 
understanding and reciprocal recognition [that] circumscribes the universe of a common 
form of life.”7 There is a reconciliation and a recognition possible, if reasonable discourse 
provides the means by which subjects understand and acknowledge each other and a 
                                                 
7 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 324. 
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deliberative politics works to circumscribe them together through consensus, which 
requires State institutions to mediate differences. ‘Modern’ political theory is an 
extension of the Enlightenment categories of universality and autonomy, an 
understanding of politics as rational debate to realize individual freedom and collective 
equality.  
I use the term ‘post-modern’ in the sense that there is an argument made in favor 
of the particular, a society of parts that are never made whole except as contingency or in 
bad faith, which follows and disavows the possibility of a ‘modern’ universality. An 
example of this (though he might disagree with my labeling of his political theory as 
‘post-modern’ even with the use of a hyphen to distinguish it from ‘postmodern’), is 
Alain Badiou’s notion of democracy as “the always singular adjustment of freedom and 
equality” wherein “the State is put at a distance” and whereby “in the distance thus 
created, the political function is applied” to treat each and every singularity identically.8 
This does not require the disappearance of particularity into universality, rather it 
involves a continual readjustment to ensure an egalitarian consideration of non-resolvable 
divisions in the public sphere.  Such activity happens at a distance from “the consensual 
figures of the State” because the State only manages to diffuse difference through 
consensus, yet political activity must retain its particularity and make democracy “a space 
of emancipation” in which differences are never resolved, but continue to make demands 
of and from each other.9   
While ‘post-modern’ political theory might evidence a tendency to introduce 
seemingly universal and collective goals—Badiou’s “egalitarianism,” Richard Rorty’s 
                                                 
8 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics (London; New York: Verso, 2005), 151. 
9 Badiou, Metapolitics, 90. 
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“human solidarity,” Jacques Rancière’s “equality,” Ernesto Laclau’s “hegemony”—that 
sound similar to those proposed by ‘modern’ theory—such as Habermas’s “lifeworld” or 
Cornelius Castoriadis’s “autonomy”—a difference between them remains: contingency as 
opposed to finality, synchronic disorder as opposed to diachronic progress.10 There might 
be political activity motivated by universal-sounding beliefs, but because of the 
contingency of the social order, and because a democracy is never complete—as 
egalitarianism, solidarity, equality, or hegemony are never to be guaranteed or 
achieved—democracy is a continual struggle, as there is no point at which it might be 
said that the project has reached its end. There is a tension between the universal and the 
particular that will never be resolved; instead, there are disruptions. ‘Post-modern’ 
political theory does not treat democracy as something static and stable, and thereby 
refutes the essentialism of ‘modern’ political theory.11 Instead, it insists on “the 
prescription of a possibility in rupture with what exists.”12  
Here then we have two theorizations of what a democracy is: a reconciliation of 
interests negotiated by the institutional practice of consensual politics at the level of the 
State, or an ever-present dissensus between political singularities that expands the space 
of emancipation by forcing increased recognition and inclusion into the always 
contingent social order. Yet it is important to note what distinguishes these theories not 
                                                 
10 See Badiou, Metapolitics, Cornelius Castoriadis, "Power, Politics, Autonomy," in 
Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. David Ames Curtis 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity: Twelve Lectures, Jacques Rancière, On the Shores of Politics (New York: 
Verso, 1995), Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
11 See Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000). 
12 Badiou, Metapolitics, 24. 
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only in content, but also in form. Each responds to the collapse of the concept of 
democracy into one type of democracy, that of a liberal democracy. The ‘modern’ 
theorization can be understood as accepting that ‘democracy’ and ‘liberal democracy’ 
have become the same, thus its prescriptions are corrective measures by which to make it 
a better democracy, a good State. The ‘post-modern’ theorization can be understood as a 
critique of liberal democracy, locating another type of democracy outside and against the 
instituted State, for its liberal democracy impedes the cyclical ruptures and disagreements 
by imposing a social order based on exclusion and inequality.  
The political theorists mentioned above all write from within an already 
constituted democratic context, and thus they critique what ‘democracy’ has become 
understood to mean. However, the Spanish situation offers another approach: to put such 
ideas to work while analyzing a democracy in the midst of becoming. Most interesting is 
that, looking back now, both theories seem to have gotten it right: on the one hand, there 
was an institution of a liberal democracy through a politics of consensus at the level of 
the Spanish State, while on the other hand there can be discerned cultural representations 
disrupting the social order inscribed by the State. But before jumping to the end of this 
history, however, it is instructive to start at the beginning, before either idea of 
democracy came into being, when there was only the possibility of democracy.  As 
Ramón Buckley suggests, Spain had “not yet already had a transition towards 
democracy... [and] Spain still was not democratic and not European... In the conflict 
between this “still” and “already” one has to look for the key to [the Spanish] 
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transition.”13 What this study intends is to progress from the beginning to the end of the 
transición, 1975-1982, providing an outline of the movement from imaginary 
significations to material actualizations of democracy, from the still not yet to the 
already, and to contextualize the transitions in politics and in culture as part of a larger 
history: that of postmodernity, a historical age informed by the logic of late-stage 
capitalism, which is at work in how both a liberal democracy at the level of the State and 
a cultural ‘democracy’ came to be.  
There were not concurrent transitions in politics and culture, for it is only in the 
practice of politics that there was a movement towards consensus and reform, while in 
Spanish culture there could be discerned a movement towards a politics of aesthetics to 
disrupt the contingency of the social order imposed by the liberal democracy. Politics 
became less about contestation and difference—questioning which State, which political 
project not only for the present but also for the future—and more about forging consensus 
between parties to streamline service to the good State, a liberal democracy that seemed 
not to require further political disruption because of its guarantee of equality and 
freedom.   
The PSOE has a long history, being founded in 1879 by Pablo Iglesias. Before the 
transición, it was split between an old guard and a younger generation. The former had 
fought in the war, or the maquis struggle afterwards, were largely living in exile, and 
were motivated by the memory of the lost Republic. The latter were Spanish-born and 
products of the student movements in the 60s, and were more interested in pushing 
                                                 
13 Translations of primary and secondary material in the original are mine, unless noted. 
For longer quotations of primary material, I provide the original as well.  Ramón 
Buckley, La doble transición: política y literatura en la España de los años setenta 
(Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 1996), xi. 
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forward the modernization project begun under the Franco regime, as ‘revolutionary’ 
reform. The younger generation began to occupy positions of power in the 70s, which 
culminated in the election of Felipe González as General Secretary in 1974. At this point, 
both sides were still unified around the idea of an eventual social democracy. However, 
during the transición the PSOE split into two camps, the older histórico and younger 
renovado, each advocating different platforms, and the renovado camp even fought to 
keep the other off the ballot.14  
The Unión de Centro Democrático resulted when Franco’s National Movement 
was abolished in 1977.  It was the moderate camp, while the ‘bunker’ formed the Alianza 
Popular. The first was composed of technocrats and Opus Dei members, who were 
conservative but invested in the modernization project begun in the 1960s, while the later 
were more interested in ‘order and security’ through authoritarian rule. The UCD 
disintegrated after the PSOE’s victory in 1982, and its followers, along with the soon to 
be defunct AP, formed the Partido Popular.15 
What is important to recognize, however, is that the PSOE and the UCD did not 
oppose each other, but instead they worked together to institute a liberal democracy. 
However, the freedom and equality guaranteed by a liberal democracy, built to service 
the interests of an expanding free market and bring the Spanish economy more in line 
with the dictates of the Common Market, was by definition reserved for the few. As 
Fredric Jameson points out, the values of “freedom and equality turn out to be unfreedom 
                                                 
14 See José María Maravall, La politica de la transición (Madrid: Taurus, 1982). 
15 See Carlos Huneeus, La Unión de Centro Democrático y la transición a la democracia 
en España (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1985). 
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and inequality” in a liberal democracy.16 They “cannot be realized...[as long as] the 
system that generates them [only as ideals]” still survives.17 As the liberal democracy 
took shape and was eventually instituted, culture became a place of refuge for political 
disruption and disagreement to include the excluded, to give name to the unnamed, to 
represent the non-parts of the whole. Yet, though representations of disorder and 
contingency might have introduced imaginations of democracy into culture, the meaning 
of such activity with respect to disrupting social reality remains to be interrogated, for 
democratic representation does not necessarily translate into democratic actualization.   
Only by the end of this study will an answer to this question be possible.   
What happens in Spain over the years 1975-1982, politically and culturally, 
provides the terrain on which we can cognitively map out the relationship between 
postmodernity and possibilities for democracy within it, both in socio-political reality and 
in socio-cultural representations. The transición is a beginning not only of Spain’s 
democracy but also of its historical entrance into postmodernity, and thus a study of it 
will help shape and inform how the two terms are related, which is not only useful for 
peninsular scholarship, but also for other area studies, or comparative studies, that ask the 
question of what possibilities for democracy might exist in postmodern politics and 
culture.  
There have been, of course, many studies that take on this perplexing question, 
which began in force in the 1990s, and which approached the question from many 
different perspectives. For example, Edward Said has argued against the supposed end of 
                                                 
16 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1991), 261. 
17 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 262-63. 
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narratives of enlightenment and liberation in postmodernity, suggesting instead that 
intellectuals argue in support of a renewed investment in proposing such activity and 
knowledge to bring to light universal and human connections.18 Gayatri Spivak argues 
against the multiculturalism of cultural studies, an academic project taken to be a product 
of postmodernity, in that a shared but dissimilar economic reality faced by multiple 
particularities is obfuscated. However, to imagine any alternative reality outside the 
fragmented present was possibly impossible because one could not emerge from the 
present unblemished, thus suggesting that one should critique the present but remain 
mute as to what might be in the future.19 Terry Eagleton does not advocate a return to 
narratives of enlightenment, nor suggest that one cannot gesture towards a positive 
position with regards to future possibility. Instead, he maintains that one should perform 
a negative evaluation of the present situation in addition to suggesting more appropriate 
means of representing constitutive and political forms of universality to include and 
recognize multiple particularities.20 Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Zizek, two other critics 
of political possibility in postmodernity, will be returned to more fully in the conclusion. 
My study does not approach the transición to reveal a particular or unique quality 
of the Spanish case; in fact, it is from the particular to the universal that I wish to bring a 
consideration of the transición. At issue then is not how the Francoist past, the 
democratic present, and foreseeable future of Spain are intertwined/disconnected as a 
result of continuity/rupture in a Spain-specific way. For this reason, I do not recount the 
                                                 
18 See Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993).  
19 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History 
of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 




history of the transición, offering a historiography to isolate the significance of actual 
events and how they inform Spanish history specifically (place, people, nation, etc.).21 I 
also do not look to the question of the remembrance of Spanish history, a recent field of 
interest that has contributed significantly to rethinking historical recuperation and has 
made Spanish history a multivalent narrative.22 Nor will I explore issues such as memory 
and trauma in representation, which would be central for exploring how contemporary or 
transición culture has or did reveal processes of remembering and forgetting in 
representational form and content, necessary to peninsular studies of culture during or 
following the transition to democracy, which has also produced much engaging and 
insightful scholarship.23 (The exponential growth of such scholarship concerned with the 
transición might be a symptom of the nagging malaise of postmodernity, its uncertain 
                                                 
21 There are many studies of the transición that have been written with this in mind.  See 
Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London; Boston: 
G. Allen & Unwin, 1981), Julián Casanova et al., La transición a la democracia en 
España: Actas de las VI Jornadas de Castilla-La Mancha sobre Investigación en 
Archivos, Guadalajara, 4-7 de noviembre 2003 (Guadalajara: ANABAD Castilla-La 
Mancha, 2004), Santos Juliá, Origines sociales de la democracia en España (Madrid: 
Marcial Pons, 1994), Charles S. Maier and Santos Juliá, Democracia y España (Madrid: 
Voz de los sin voz, 1995).  
22 See Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil 
War in the Transition to Democracy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), Santos Juliá, 
"Echar al olvido: memoria y amnistía en la transición a la democracia en España," Claves 
de razón práctica, no. 129 (2003). 
23 See Del franquismo a la posmodernidad: cultura española 1975-1990, ed. José B. 
Monleón and Carlos Blanco Aguinaga (Torrejón de Ardoz: Akal, 1995), Ofelia Ferrán, 
Working through Memory: Writing and Remembrance in Contemporary Spanish 
Narrative (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2007), Jo Labanyi, Constructing 
Identity in Contemporary Spain: Theoretical Debates and Cultural Practices (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), Cristina Moreiras Menor, Cultura herida: literatura y 
cine en la España democrática (Madrid: Ediciones Libertarias, 2002), Joan Ramon 
Resina, Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish 
Transition to Democracy (Amsterdam; Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000), Eduardo Subirats, 
Intransiciones: crítica de la cultura española (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002), Teresa 
M. Vilarós, El mono del desencanto: una crítica cultural de la transición española 
(1973-1993) (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 1998). 
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and dissatisfying democracies, I might add, for which this study is not a cure, though it 
does hope to offer a diagnosis).  
I am focused on the historical happening of the transición, the fact that it occurred 
in the late 1970s when the organization of Western economies was dramatically changed 
following the oil crisis, the collapse of Bretton Woods and the gold standard, the 
burgeoning of the global market, and the end to all revolutions in Western Europe with 
the rise of Eurocommunism and the turn to democratic socialism, both of which 
envisioned significant political change to come from internal reforms to the State. I will 
build out from the historical events of the transición, and not turn inward to find the 
Spanish essence they contain.  I do this in order to use the transición as a case study to 
search for possibilities of democracy in postmodernity: both in the institution of a liberal 
democracy and in the creation of symbolic spaces of emancipation, that is, in both the 
socio-political and the socio-cultural spheres.  
It is important to note, however, that the transición was not one simple 
movement, and that these transitions in politics and culture did not happen all at once, for 
there were distinct periods within each transition. The signification given to and taken 
from democracy in politics is distinct at the beginning of the transición and its end, which 
I will address in the second and fourth chapters. To trace this movement I will analyze 
and interpret the writings of Eduardo Haro Tecglen in Triunfo. Triunfo—one of the most 
important weeklies of the day, and the most ‘neutral’ as it was not committed to an 
ideological viewpoint, as were others like Cuadernos para el Diálogo (socialist/Christian 
democratic), El Viejo Topo (Marxist), and Fuerza Nueva (fascist/Falangist)—continually 
asked if the democracy being actualized would lead to a flourishing of political 
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opposition and a securing of freedom and equality, which were taken to be fundamental. 
Cambio 16 was also not affiliated with a particular ideological perspective, and they were 
very dedicated to the institution of democracy as well.  However, as announced in the 
lead editorial of their first issue, they were primarily interested in analyzing the 
“economic reality inside of the social totality,” as they were focused more on the socio-
economic and not the socio-political, which was more Triunfo’s concern.24  
For Triunfo, the initial period from 1975-1977 was one of intense questioning of 
what is meant by ‘democracy,’ of what it consists and what it requires to exist.  Answers 
were provided by a group of writers, but instead of coalescing around a certain 
ideological perspective, there were a collection of different ideological perspectives: the 
somewhat Christian democrat Enrique Miret Magdalena, the ambivalent Marxist Manuel 
Vázquez Montalbán, the almost anarchist Fernando Savater, and the nostalgic republican 
Eduardo Haro Tecglen, to name but the most influential and longstanding.  
Admittedly, Triunfo was not some unbiased objective account of the transición, 
and certainly most cast their votes for the socialist PSOE or the communist PCE,25 but 
these parties do not elude criticism; in fact, they are the targets of most invectives. This is 
                                                 
24 See "Editorial," Cambio 16, no. 0 (October 1971): 5. 
25 The Partido Comunista de España had undergone a significant reconstitution in the 60s 
and early 70s.  With Santiago Carrillo made General Secretary in 1960, the PCE was put 
on a path towards Eurocommunism, which was the attempt to distance the party from the 
USSR and repackage it as a party willing to work within a multiparty plurality for reform.  
In 1964, the PCE officially renounced armed struggle to overthrow the Franco regime 
and vowed to work for national reconciliation.  This shift caused fissures at first, and then 
splintered it into many groups, including Marxist-Leninist, Maoists, Workers’ Party 
subgroups. They all distanced themselves from the PCE’s project of national 
reconciliation, and some began to carry out clandestine attacks against the military and 
police in the hopes of provoking a revolution.  See Gregorio Morán, Miseria y grandeza 
del Partido Comunista de España, 1939-1985 (Barcelona: Planeta, 1986), Eusebio 
Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1983). 
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important to note, for at the time, ideological neutrality was a coveted designation to 
grant legitimacy to one’s critique of the transición, which unabashedly, some hard-line 
rightists like Manuel Fraga Iribarne tried to claim. For example, he wrote:  
No other country has had experiences as complete as ours, whether in the 
exploration of the limits of anarchy or in the impossible intent to restore 
the spiritual and social order of the Middle Ages.  Now we have to come 
face to face with reality.  And as we speak clearly, neither Fuerza Nueva 
nor Triunfo gives us the answer.  
[Ningún pais ha hecho unas experiencias tan completas como el nuestro, 
ni en el explorar los límites de la anarquía ni en el imposible intento de 
restaurar el orden espiritual y social de Medioevo.  Ahora tenemos que 
enfrentarnos con la realidad. Y hablemos claro: ni “Fuerza Nueva” ni 
“Triunfo” nos dan la respuesta.]26   
 
Fraga’s attack was absurd, but he was right to distrust Triunfo’s answer, for it was 
nothing less than that Francoism had ended and that a rupture was necessary so as to 
allow a new present to flourish, which suggested as well that the end was near for 
officials like Fraga. Triunfo had already fired the first salvo in April of 1975 (before 
Franco’s death) in an article proclaiming that fascism should be understood less as an 
ideology, and more as a form of power requiring unique historical circumstances and an 
eternal leader.27  The article went on to say that Spanish society must prepare for the 
inevitable ruptura that would occur once Franco had died, which required an organizing 
of the people to guide the process from the bottom up and not from the top down as did 
the regime. The suggestion that ordinary citizens should occupy positions of power 
instead of officials of the regime might have provoked Fraga’s ire, and it most certainly 
caused the regime discomfort, for Triunfo was forced to shut down for four months after 
                                                 
26 The original quote is from Ya, 31 July 1975, which is quoted in "Fraga inventa su 
centro: "Entre 'Triunfo' y 'Fuerza Nueva'"," Triunfo, no. 674 (30 August 1975): 15. 




this article was published. However, when it returned in January of 1976, it seemed to 
respond even more forcefully to Fraga’s question of how to understand the new reality, 
dashing its cover with “LA RESPUESTA DEMOCRÁTICA” (THE DEMOCRATIC 
ANSWER).   
The ‘democratic answer’ to the new reality of post-Franco Spain, as to how it 
should be structured and organized, became Triunfo’s primary concern. While it is not 
possible to explore in depth the volume of articles that this weekly produced, it is the 
intent here to provide a general sense of how Triunfo functioned to critique the institution 
and imagination of democracy during the transición by focusing on the lead editorials 
written each week by Haro Tecglen. There was always the question, and significant doubt 
as the transición proceeded, of whether or not the form of democracy being instituted 
was democratic enough. As Alicia Alted Vigil puts it, confronted with “the weight of a 
reality that since its recent historical beginnings spoiled the imagined and dreamed of 
change,” Triunfo and Haro Tecglen put themselves in service of critiquing what the 
Spanish democracy became.28  
More than the other writers, Haro Tecglen’s critical perspective began to shift as 
the weight of this reality created more imbalances and disparities than a leveling of the 
field.29 There are compelling cases to be made for other writers, who were active critics 
of both the transición and the democracy, but they did not evidence the bifocal 
                                                 
28 Alicia Alted Vigil, "Del olvido y recuperación de la memoria," in Triunfo en su época: 
jornadas organizadas en la Casa Velázquez los días 26 y 27 de octubre de 1992, ed. 
Alicia Alted Vigil and Paul Aubert (Madrid: École des hautes études hispaniques; Casa 
de Velázquez; Ediciones Pléyades, 1995), 309. 
29 See Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Cómo liquidaron el franquismo en dieciséis meses y 
un día (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Crónica sentimental de 
España (Barcelona: Lumen, 1971), Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Crónica sentimental de 
la transición (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985).  
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imagination of Haro Tecglen, as they were consistent throughout in their approach and 
perspective. A good example of this is the skeptical criticism of Manuel Vázquez 
Montalbán, who also wrote for Triunfo. Juan Goytisolo was also an active critic and 
occasional writer in Triunfo, but he always approached the question of Spain from 
outside, seeing it with ‘exilic’ and individual eyes.30   
What makes Haro Tecglen most interesting is that once there was a liberal 
democracy instituted, his perspective shifted from an initial optimism for democratic 
possibility to a mournful critique of the liberal democracy’s demolishing of political 
opposition. These later writings demarcate a second period of the transición, from 1977-
1982, when a disenchantment with the depoliticization of the socio-political started to 
mark the page. At this point, his writings were no longer directed at giving form to social 
imaginary significations of what the democracy might be. Instead, they began to warn of 
the unfreedom and inequality inherent in a liberal democracy and, eventually, to explore 
how the practice of consensual politics stymied political possibility.  I shall follow this 
shift in Haro Tecglen to tell the history of how the self-reflexive imagination of 
democracy began to diminish in the practice of politics.  
This is not to say that there was no longer, tout court, a reflection on the 
shortcomings or successes of democracy, for as Castoriadis points out 
democracy consists in this, that society does not halt before a conception, 
given once and for all, of what is just, equal, or free but rather institutes 
itself in such a way that the question of freedom, of justice, of equity, and 
of equality might always be posed anew.31   
 
                                                 
30 See Juan Goytisolo, Libertad, libertad, libertad (Barcelona: Anagrama, 1978). 
31 Castoriadis, "The Greek and Modern Political Imaginary," 87. 
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However, with the depoliticization of opposition in politics, there was not any self-
reflexivity to be found in this socio-political sphere near the end of the transición. A 
politics of consensus is not a process of critical reflection and does not work to redefine 
the signification of democracy: of what it should consist of outside of what is already 
inscribed. With “the general retreat into conformism,” there was no longer the necessary 
contestation or disagreement to fuel critical reflection in politics.32  In culture, however, 
the questioning of freedom, justice, equity, and equality was becoming a possibility just 
as the liberal democracy was becoming immutable. The limits and shortcomings of the 
liberal democracy, the gap between the powerful and the powerless, and the interests of 
those previously unrepresentable were beginning to be projected on the film screen near 
the end of the transición.  
As Walter Benjamin writes, “a different nature opens itself to the camera than 
opens to the naked eye—if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted 
for a space consciously explored by man.”33 Cinema can have us imagine reality 
differently by displaying a social unity of individuals informed by forms of value, beliefs, 
and desires in a spatio-temporal reality separated from actual reality. Benjamin suggests, 
however, that there is an overlap, in sensation and understanding, between diegetic reality 
and social reality, and that while we may experience the latter somewhat unconsciously, 
we bring conscious attention to the former.  If the conscious reflection is then brought to 
bear in reality after having been summoned and awakened by cinema, a critical 
                                                 
32 Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Retreat from Autonomy: Postmodernism as Generalized 
Conformism," in World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and 
the Imagination, ed. David Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 42. 
33 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in 
Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 237. 
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possibility opens up for the experience of reality. A critical reflection of reality is 
possible if looked upon now with eyes consciously exploring its space and time after 
being trained by the conceptualization and imagination of diegetic reality. As Jacques 
Rancière says, reality “must be fictionalized to be thought,” for which films provide: “a 
double resource of the silent imprint that speaks and the montage that calculates the 
values of truth and the potential for producing meaning.”34 The imprint of reality speaks 
still, but what it speaks of is given new meaning through cinematic representation. The 
potential of a different experience of democracy outside of the liberal democracy is 
possibly provided by the cinematic apparatus, offering an alternative reality positing new 
values, freedoms, and visions of equity and equality continuously anew. This is 
conceptually different than other narrative experiences, such as when reading a novel,35 
for cinema deals more with the social than with the individual, whereas much like Proust 
suggests, “each reader, when reading, is the proper reader of himself...to discern in the 
book what he might not have seen in himself.”36  
The number of films during the transición that made explicit socio-political or 
political reference numbered 132, which accounted for roughly 20% of the total output of 
                                                 
34 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London; 
New York: Continuum, 2004), 38. 
35 Individual experiences and identities were rewritten ideologically and historically as 
protagonists moved through the past and negotiated the present. See, in particular, Juan 
Goytisolo, Juan sin tierra (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1975), Juan Marsé, Si te dicen que caí 
(Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1976), Jorge Semprún, Autobiografía de Federico Sanchez 
(Barcelona: Planeta, 1977). See also Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Los Mares del sur 
(Barcelona: Planeta, 1979). Though somewhat different because it is a ‘detective’ novel, 
critical perception and investigation of the social space are still carried out through 
individual activity. 
36 Marcel Proust, Le Temps retrouvé (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 217-18.  
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films.37  Of course, this does not include films with indirect reference to the socio-
political or political, which would include each and every one, as all cultural artifacts are 
imprinted with marks of their material history, thus any such reference could be located 
through interpretative means.  Instead, only films making explicit reference are a 
concern, for this study seeks to outline how democracy was expressly engaged by films 
from the transición’s beginning to its end. Two primary means of directly questioning 
and representing what democracy signified were evidenced in documentary films and 
melodramas. I will analyze and interpret melodramatic representations of democracy, for 
they reveal a radical reversal in how the melodramatic mode was employed, which occurs 
in relation to the institution of a liberal democracy over the course of the transición.  Just 
as there was a transition in politics, there was also a transition in melodramatic 
representations of democracy, a transition which is differentiated in chapters three and 
five.  
At the beginning of the transición, there can be discerned melodramatic 
representations of democracy as a demos formed around a common ethos, a universality 
construed as a ‘people’ by an ethical essence that was shared by all. These can be 
understood as representational means to provide order, at least for the diegetic reality, 
determined through a clear-cut distinction between good and evil. Such representations of 
democracy imagined the good to be a national reconciliation, threatened by the evil of 
political opposition, visions appearing against the backdrop of an uncertain social reality, 
given the initial fears that democracy would only be a possibility. Films, such as Jamie 
Camino’s Las largas vacaciones del 36 and Pedro Olea’s Pim, pam, pum... ¡fuego!, 
                                                 
37 Antonio Dopazo, "La transición democrática en el cine español," in El cine y la 
transición política española (Valencia: Filmoteca Valenciana, 1986), 48. 
 
21 
projected a political desire to break from the past taken to be still very much present, a 
past marked by ideological conflict and societal divisions.38  
Yet, as the liberal democracy was taking root, some melodramas, such as Pedro 
Almodovar’s Pepi, Luci, Bom y otras chicas del montón and Eloy de la Iglesia’s 
Navajeros, began to invert the mode to disrupt and disorder any national identity or 
reconciled society proposed for the present, not because democracy was not desired, but 
because the liberal democracy taking shape did not include all parts of society into the 
whole.  That is, just as there was a social order being imposed, there can be detected a 
shift in some melodrama towards representing either the inclusion of new identities not 
accounted for, or how the liberal democracy still excluded certain particularities from the 
universal society that it proposed. The melodramatic mode, as an aesthetic of 
reconciliation or order, was upset from within to insert new values, norms, meanings and 
identities into diegetic reality, employing its mode of excess to an excessive degree in 
which any narrative order was disallowed. This was not an aesthetic resolution to societal 
divisions, but instead was an aesthetic disruption of representing the social as universal, 
immutable, or complete; in short, what was represented was a different imagination of 
democracy, as contingent and in flux, which could be read as similar to how ‘post-
modern’ political theory imagines political possibility for postmodernity.  
                                                 
38 The distinction between ‘ethics’ and ‘politics’ in relationship to a liberal democracy 
has been addressed by, among others, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek.  See Alain Badiou, 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (London; New York: Verso, 2001), Slavoj 
Zizek, "From Politics to Biopolitics... and Back," The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 
2/3 (Spring/Summer 2004).  They identify the ideology of human rights as, respectively, 
a division of the global world into helpless victims and villainous benefactors, or between 
charitable cases and accumulating capitalists. This is different than the victims and 
villains represented during the transición, but is still relevant in that they critique 
inequality and unfreedom being approached as ethical instead of political issues.   
 
22 
By following this movement, I will explore why an ethics for national 
reconciliation and identity was represented at a time when democracy was only a 
possibility, and why this was then followed by representations of a cultural politics to 
demonstrate the particularity of specific segments of society, or the exclusion of them in 
the social order because of the liberal democracy. Along the way, I will read and view the 
interrelationship of these transitions in politics and culture, and interrogate what they 
signify about political possibility in postmodernity. While the names and events that will 
be referenced will be specific to Spain, the conclusions are not to be limited to its 
particular case. The Spanish transición helps us understand what possibilities for 
democracy exist in postmodernity, specifically because it allows for an analysis of a 
political transition towards a liberal democracy as well as a cultural transition to an 
alternative imagination of democracy in opposition to the former.  Instead of probing 
within an already constituted postmodern democracy, the case of Spain—with its strange 
confluence of both a pursuit of a political modernity (reconciling or eliding the clashes 
and conflict between a type of fascism and those of socialism and communism) and a 
cultural postmodernism (the turn to represent fragmented and fluid identities)—reveals 
dramatic political and cultural transitions as they happen during Spain’s transition into 
postmodernity.   
There seems to a desire—academically, politically, socially, culturally—to move 
beyond the postmodern (only announced in 1979 by Jean-François Lyotard “as 
incredulity toward metanarratives,” but which has already, and inevitably, become its 
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own recognizable ‘metanarrative’ more than ever).39 The transición offers an opportunity 
to think our way out of postmodernity’s eternal present. Though I will not gesture 
towards future realization but only future possibility, I hope at least to expose the 
permeability of what seems like the closed system of liberal democracy by locating 
potential political possibilities in cultural representations, which might gesture towards a 
more democratic form of democracy, for its promise still allures and confounds. Possibly 
the melodramatic mode, and its disruption and disorder, offers a counter to the politics of 
consensus that seems to foreclose political possibility; perhaps, they gesture towards 
“dissensus,” to use Jacques Rancière’s term: “a gap in the sensible...a dissensus about the 
givens of a particular situation.”40  Do they symbolize then, not only a contestion of what 
is given, but also a location of political possibility for some other form of democracy 
beyond our particular situation? 
As Castoriadis states, if politics become a practice of conformism and consensus, 
the form of democracy instituted in the socio-political sphere is “a tragic regime.”41 The 
different sort of democracy imagined in the aesthetic sphere during the transición, as 
rupture and contingency, introducing non-parts and demanding the inclusion of the 
unseen and unheard in through the interstices, appears on the surface to bring into being 
dissensus, “making visible the fact that [one] belong[s] to a shared world that the other 
                                                 
39 Lyotard provides the first epistemo-philosophical definition of the ‘postmodern’, see 
Jean-François Lyotard, La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir (Paris: Éditions 
de Minuit, 1979).  That what is called ‘postmodern’ today is so varied that either 
everything or nothing counts further complicates things, and also announces the anxiety 
with and within ‘postmodernity’. In translation see Jean-François Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984), xxiii-xxv, 71-82.  
40 Jacques Rancière and Davide  Panagia, "Dissenting Words: A Conversation with 
Jacques Rancière," Diacritics 30, no. 2 (Summer, 2000): 124. 
41 Castoriadis, "The Greek and Modern Political Imaginary," 93. 
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does not see.” 42 It remains to be seen whether such dissensus in representation, without 
possibly a corresponding dissensus in social reality, serves as a counter to our 
contemporary hubris in imagining that we actually live in a democratic society or under a 
democratic State. 
The question quite simply is this: is there a future for political possibility if it only 
survives in representation but is absent from reality? Or, does a democracy require 
political ruptures, continuously and critically, in both the socio-political and the socio-
cultural spheres? As Reinhart Koselleck notes, “it is the tension between [past] 
experience and [future] expectation which, in ever-changing patterns, brings out new 
resolutions and through this generates historical time.”43 Liberal democracy’s promise of 
progress, a reduction of “the temporal difference between experience and expectation to a 
single concept,” seems to smooth over any tension between experience and expectation 
by reducing history to an eternal present.44 Can cultural representations alone propel 
historical time, generating gaps in the sensible by introducing unknown and unseen 
perspectives of experience? Or is it that culture can help to perceive and conceive of 
alternate expectations for the future, but without a politics to institute the means of 
arriving there, then it is quite difficult to have new resolutions in a contingent reality? It 
could be that the restart of historical time requires that the experience of progress—the 
eternal present of a liberal democracy—becomes a future past, a past expectation for the 
future that has been superceded not only in culture but in politics as well.  
                                                 
42 Jacques Rancière, "Ten Theses on Politics," Theory & Event 5, no. 3 (2001), 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.3ranciere.html. 
43 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), 262. 
44 Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 268. 
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It could be that history once again will be thought of historically, for there is a 
mood in the air that the future will not be more of the same, but instead is ominously 
silent and unclear.  It seems that our postmodern present stands upon the edge of a new 
temporality, and as Koselleck states, “the more a particular time is experienced as a new 
temporality... the more that demands made of the future increase.”45 This study asks that 
we reconsider democracy and political possibility in politics and culture, looking to past 
experience to articulate expectations for the future, to transition towards new resolutions 
in history. José Ortega y Gasset, prefacing the first issue of the Revista de Occidente, 
while staring out into the future from the precipice of his present with the past at his back, 
suggested in 1923 that there was an “excitement of departing, the tremor of the unknown 
adventure, the illusion of arriving, and the fear of getting lost.”46 Now we may be about 
to embark upon another adventure, full of excitement, full of doubt, one we might call the 
pursuit of democracy in postmodernity.   
 
                                                 
45 Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 3. 
46 Quoted in Ernesto Laclau, "Democracy and the Question of Power," Constellations 8, 














 Thoughts about the possibility of democracy after the end of the regime had 
circulated before the transición.  During the apertura (‘opening’) of the late 1960s and 
the dictablanda (‘soft dictatorship’) of the early 1970s, censorship strictures were relaxed 
(though the relaxation of these strictures was countermanded whenever the State felt like 
it had to demonstrate its might and quell too vocal protests) and cultural journals were 
able to suggest, subtly, that Francoism might not last forever. José Ángel Ezcurra, 
director of Triunfo from its beginning to its end, describes its critical methodology as 
writing a metalanguage to read its readers metaphorically.47 In Triunfo  
one sought the complicity of the reader through a metalanguage that 
served to communicate implicit analogies of time and space, that is of 
History and international politics, which were metaphoric instruments to 
analyze life as it truly was in our country from the perspective of what had 
come to be called that of the intellectual left.48    
 
                                                 
47 For a fascinating account of Ezcurra’s history, starting with the first inception of 
Triunfo as a film journal in 1946, the creation of the influential film journals Objectivo 
(1953-55) and Nuestro Cine (1961-70), and the recreation of Triunfo as a socio-cultural 
magazine in 1962 see José Ángel Ezcurra, "Crónica de un empeño dificultoso," in 
Triunfo en su época: jornadas organizadas en la Casa Velázquez los días 26 y 27 de 
octubre de 1992, ed. Alicia Alted Vigil and Paul Aubert (Madrid: École des hautes études 
hispaniques; Casa de Velázquez; Ediciones Pléyades, 1995). 
48 José Ángel Ezcurra, "Apuntes para una historia," in Triunfo en su época: jornadas 
organizadas en la Casa Velázquez los días 26 y 27 de octubre de 1992, ed. Alicia Alted 
Vigil and Paul Aubert (Madrid: École des hautes études hispaniques; Casa de Velázquez; 
Ediciones Pléyades, 1995), 46-47. 
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Especially important for this study is the beginning of Triunfo’s political criticism during 
the transicion until financial problems forced its demise in 1982, a period that Ezcurra 
describes as one of critical freedom and examination. Though Spain was confined to its 
Francoist prison, Triunfo imagined the socio-political contexts of its democratic 
European neighbors as its own. As Teresa Vilarós states:  
the deployed positions in the social struggle against the dictatorial 
apparatus of Francoism, which Triunfo and other similar journals gave 
voice to, had been studied above all as responding to a feeling of “being 
outside” of the global circuit of politics.49   
 
This international/national metalanguage spoken from deployed positions did not take 
explicitly political form, for such articulations would not have had much chance for 
circulation.50 Articles and editorials became increasingly more political towards the end 
of the regime, when Spanish leaders and Spanish politics were criticized more openly, 
especially after Franco diminished his control in the early 70s, and after the regime 
suffered a severe blow with the assassination of Franco’s handpicked successor, Luis 
Carrero Blanco, in 1973.  Publications such as Triunfo and Cambio 16 tested the limits of 
what was permissible, and sometimes found themselves facing fines, censure, and 
suspension. 
To avoid such governmental countermeasures, comments about the limited 
lifespan of Francoism were made through reference and analogy.  Comparisons were 
made between the growing consumerism in Spain with that found in other Western 
nations, or how Spain was experiencing the same late-modern cultural movements of 
                                                 
49 Vilarós, El mono del desencanto, 64.   
50 See the section entitled “La prensa en el segundo franquismo” in Jordi Gracia García 
and Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer, La España de Franco (1939-1975): Cultura y vida 
cotidiana (Madrid: Síntesis, 2001), 303-08.    
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other democratic societies.  By presenting the similarities between Spain and Europe or 
America in cultural production and the driving force of consumerism behind it, or the 
overlap between artistic movements like the New Spanish Cinema or the New Novel and 
their Western cousins, and at the same time criticizing the national politics of the West 
except Spain’s, Triunfo did perform a type of criticism by having the reader reflect on its 
absence from the material page.  As Ezcurra states, “Triunfo constituted itself as a 
platform to stimulate the freedom of criticism, of unfettered examination... preferring to 
use cultural means to come to understand and know this freedom.”51  Cultural criticism 
was the avenue open to critics at the time to articulate an alternative understanding of 
Spanish culture, but also to make oblique references to the socio-political context, for 
which they relied upon the reader to perform the necessary inferential leap. As Vilarós 
points out, Triunfo’s peculiar “symbolic/ideological/social” apparatus presented Spanish 
culture as if “it denotes the possibility of achieving a substantial value identical to the rest 
of the West in a future that one already begins to see as near and real,” a future fulfilled 
by the conversion of democracy as an idea into a reality. 52 
The imagination of a future with a different practice of politics and the possibility 
of democracy could be written in between the lines through reference to the ongoing 
struggles of the Cold War in Cuba or Vietnam, the dynamics of the left and right in the 
United States or the rest of Europe, or to other dictatorships. While Triunfo had to leave 
unsaid how Spain’s practice of politics either differed or was similar to these other 
contexts, a commentary about the Spanish situation could still be made.  This became 
even more explicit after 1973 when Luis Carrero Blanco was assassinated. Carrero 
                                                 
51 Ezcurra, "Apuntes para una historia," 49.  
52 Vilarós, El mono del desencanto, 63. 
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Blanco wanted to halt and contain the increasing liberalization of society as a result of the 
economic boom throughout the 1960s. He also dealt severely with any form of dissent. 
His death was a blow to the regime unlike any other before because it was the first 
successful violent attack against its leadership. The assassination was also the first 
successful ETA operation of such magnitude, which catapulted it and the issue of 
regional autonomy onto the national stage.53  
Franco’s next choice, Carlos Arias Navarro, made his espíritu del 12 de febrero 
address in 1974, which promised concessions such as political associations (not parties), 
relaxed censorship, and electoral reforms that would give the populace more control over 
electoral representation instead of simply voting yes or no in referendums (though there 
was no mention of elections). The end of the regime was less imaginary, almost tangible, 
and journals began publishing political critiques that began to toe and even cross the line. 
The question of a new state was referenced much less subtly, and politics began to be 
considered independently of culture. However, this happened in spurts as the government 
alternated between liberalization and repression, which was characteristic of Arias 
Navarro’s reign as president, for he just as often bowed to the pressure from the hard-
liner ‘bunker’ not to institute change, many of whom, it must be noted, he had chosen for 
leadership roles and did not simply inherit.  
A fractured, schizophrenic state, led by a smattering of the more economic-
minded and those sounding slogans from the Civil War, alternated between repression 
and relaxation, which consequently weakened the disciplinary arm of the regime because 
its lacked the unabashedly brutal approach to dissent that characterized the Carrero 
                                                 
53 For a historical overview and analysis of the Carrero Blanco years, see Preston, The 
Triumph of Democracy in Spain, 18-52. 
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Blanco years. At this point, policing the social body was not an easy matter for the 
regime, for its ‘enemy’ was less an ideological foe from the Civil War like the republican 
maquís than an amalgam of opposition composed of workers, ethnic and regional groups 
like ETA, or university students. As Paul Preston argues, Arias Navarro was unable to 
mediate the various demands within the regime, often walking “a tight-rope between the 
wishes of the reformists and those of the bunker, while all the time the problems of the 
opposition pressure, labour militancy and terrorism grew unchecked.” 54  
The limits imposed by censorship or punishment were more easily crossed in this 
context.  In Triunfo, the political question of how democracy might take root in Spain 
began to be asked.  Direct comparisons were made between the case of Spain and 
transitions unfolding in nearby Portugal and Greece, which of course were the only other 
countries in Western Europe still controlled by authoritarian governments. These 
countries’ attempts and struggles to institute democratic governments were treated as 
examples to be learned from and to imagine the eventuality of Spain’s own transition.  
That is, the question of a democracy was not a matter of if but when, and what remained 
to be done. Eduardo Haro Tecglen, writing in August of 1974, posited the question as 
such:  
The political is always very slow and conservative to act, in general terms, 
and usually responds to historical changes well after the fact. Great 
political changes are generally produced many years after they are 
necessary and only when social classes are sufficiently convinced of the 
necessity for change, even though these changes would have served 
everyone best earlier on.  They are finally made in resignation and with 
fear... As such, it happens that political changes are made by those classes 
that at first did not try to change anything only after already much 
irreparable damage has been done.  
                                                 
54 Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, 56.   
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[La política es siempre muy lenta y muy conservadora (en términos 
generales), y suele ir con una situación de retraso.  Los grandes cambios se 
producen generalmente muchos años después de ser necesarios, cuando 
los estamentos están sobradamente impregnados de la necesidad de 
cambiar, aunque sea en su conveniencia: se producen por resignación y 
con miedo....De esta forma, sucede que cuando el cambio se produce, 
muchas veces se han producido ya daños irreparables, precisamente para 
los mismos estamentos que tratan de no cambiar.]55 
 
Haro Tecglen not only offered an insightful dissection of the situations in Greece and 
Portugal, but provided a much bolder commentary on the specifically political situation 
in Spain. This quote and the majority of the article functioned as a direct attack on the 
entrenched autocratic elite in Spain as well as a call to moderates within the regime to use 
their power to bring about democratic change instead of remaining passive in the face of 
the hard-line bunker of the right.   
Furthermore, fascism is declared to be an ideology that has become historically 
irrelevant because of the shift towards a consumer society in Spain.  Haro Tecglen gave 
three reasons:  
Without doubt, its harsh and repressive control of people does not 
correspond to the demands of a consumer society that requires some 
liberties and a certain autonomous individual to consume... In addition, 
there is no revolutionary threat from the left that would require the police 
state of fascism to control and contain such a threat... The third factor is 
that of the mold of international relations based on the notion of 
coexistence.  
[Sin duda, no corresponde su mecanismo de sociedad dura y represiva en 
la sociedad de consumo que requiere el funcionamiento de unas libertades 
y de una cierta autonomía individual del consumidor... No existe, por otra 
parte, una tensión revolucionaria de izquierdas que requiera la policía del 
fascismo para ser reprimida... El tercer factor es el del molde de las 
relaciones internacionales, basadas en la coexistencia.]56 
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Haro Tecglen made clear the contradictions inherent in the Spanish government’s intent 
of continuing to develop a consumer society while also continuing to control society 
using the same repressive tools even though the threat of ‘revolution’ has long been made 
irrelevant by ideological shifts in history. Haro Tecglen was explicit in demonstrating 
that the tremendous push for international markets and economic policies based upon 
increased consumerism, and the weakening of the left and a growing conservatism 
throughout Western Europe since the end of World War II, led to a new practice of 
politics. A new world of interconnected consumer societies (the establishment of 
contemporary globalization) had been formed, which made the continuation of the regime 
historically unnecessary, if not impossible, for Francoism was rooted in a past ordered by 
now irrelevant social and economic relations, which was known by both sides along the 
power divide even if it wasn’t openly declared.  As Haro Tecglen stated, “for the moment 
the various forms of fascism are not viable. Those who try to perpetuate them, sometimes 
with success by means of convenient disguises, know as well.”57  
This is not to say that fascism was forever banished to the past, for the inequalities 
fostered by a consumerist, capitalist economic system could again foment thoughts of 
radical change and upheaval, circumstances that aid fascism as much as 
‘revolutionaryism’ in organizing forces. If inequalities widened too much between social 
classes, there would then exist the possibility that “ideas of revolution will reappear and 
consequently fascist responses will follow, whether or not the lesson of their unsuitability 
and their delayed capacity for true solutions” was learned.58 By Haro Tecglen’s 
reckoning, revolutionary ideas are a response to inequalities in society, and fascism is a 
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reaction to such ideas in order to preserve the status quo.  The Franco regime reacted to 
the policies of the 2nd Republic enacted to reduce the gap between the powerless majority 
and the elite landowners and industrial capitalists. Attempts of unionizing or 
redistributing land, for example, were considered revolutionary threats against which 
rightist and corporatist groups like the Falange and its Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-
Sindicalismo (Councils of the National-Syndicalism Offensive) wanted to stamp out back 
in 1936.  However, the socio-economic backdrop in 1974 was composed of new 
relations, ones built around the idea of a consumer society, thus making this particular 
version of fascism outdated.   That is, the unique fascism of the Franco regime should no 
longer structure society, thus it was time to look for different political avenues to 
construct a new state and society.   
Haro Tecglen argued that only a new state form can negotiate the new sets of 
conflicts brought about by the contemporary inequalities generated by 
consumerism/capitalism (which also means that even if a new form of fascism were to 
spring up in reaction to attempts of reducing inequalities by means of a new state form, it 
would be historically distinct from the Franco regime which was designed to counter the 
2nd Republic). Drawing upon the examples of Portugal and Greece, and their “change of 
regime[s] without revolution or blood: a demonstration that violent compulsions are 
absent in contemporary Europe,” Haro Tecglen concluded that it was possible to 
transition away from fascist regimes and create States that would more closely resemble 
those of Western Europe.59 In describing how Portugal and Greece managed their 
transitions, and not specifically mentioning Francoism, Haro Tecglen suggests that there 
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is a future beyond the present of an authoritarian State, which would apply to Spain as 
well. 
He identified elements for a non-revolutionary transition, such as a pact to quell 
any fears by the regime’s leadership concerning accountability for past actions, a 
transitional government tipped strongly towards the right and the interests of the elite, so 
as to not upset the power structure too much at first, and one which also conceded just 
enough to the left and the young (those now imagining the possibility of the future) so 
that these marginal groups would participate in the transitional process:  
the change has been the result of a pact... that has managed to demand the 
security of all those members pertaining to the previous regime... and has 
formed a government that is backed by the right and the older generations 
while giving some measure of concession to a weak left and the younger 
generations. 
[el cambio ha sido fruto de un pacto... ha debido exigir la seguridad de 
todas las personas pertenecientes al Régimen anterior... ha formado un 
Gobierno con enorme peso de la derecha y de las clases de edad avanzada, 
con alguna concesión a una izquierda suave y a algún joven.]60  
 
Haro Tecglen was careful to point out that these are only first steps, and that a transition 
would also have to take account of the still pressing matters regarding the return of exiles 
and the liberation of political prisoners. The push and pull to meet these other demands, 
the  discouragement of reactionary responses, the patience to see the process through in 
hopes of bringing about real change, the attempts to break from the past—these are taken 
to be necessary for a transition away from an authoritarian regime.  The only measure of 
a transition’s success would be if it managed to leave the conflicts of the past behind and 
secure a democratic future, which the transition in Greece had yet to attain: “The fall of 
Fascism...is a fact; the restoration of some liberties, as well.  But only the development of 
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many more advanced successes in Greece can return to it the enjoyment of an authentic 
democracy.”61  
Haro Tecglen’s reading of a transition away from an authoritarian regime to a 
democracy in 1974 establishes a beginning point from which to begin a consideration of 
Spain’s entrance into the postmodern age and its construction of a certain ‘democracy.’ 
That he is able to openly conceive of democracy within the Spanish context, of a new 
social imaginary signification for it to institute and claim, already reveals the “rupture of 
the closure of signification” that Castoriadis singles out as the break from past norms and 
laws and the “unlimited interrogation” of what should now be instituted.62  In just over a 
year, Spain would begin its transition, and Haro Tecglen would write in situ new social 
imaginary significations for the concept of ‘democracy.’ He took it as certain that the 
Spanish politics would bring about real change—democracy instead of dictatorship—
once Franco had fallen. The question is: how would history affect what he imagined as 
‘political’ or ‘democracy’ signifying? The anti-Francoists had always believed that, 
eventually, a democracy would be realized. Haro Tecglen labeled himself as a member of 
this opposition.  Yet as Spain stumbled into the postmodern world and erected a liberal 
democracy, how would the ideas of ‘opposition,’ ‘democracy,’ and the ‘political’ in 
politics and cultural politics be impacted by history and shifts on both sides of the 
ideological divide? The political criticism in the pages of Triunfo during the transición 
provides some answers.  
The ability to perform political criticism on the part of the press after Franco’s 
death no longer required that politics only be discussed as a matter of culture, as for 
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example during the apertura of the 1960s and the dictablanda of the early 1970s.63 Then 
politics could not be openly discussed, and thus it fell upon cultural criticism to subtly 
reference the socio-political situation.  Cultural criticism was a vehicle to gesture towards 
reality through an analysis and interpretation of its representation. For example, the 
cultural criticism in the film journals, Objetivo, from 1953-55, and Nuestro Cine, which 
lasted from 1961-71, framed films in relationship to what they said about the reality of 
Spanish society, which was treated as an extension of the regime. Triunfo itself started as 
a film journal in 1946, but was developed into a more comprehensive cultural journal by 
Ezcurra in 1962.  However, it was not an active socio-politico-cultural journal until the 
mid-1970s when the focus was no longer on consumerism (Miss Europe, the newest 
commodities, ‘modern’ life, the ‘new woman’, etc.) but was fully engaged in the pursuit 
of a post-Franco State and society.  
With censorship relaxed significantly, it became more possible to criticize the 
practice of politics in Spain (though censorship was not completely abolished until April 
of 1977). In the first years of the transición, politics as a matter of government and 
parties was present in discourse as an object of analysis openly approached and 
discussed. Once Triunfo began publishing again in January of 1976 after finishing a four 
month suspension, the political landscape of Spain was no longer referred to only 
allegorically, analogically, or via metaphorical representations. For the first time since the 
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installation of the Franco regime, a critical analysis of politics became the primary focus, 
and cultural criticism was moved to the back of the journal in the ‘Arts, Letters, and 
Entertainment’ section.64 This is not to say that there was not an exploration of cultural 
politics, or that cultural articles were mere reviews or announcements of events, but 
rather that politics as practice and the politics of culture were now critiqued as related but 
distinct questions. 
Triunfo’s political criticism in 1976, a year in which nobody was in control and 
nothing was certain, was directed at the referential gulf separating words from the 
situation on the ground.65  For the first half of the year, the government talked plenty 
about making significant changes: the legalization of political parties, the reform of the 
penal code, the abolition of state censorship, the right to organize outside of the 
government union, and a general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles.  Of course, it 
would not have been realistic to think that such things could be achieved overnight.   
However, as the gulf dividing what was said and what happened in reality widened with 
time, as speeches about democracy were not followed by actions, the situation reached an 
untenable point and its contradictions became obvious and absurd.   
For example, in March the government authorized a gathering of leftist leaders, 
after which one participant was jailed and fined a million pesetas for openly declaring 
himself a communist, though a month later Louis Althusser was openly welcomed by the 
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state to speak at a university.66  Even as late as the 6th of June, already after the right of 
political association was granted (with the exception of communism) by the government, 
one could still be arrested if s/he declared such an association according to the penal code 
because reforms to the code were continually tied up in session or tossed out. The Arias 
Navarro government maintained a holding pattern: unsure of what to do, unwilling to let 
go, trying to put forth an image of democracy to the international arena, but hardly doing 
anything to change the national.67 In this it was performing much like the official practice 
established long ago by Franco: to represent an official reality more real than reality.  
Triunfo’s textual world wanted to bring the signifier and the signified closer 
together, for social reality no longer approximated the official reality spoken of by the 
‘democratic’ regime. Juan Goytisolo wrote an article in Triunfo arguing that the gap 
between referent and reality, long maintained by those in power, was beginning to reveal 
itself: 
In one case or another, the oppositional reading material of our periodicals 
or newspapers... reveals to us a fact with incalculable consequences: the 
moral scandal of having lived a long and invisible occupation without 
helmets, guns or tanks, an occupation not of land, but rather of the spirit 
through the expropriation and seizure of the power and practice of the 
word by a few. Years and years of illegitimate possession and exclusive 
end to vacate words of their genuine content by evoking human liberty 
when defending censorship or praising the dignity and justice of 
government unions, with the result of sterilizing the subversive potency of 
language and converting it into a docile instrument of a discourse 
voluntarily arranged, deceptive and soporific... Opposite this situation of 
poisoning and asphyxiation, the present system of a tolerated semi-liberty 
appears to us almost like an early fig: the soothing readjustment of 
language to the facts, the end to the continuous and painful schizophrenia 
of living day after day in between two distinct and irreconcilable planes. 
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[En uno y otro caso, la lectura contrapuesta de nuestros periódicos y 
revistas... nos descubre un hecho de incalculables consequencias: el 
escándalo moral de haber vivido una larga e invisible ocupación sin 
cascos, fusiles ni tanques, ocupación no de la tierra, sino de los espíritus 
mediante la expropiación y secuestros por unos pocos del poder y ejercicio 
de la palabra. Años y años de posesión ilegítima y exclusiva destimada a 
vaciar los vocabulos de su genuino contenido evocar la libertad humana 
cuando se defendia la censura, la dignidad y la justicia en materia de 
sindicatos verticales a fin de esterilizar la potencia subversiva del lenguaje 
y convertir lo en instrumento dócil de un discurso voluntariamente 
amañado, engañoso, y adormecedor... Frente a tal situación de 
envenenamiento y asfixia, el sistema acutal de semi-libertad tolerada nos 
parece casi una breva: el reajuste lenitivo del lenguaje a los hechos, el fin 
de la continua y penosa esquizofrenia de vivir día tras día entre dos planos 
distintos e inconciliables.]68 
 
Goytisolo’s ‘early fig’ was still ripening, but it did signal a hope for the present: that 
discourse, political or otherwise, might now reference the real world. He implied that the 
occupation of Spanish minds and the evacuation of any perception of a reality different 
from the logic of those in power was coming to an end, which might now be contested 
because the power of language was returning to those previously silenced. 
However, democracy was scarcely more than an idea at this point. As Javier 
Tusell writes, “one deduced in the summer of 1976 that a ruptura was impossible, as well 
as a ruptura pactada; but reform, which everyone talked about, was not realizable either 
if it was directed by Carlos Arias Navarro.”69 Just before Goytisolo’s article, in July of 
1976, there was some shuffling by the King to replace Carlos Arias Navarro with Adolfo 
Suárez as president, but this move in itself was hardly a clear indication that reforms 
would be made in the near future, for Suárez was a loyal member of the Opus Dei and the 
former Secretary General of the National Movement.  Yet, it is instructive to point out 
that, according to Goytisolo, language had been liberated somewhat already in these early 
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moments of the transición—not enough to make the referent and reality one, but enough 
that Goytisolo could publish his words of rebuke and condemnation to provide a textual 
ground for the idea of a present distinct from the past: language was returning to those 
who had been silenced by the regime, or as Jacques Rancière might phrase it, was 
“mak[ing] visible what had no business being seen, and mak[ing] heard as discourse what 
was once only heard as noise.”70   
For Rancière, such activity—the inclusion of the unseen and unheard, the rupture 
of a closed system by their insertion into the social as equal subjects with equal voice—is 
the political:  
[w]hat makes an action political is not its object or the place where it is 
carried out, but solely its form, the form in which confirmation of equality 
is inscribed in the setting up of a dispute, of a community existing solely 
through being divided.71   
 
As the regime faltered without its leader and hero, it was now possible to dispute its ideas 
concerning Spain’s future, which split a community previously created and regulated by 
the Francoist regime, thereby opening up spaces for the inclusion of those before 
invisible and unheard and the practicing of political activity. The idea of what 
‘democracy’ and the ‘political’ should and could mean was now a matter of dispute and 
disagreement. Goytisolo described such a transformation: 
Polio-stricken monkey of speech and writing in the hands of pseudo-
politicians, pseudo-union leaders, pseudo-scientists, pseudo-intellectuals, 
and pseudo-writers who, inside or out of the ‘bunker,’ tremble today in 
panic and sacrosanct indignation in observing that their presumed 
intangible truths are objects of discussion; that their arbitrary privileges 
are questioned; that attacking their stale rancid dogmas has ceased to be a 
sacrilege; watching with fury and impotence as those who have lived in 
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exile or who have been gagged now raise their voices, and who to defend 
their own cushy positions and perks have to come forward and fight like 
anyone else; observing, finally, with desolation and dejection that the 
people have lost respect for them, not because of a zeal for revenge, but 
rather because of a spirit of equity... Gradual change that day by day, inch 
by inch, opens new breaches and cracks in the ancient verbal jail erected 
by censorship, disarticulates the rigid straightjacket that has paralyzed 
periodicals, and permits the passage of oxygen and fresh air into the long-
suffering lungs of the masses.  
[Mono polio del habla y escritura en manos de seudo-políticos, seudo-
sindicalistas, seudo-científicso, seudo-intelectuales, seudo-escritores que, 
dentro o fuera del ‘bunker’, tiemblan hoy de pánico y sacrosanta 
indignación al observar que sus presuntas verdades intangibles son objeto 
de discusión, que sus privilegios arbitrarios son puestos en tela de juicio, 
que atentar a sus rancios dogmas ha dejado de ser sacrilego viendo, con 
rabia e impotencia, que quienes habían vivido en exilio o amordazados 
comienzan a elevar la voz y que para defender sus propias sinecuras y 
prebendas deben saltar a la palestra y luchar como cualquier hijo de 
vecino, comprobando, en fin, con desolación y abatimiento, que el pueblo 
les ha perdido el respeto y no por afán de venganza, sino por espíritu de 
equidad... Cambio gradual que, día a día, pulgada a pulgada, abre nuevas 
brechas y grietas en la vetusta cárcel verbal erigida por la censura, 
desarticula la rígida camisa de fuerza que paralizaba a los diarios, permite 
la entrada de oxigeno y aire fresco en los sufridos pulmones de la gran 
masa.]72  
 
Language used to imagine or describe alternate realities was now spoken from mouths 
not of the select few, and with each breath emitted came the possibility of voicing 
difference.   
Goytisolo attributed the slow pace to the fact that the bunker remained strong and 
that the public had little experience in critical reflection and articulating divergent 
political landscapes, or in demanding more concessions from leaders.  His piece was a 
beginning salvo, a call to arms now that words were tools with which to fight: 
To abandon the imposed leaders, to examine the specific weight of 
concepts and words will not be in the near future some rhetorical exercise, 
but rather will be the indispensable business for national health if we truly 
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want to rid ourselves from the consequences of past oppression and start 
along the path towards a free and just society, worthy and livable. 
[Abandonar los cuadros impuestos, examinar el peso específico de los 
conceptos y palabras no será pues en un futuro próximo un excusable 
ejercício retórico sino una empresa indispensable de salud nacional si 
queremos desembarazarnos de verdad de las resultas de la opresión 
anterior y emprender la ruta hacia una sociedad libre y justa, digna y 
habitable.]73 
 
Goytisolo finished by saying that the end to Francoism and the beginning of a new 
society would depend on the collective work of “us writers, intellectuals, readers” to 
articulate new experiences, to write a new present defined by a new approach to reality, 
and make seen and heard those not considered as equal parts of society before.74 
Goytisolo’s concept of democracy seemed to require, politically and socially, a 
disagreement that would continually introduce new voices to the debate.  
This is like Rancière’s idea of democracy as a process of continual rupture of the 
social order that make visible and heard heretofore unequal parts.  He writes that the 
social is always ordered as a:  
symbolic distribution of bodies that divides them into two categories: 
those that one sees and those that one does not see, those who have a 
logos—memorial speech, an account to be kept up—and those who have 
no logos, those who really speak and those whose voice merely mimics 
the articulate voice to express pleasure and pain.75  
  
The social order is divided into those that participate and create, and those that can only 
articulate sensations in response, yet this social order is ruptured once the previously 
invisible without logos speak, “the account by which a sonorous emission is understood 
as speech, capable of enunciating what is just.76  Goytisolo, long forbidden to speak in 
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Spain, is seen on the page and heard declaring what is just.  One who was not considered 
an equal part of society before, but now is free to disagree, demonstrates a rupture from 
the Francoist past that had previously silenced and enshrouded any dissenting voices 
before. The appearance of disagreement signals a moment of interrogation, of 
redefinition, on the part of those unheard and invisible before. However, there is still the 
question of whether the democracy that would be instituted after this moment of rupture 
would be one of continual disagreement, or would work to reconcile competing interests. 
These are very different imaginations of a democracy, guided by a politics motivated 
either by ‘dissensus’ or consensus.  
At this point, Spain was still not a democracy, but was already motivated by other 
models of democracy outside.  It sat in between the imagination and the realization of 
democracy, and a study of its transition offers the means to think about what democracy 
was taken to mean along the way, from conception to inception. We already know how 
the transición would end—it was a transition not only to a liberal democracy guided by 
the logic of late-stage capitalism, but also from modernity to postmodernity—though a 
study of how it arrived to institute its particular postmodern democracy allows us to ask 
what shift in the practice of politics enabled this transition. Thus the questions of what a 
transition to a liberal democracy entails and how this is achieved politically become 
central: consensus or dissensus, reconciliation or opposition, and the relationship between 
the universal and the particular.  
To guide our study, the editorials of Eduardo Haro Tecglen in Triunfo, appearing 
weekly, provide a means to analyze steps taken towards democracy at ground level. His 
writings provide a material ground on which it is possible to follow how a democracy 
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was created as well as the ideas behind the particular form it took in Spain. With 
Goytisolo’s “early fig” ripening and political criticism burgeoning, Haro Tecglen opened 
every weekly issue with an editorial documenting political happenings and institutional 
changes, commenting critically on how they impeded or furthered the push for 
democracy, and suggesting what was necessary for democracy to exist and survive.  
Haro Tecglen has been accused of being a ‘collaborator’ with the regime.77  He 
did associate with the Falange as a youth, but his donning of the uniform can be 
understood in light of the fact that by doing so he helped his father’s death sentence be 
commuted to a thirty year incarceration instead. This was a personal and familial 
position, not an ideological one. After he began writing for Triunfo in 1968, he was never 
a member of any leftist party (neither discretely in Paris or Tangiers during the regime, 
nor openly during and after the transición, though he has referred to himself as a ‘red’). 
He did not take a side, nor did he toe the line; rather, he attempted to place himself at an 
objective distance from either ideological position, and critique the politics of all parties 
and politicians if they stood in the way of realizing his idea of a democracy.  
Haro Tecglen referred to himself instead as a ‘republican child.’78 While he 
certainly was a child before and after the Second Republic’s brief history, what he 
matured into under the regime was a proponent of democracy, which had nothing to do 
with the question of whether or not a democracy should be coterminous with a republic. 
The ‘republicanism’ that Haro Tecglen brought to his idea of democracy was that 
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political plurality was necessary for democracy to survive, but also that political divisions 
had to be lessened so that democracy might first exist. What was remembered about the 
Second Republic, his lost childhood, was that its demise was the fault of the State, unable 
or unwilling to mediate the political divisions that led ultimately to the internecine war of 
ideologies.79 Haro Tecglen attempted to take a non-partisan position to observe and 
comment critically on what was required from the State to meet and meditate political 
demands and interests.  
In a 1976 editorial from just before the referendum to legalize political parties, the 
Ley de Reforma Política, Haro Tecglen suggested that a democracy is not simply defined 
by politics or parties, but instead “deals with a new division of wealth—and poverty—of 
the nation according to more just rules of organization.”80 Democracy depends on the 
character of its institutions, which should guarantee not only the right to vote and 
political association, but must also ensure economic mobility and social liberty.  Haro 
Tecglen took acts of violence, such as those of ETA or the extreme right, to be surface 
expressions of a deep fear or mistrust of democracy. ETA assassinated 338 people 
between 1976 and 1982, and the most famous example of violence by the extreme-right 
was the Atocha Massacre by the group, Triple A, when on 01/24/1977 five members of a 
militant labor union and the communist party were murdered.81 While leftist groups like 
GRAPO or the regionalist group of ETA accounted for the most deaths (respectively, 29 
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and 67 in 1979 alone), the extreme right accounted for the largest amount of violent 
attacks (roughly 60% of them through 1978).82   
Only when institutions functioned “to create the conditions so that protesters do 
not take to the streets, and to create the abundant and necessary channels of 
communication to avoid confrontations,” would the violence abate.83  Haro Tecglen 
believed that such violence was motivated by a disbelief in the idea of democracy, but 
that once it was experienced, and proven to grant to all the same mobility and liberty, 
then the violence would cease.  For this reason, he blamed the Suárez government for 
sullying the idea of democracy by staging referendums that did nothing to feed the 
hunger for democracy, or quell the panic it induced on the part of an increasingly 
frustrated public.  The only way to discourage violent reactions was to perform the 
necessary work of eliminating the causes behind disruptions to the public order, which 
meant working to correct the economic and social inequalities.  The democracy had to be 
visible in reality and not just a rhetorical mirage.   
This editorial imagined democracy similarly to Castoriadis’s “genuine 
democracy”:  
a substantial and substantive universality, that can be done only by putting 
‘enjoyments’ in their place, by demolishing the excessive importance the 
economic sphere has taken on in the modern world, and by trying to create 
a new ethos... connected at its center to man’s essential morality.84  
 
Castoriadis suggests that this genuine democracy can only be realized with a 
corresponding collective imaginary: new norms, values, orientations, and goals for 
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collective as well as individual life, imagined by and in society then manifested through 
social institutions.  However, Haro Tecglen believed that social institutions should 
provide the means by which it is possible to make a collective out of individuals, which 
then make possible the imagination of different norms, values, etc. He argued that for 
there to be a new ethos, the State has to be constituted by a democratic election of 
leaders, who then work to guarantee equality in the distribution of wealth and the 
freedom of expression for all. Haro Tecglen took the transition to democracy to be a 
process to bind the political, economic, and social together, “to ratify the country to the 
Western systems of political, economic and social democracy.”85 As such, the State 
would ensure that the national body fragmented by the regime would now be recognized 
and reconciled, and a new essence would constitute the demos.  
In a later editorial from just before the 1977 elections (the first in over forty 
years), he wrote that the transition to democracy would render a new ethical essence 
formed by national identity: “this country at each grand step, actual or not, examines not 
only the form of government, system of administration, alteration of social classes, or the 
better distribution of wealth, but also examines its own essence, its own identity.”86 The 
suggestion is that if a genuine democracy were instituted at the level of the State, then its 
citizenry would be composed around a democratic ethos. Democratic institutions produce 
democratic results (economically, politically, socially) and foster a Spanish demos with 
everyone having a fair share and say.  
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This sounds very much like the notion of the ‘good State,’ which as Badiou points 
out, is taken to signify the circulation and distribution of goods, the fostering of a national 
identity, and the guarantee of freedom (of opinion, association, etc.).87 The ‘good State’ 
would effectively, fairly, and judiciously administer the economy, bind the social 
together, and ensure democratic freedoms and liberties. It is not surprising that a 
‘republican child’ imagined democracy be brought about by the ‘good State,’ for as 
Reinhart Koselleck points out, republicanism is a “concept of movement” in which 
“republic” becomes a telos towards which history leads.88 Haro Tecglen’s expectation for 
the future was the realization of a democracy, a republic or otherwise, and he measured 
the progress of the transición towards this goal: a ‘good State’ able to mediate differences 
and bind the social together, all the while respecting individual freedom and liberties, and 
to promote an ethics of equality concerning wealth and power.  
The realization of the ‘good State’ in Spain would not be easy, thanks in large part 
to the hold of the past over the present. Haro Tecglen wrote 
the ‘blank page of history’ is not so blank.  History never erases itself: it 
holds on, it continues on, it mixes itself into the present and the future... It 
is absurd to think that the past forty years’ monumental creation of a 
system of power that still prevails and its political class that still sustains 
itself are not going to leave a significant mark of this supposedly ‘blank 
page’ that one assumes should be written... The collection of interests and 
forces that dominate the country maintain their position with great vigor. 
[la “página blanca de la historia” no es tan blanca. La historia nunca se 
borra: se arrastra, se continúa, se mezcla en el presente y en el futuro... es 
absurdo pensar que los cuarenta años pasados y su creación monumental 
de un sistema de poder que prevalece y de una raza política que se 
sostiene, no van a tener un peso decisivo en esta supuesta “página en 
blanco” que se supone que debemos escribir... El entramado de intereses y 
fuerzas que dominan el país se mantiene con un gran vigor.]89   
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However, with a strong and committed opposition, Haro Tecglen believed that eventually 
a new present could be written into Spanish history. He conceived of the opposition as 
the means to represent norms and values that would be different from those of the past, 
thereby granting representation to those parts of society occluded by Francoist regime, 
and expanding and deepening the understanding of national identity. There was doubt 
that the present would be freed from the past, for the left remained disorganized leading 
up to the elections in 1977.  For this, Haro Tecglen had often taken them to task for their 
inability to form a unified coalition, as he maintained that a democracy could only be 
achieved if the left did not particularize their platforms, for the strength of the moderate 
right was too great to defeat single-handedly, though this seemed to have changed after 
the 1977 elections. 
After the release of the results, and the announcement that the socialist party, the 
PSOE, barely finished behind the moderate right, the UCD, Haro Tecglen’s doubts 
diminished.  He thought that, with such a large base and a strong showing, the path 
towards a genuine democracy was all but guaranteed.  He celebrated with a fervor that 
could not be contained on the page, quite literally as his usual two page editorial was a 
staggering eight pages this time around.  He wrote: “After the curious elections on the 
15th of June, what has been formed for the immediate present is a bourgeois democracy 
with a conservative court solidly established, but flanked by a thriving socialist party with 
dauphin possibilities.”90 Such a statement took the PSOE’s showing (29% of the vote 
behind the UCD’s 35%) to indicate that a significant step towards democracy had been 
                                                 




“accomplished.”91  That 78% of the voting public had turned out was encouraging as 
well.92 However, Haro Tecglen’s celebration of the “positive elections,” the title of the 
editorial, also contained a warning for the PSOE of the future: 
The realization of this party has been spectacular. They have managed to 
create an image of an uncompromising left... The new historical 
responsibility of Spanish socialism expressed in the PSOE, which has 
managed to overcome divisions and splits, is very great. There are 
European socialist parties...that have deceived or are deceiving the hopes 
placed on them by left in general, by the non-militant and voting left.  
[La realización de este partido has sido espectacular. Ha sabido crear una 
imagen de izquierda no pactante... la nueva responsibilidad histórica del 
socialismo español expresado en el PSOE, que ha sabido salir adelante de 
escisiones y concurrencias, es muy grande. Hay partidos socialistas 
europeos... que han decepcionado o están decepcionado las esperanzas 
puestas en ellos por la izquierda general, por la izquierda no militante pero 
sí votante.]93  
 
The 1977 elections seemed to signal the end of Francoism, but what remained uncertain 
was what kind of democracy the socialists imagined for the future, or if they would 
continue to work towards an ethos of equality. There was still much work to be done 
before it could be said that Spain had entered a democratic present (changing directives 
for institutions, new economic policies, diminishing the role of the military and 
eliminating its tribunals), and it was troubling that the UCD were still in power. But, 
Haro Tecglen issued a reminder to the socialists that they had legitimized their 
oppositional position, and that they needed to struggle against the UCD to secure a full 
democracy for Spain:  
One spoke of possible pacts at the last hour when it was thought that they 
would have less seats than they won. Maybe pacts are not necessary.  
Maybe some compromise is enough... What will occur, then, with regards 
to an in depth analysis of constitutional reform? This is unknown now. But 
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unknown in how the parliamentary left, and the other leftist parties not 
represented in Parliament, should compel an appropriate path towards 
reform.  If they make good on their directives, it is possible that their 
public base will carry them out.  
[Se hablaba de posibles pactos, cuando se pensaba a última hora que el 
poder tendría menos escaños de los que ha tenido. Quizá no hagan falta.  
Quizá baste con algún compromiso... Qué va a ocurrir, entonces, con la 
profundización de la reforma consitutional? Esto aparece ahora como una 
incógnita.  Pero una incógnita en que la izquierda parlamentaria y las 
posibilidades de entendimiento de los partidos de izquierda fuera del 
Parlamento deben forzar hacia un camino apto. Si lo hacen sus directivas, 
es posible que sus bases se lo impongan.]94    
 
What then was the appropriate path for the opposition in instituting a full democracy and 
following through with their directives after these “positive elections”?  
The left could have advocated a dismantling of the State, if such a Leninist idea 
was even possible at the time, or they could have refused to participate, as some did 
before the 1976 referendum to legalize parties because it was feared that they would be 
left out of the political equation.  But, really, these were not viable options, for the left 
believed, just as Haro Tecglen did, that the elections were the necessary first step towards 
a democracy. Haro Tecglen and the left put so much significance into the elections 
because they believed that a balanced government (ideally with the PSOE weighted just a 
bit more) would ensure the drafting of a fair constitution, the establishment of just laws, 
and the creation of a social space promising freedom and equality. These components—
the rule of law, a constitution, individual rights—are those of a liberal democracy. 
Elections are necessary for a liberal democracy.  However, elections, by themselves, are 
not the sine qua non of democracy.  They are only a symbolic expression of an 
individual’s freedom to appear at an appointed time and place to cast a vote, but they are 
hardly the same as political participation or political articulation as “sonorous speech.” 
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Once elections are taken to signify anything more meaningful than this, then political 
activity signifies nothing more than a choice between party platforms vying for votes, and 
the idea of democracy once again is collapsed into a singular type of democracy, that of a 
liberal democracy.  
Haro Tecglen desired democracy to be a national reconciliation and the fostering 
of an ethos of equality, which is understood, given his biography as a ‘republican child,’ 
and because of Spain’s history of fragmentation and uneven distributions of power and 
wealth.  His desire for democracy was a future expectation of the righting of wrongs and 
the inclusion of unequal parts, which would be won through an oppositional struggle. As 
such, this was a political desire. However, his desire took essentialist and universal 
form—a national identity, an essence of the demos—and thus it is no surprise that the 
means to fulfilling this desire would take similar form—reasonable debate to promote 
social and economic justice guaranteed by a constitution and the rule of law.  For the left,  
the socialist PSOE and communist PCE, the means determined the end. Eurocommunism 
and the new socialism dictated that the revolution would be a matter of reforming the 
liberal democracy from within, and thus the primary importance was to secure a spot at 
the table of negotiation. Consensus was the means by which the revolution would become 
a permanent practice of reforming the State.95  However, as Koselleck points out, “within 
the declaration of the revolution’s permanence lies the deliberate and conscious 
anticipation of the future, as well as the implicit premise that this revolution will never be 
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fulfilled.”96  There was not a specific end towards which the means were directed, rather 
it seemed that the establishment of the means was the end. As such, there was nothing 
political about this activity, for there was no expectation of the future besides its 
anticipation, and there was no end at stake that had to be won.   
Possibly the left was at pains to avoid even the mere suggestion of an antagonistic 
confrontation, given the calamitous past that Spain was extricating itself from, and the 
fear that the public had for another ideological conflict. There were examples of 
antagonistic extremists (GRAPO, FRAP, Triple A, etc.) who were waging a war of sorts 
on the streets by carrying out brutal assassinations and acts of aggression, and who 
openly condemned the mere suggestion of a democracy.  Or, possibly their participation 
in working with the right, negotiating consensual pacts and looking for rational solutions 
to conflicts, was a sign of how politics as practice had changed historically.  Castoriadis 
claims that the waning of political conflict over the last half century is because there is 
“no longer a struggle over the institutions, but a struggle aimed at the changing of these 
institutions.”97  It was a matter of being in position to reform the institutions from within 
the corridors of power. 
Yet, neither fully accounts for the difference between Haro Tecglen’s political 
desire for democracy and the left’s desire for an internal reform of the State, for Haro 
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Tecglen still did stress the importance of conflict, which is different from consensus. 
What the fulfillment of his desire required was what Chantal Mouffe calls “agonism”:98 
[A]gonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although 
acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, 
nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents.  They are 
‘adversaries’ not enemies.  This means that, while in conflict, they see 
themselves as belonging to the same political association, as sharing a 
common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place.  We could 
say that the task of democracy is to transfer antagonism into agonism.99 
   
By October of 1977, it was already clear that the PSOE did not conceive of politics as 
agonism, or that they would propose a new vision of society, such as Haro Tecglen’s 
imagination of a social democracy. The PSOE, instead of proposing an alternative set of 
economic reforms to promote the distribution of wealth, worked with the UCD to rework 
the reforms instituted in the 1960s and 1970s by the regime so as to facilitate the 
international exchange of goods and capital and stave off a soaring rate of inflation. They 
gladly sat down with the UCD to hammer out the Pactos de la Moncloa, a set of pacts 
that required the working and lower classes to sacrifice their interests so that the economy 
might flourish. The Pactos de la Moncloa will be discussed in detail later, but as Álvaro 
Soto Carmona points out, while they succeeded in righting the Spanish economy from a 
free market perspective, they also contributed to the growing social demobilization and 
disenchantment because they legitimated the continued presence of members of the 
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regime—financiers, the police, and politicians—that seemed to work against any 
authentic democracy.100   
However, it was not that the PSOE were too weak to form a viable opposition, or 
that they simply wanted to get in on the profits. It was that they had already conceived of 
the democracy as a liberal democracy, as the means to bring about the desired 
modernization of the nation’s infrastructure and the requisite economic expansion that 
would stop the downward spiral of inflation and unemployment, all of which largely 
depended upon foreign investment.  Together, in order for Spain to gain entrance into the 
international market, the PSOE negotiated for the institution of the same socio-economic 
principles sought by the entrenched elites. When they were unsuccessful once again in 
1979, González clearly signaled that the PSOE should not be considered as a party 
opposed to a liberal democracy. He resigned his leadership in protest in May of 1979 
when the membership hesitated to renounce Marxism, though eventually they caved and 
Felipe resumed his leadership post in September.  Needless to say, the PSOE would win 
in 1982.101   
To win in the election, they pursued a politics of consensus to appeal to the 
undecided middle classes, whose primary concern was continued economic development 
and social stability. By presenting a non-antagonistic face to the public, and avoiding 
being labeled as part of the militant or extreme left, the PSOE was able to gather enough 
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diverse voters in order to garner enough votes.102  The PSOE (and even the communist 
party, the PCE) had to win over a greater number of the public so as to eventually come 
out on top and gain control of the government. But, again, this pursuit was a means 
without an end. They thought that by simply securing a seat at the table, democracy 
would be achieved.   
It was at this point that Haro Tecglen began to examine more critically the 
consensus required by a liberal democracy. What he first took to be missteps on the part 
of the left to form an oppositional front, Haro Tecglen began to realize were in actuality 
clear steps towards consensus rather than competition, an attempt that he began to 
identify with alarm. As Mouffe points out, “envisaging the aim of democratic politics in 
terms of consensus and reconciliation is not only conceptually mistaken, it is also fraught 
with political dangers.”103 Haro Tecglen perceived that the antagonistic element of 
politics, if ignored or thought to have been reconciled, might return all at once and in 
abundance to threaten the democratic order. Antagonism might erupt if not given a vent 
for release through agonism. The attempted coup on February 23rd, 1981 would be the 
ultimate expression of this. 23–F, as this attempted coup was termed, was carried out by 
leaders isolated from both the right and the left, who attempted to install a military 
dictatorship and reorder Parliament. Javier Tusell argues that it was a result of the 
irresponsibility on the part of the political class: Suárez contributed to its occurrence by 
                                                 
102 See Antonio García Santesmases, Repensar la izquierda: evolución ideológica del 
socialismo en la España actual (Madrid; Barcelona; Iztapalapa, México: Universidad 
Nacional de Educación a Distancia; Anthropos; Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 
Unidad Iztapalapa, 1993), 55-82. 
103 Mouffe, On the Political, 2. 
 
57 
leading the nation to a political impasse, just as much as González had by maintaining 
that the transición was over.104   
If democracy was taken to be a consensual reconciling of society—that is, the 
dismissal of any ideological conflict with respect to interests and beliefs—then a genuine 
democracy would no longer be possible, if it was taken to be a struggle between opposing 
hegemonic projects that can never be reconciled rationally, or a competition for 
hegemony between adversaries.105 Even though Haro Tecglen perceived that a 
democracy required an agonistic element, at this point he failed to see that such an 
element could not be incorporated within a liberal democracy (this would come later). 
That is, it was not the left’s lack of putting up a fight that was at fault; rather, it was the 
inadequacy of the form of the fight itself. 
Because of the fact that the left and right entered into negotiations from the 
beginning, with Suárez meeting with leaders from the ‘opposition’ immediately 
following the 1977 elections, the possibility for Spain to realize an agonistic, and 
consequently less dangerous, democracy was foreclosed at the same time when many 
thought that it was being achieved. Though the signs were already present that the 
political path the opposition would follow would be one of consensus and 
reconciliation—or as the head of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo, announced as early as 1976, 
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a “consensual democratic rupture” not to be understood as “revolutionary”106—the 
depoliticization of the practice of politics that would follow the 1977 elections was not 
immediately apparent, but it was foretold. In late 1977, Haro Tecglen would begin to 
reflect critically on the ‘modern’ conception of democracy and the limits that it imposed 
on disagreement, which he became convinced, denied the possibility of democracy 
altogether with its politics of consensus. This will be the focus of chapter four, but first I 
turn to the transition in culture. At the beginning of the transición, there was a similar 
desire to represent democracy as a national reconciliation in filmed melodramas, and like 
the transition in politics, it was represented as the end to ideological conflict. In this, 
Spanish cinema evidenced a similar tendency towards the ‘modern’ political project to 
construct a universal demos that surmounted political differences, thereby creating a 
democratic social space of equality and freedom. However, that they are representations 
allows for a comparison—the differences and similarities—to be made between the 
emerging practice of politics in reality and the politics of aesthetics in imagining a demos 
and projecting democracy on the screen.  
                                                 











Filming the Past: The Ethics of Melodrama 
 
 
Just as the socio-political history of Spain began a new epoch with the present of 
the transición, so too did Spanish cinema enter into a transition. While Haro Tecglen’s 
reportage attempted to document the practice of politics in the immediacy of the 
present—reporting on contemporary events and actors, telling the facts in order to hold 
them fixed for the focus of the interpretative eye—Spanish films created worlds 
temporally and spatially distinct from reality, whose form and content were now marked 
by this new present.  As Fredric Jameson points out, “there is nothing that is not social 
and historical—indeed, that everything is “in the last analysis” political,”107 but an 
analysis and interpretation of Spanish cinema offer a different picture of the political 
situation of the transición than do Haro Tecglen’s editorials. In the gap between reality 
and representation there can be found imaginary visions of past experiences and future 
expectations that require aesthetics to take form and speak.  
Haro Tecglen attempted to capture the nature of the socio-political transition on 
the page, and determine its essence and function by reporting on events and actors and 
interpreting the meaning behind them. What culture performed, by contrast, was the 
telling of a (hi)story in images and words outside of ‘real’ time and space, retelling or 
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foretelling events according to desires for political possibilities, which should not be 
understood in all cases to be progressive/revolutionary but could just as well be 
conservative/reformist.  That is, the desires that can be read in cultural texts represent 
diverse political possibilities, though there are social desires more pronounced than others 
in a given time and place. 
At the beginning of the transición, representations of the past were most common, 
returning to past events to situate them with respect to the present. There was a boom in 
documentaries, often made up of footage from newsreels before or during the war, or of 
Francoist parades and speeches, and often interspersed with interviews. Basilio Martín 
Patino’s Canciones para después de una guerra (Songs for After a War, 1976), Caudillo 
(Supreme Leader, 1977) and Queridísimos verdugos (Beloved Executioners, 1977) are 
most expressive of this tendency, all of which represented experiences of the past on the 
screen to be seen and reflected on in the present.  Given not only the historical distance, 
but also the referential distance between reality and representation, these films allowed 
for a critical approach to the past.  As Manuel Trenzado Romero points out, until the end 
of 1977, the theme most prevalent at the beginning of the transición in these 
documentaries was the Civil War and the figure of Franco, which he suggests was a 
means to reclaim a collective memory of the past.108 Marsha Kinder likewise argues that 
these earlier documentaries “refigured” Spanish history, while later documentaries turned 
towards more contemporary issues.109  
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In fictional films, the prevailing genres were comedy and melodrama, with 
comedies dominating the box office, especially the sub-genre of the ‘sexy’ comedy, 
which as Casimiro Torreiro writes, exploited the “sexual imaginary of the Iberian male” 
and satirized “national customs.”110 Melodramas, on the other hand, were oriented around 
history, and for this reason the genre is most often referred to as “historical cinema” and 
not melodrama, for as Kinder points out “most Spanish discourse in film criticism uses 
melodrama only in the pejorative sense.”111 Following the subversive melodramatic 
tradition established during the 1950s and 1960s around the New Spanish Cinema, which 
inverted the ideological import of Francoist melodramas by offering new figurations of 
the patriarchal family or issues of gender and sexuality,112 melodramas in the transición 
became “the means by which current political and historical issues were investigated” in 
the post-Franco period.113   
Most often, as we will see in the films discussed below, these investigations 
seemed to imagine democracy as a national reconciliation and a shared ethics binding 
individual parts together as a demos. Ideological conflict was not represented as within 
the national body, but rather it was figured as an outside threat to the demos by unethical 
individuals who threatened its constitution.  This conflict relied upon a Manichean ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’ structure to symbolize the desire of a universal and the threat to this possibility 
(particular ideologies that divided the community, or immoral individuals that 
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undermined the community). Such representations provided the means to give form and 
content to the desire for democracy during a time marked by an uncertainty that it could 
be achieved or instituted given the ideological struggles still embroiling the present.  As 
Chantal Mouffe might put it, the relationship between reality and representation was one 
of a “struggle between ‘right and left’” in reality and a “struggle between ‘right and 
wrong’” in film, a relationship of politics and ethics.114  
In order to approach this relationship between politics and ethics, in reality and in 
representation, it is necessary to begin at the beginning: the question of how the 
transición ushered in a new present for Spanish cinema.  This involves a consideration of 
Spain’s film history. Jenaro Talens and Santos Zunzunegui Díez, though they do not 
name names,115 suggest that most film histories of Spain are surveys, which while useful 
in providing historical facts and figures do not interpret specific films in great detail: “the 
films themselves, as cultural artifacts, are missing, either because of the critical point of 
view adopted by the authors or simply due to the lack of space.”116 To approach films as 
cultural artifacts, Talens and Zunzunegui Díez write, “it is not a matter of proceeding to a 
diachronic and exhaustive description of a vast field (that of cinema)... [but] [r]ather, 
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through the discovery and identification of a series of problems, historically dated.”117  
As such, a “cartographic history” can be written that avoids any tendency towards 
generalization and allows for an analysis of specific films as modes of representation 
addressing a specific set of problems.  
However, even film histories that treat individual films as cultural artifacts can 
still tend towards a totalizing perspective. Antoine Jaime argues that films from this time 
were involved in “a true ideological fight between supporters of the status quo and those 
of a new society” for how the past should be remembered;118 or, they “dreamed of living 
another way and demanded with their desires and acts a better future.”119 Spanish films, 
including melodramas, were just as varied as in any other time, and it was not the case 
that all were involved in such an “ideological fight,” or that their position in this fight 
were always clear when they did.  Jaime’s film history tends towards totality as a result 
of his understanding of Spanish history as a simple movement from dictatorship to 
democracy, whereby democracy, non-critically understood, is a triumph in itself with the 
‘people’ freed in the end after the forty years of oppression under the regime. He claims 
that Spanish cinema was militant in this fight during the whole of the transición, which 
he defines as between 1975 and 1981, which ignores that there were different transitional 
moments in Spanish cinema’s modes of representation at this time and different sets of 
questions asked and approaches taken.120  To make sense of the political and historical 
questions that melodramas might have asked, it is necessary to situate them historically, 
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to then understand how they imagined the notion of democracy differently over the 
course of the transición.  
Spanish cinema during the transición can be divided into two periods. Many film 
historians divide film production during the transición into at least two stages: the 
immediate post-Franco period after his death, which some extend back into the early 
1970s; and, the constitutional period from 1978 until the election of the socialists in 
1982.121  The first—when democracy was imagined but not yet instituted—stretches from 
the death of Franco in 1975 to the formal institution of the democracy with the Pactos de 
Moncloa and the Constitution in 1977/1978. To outline this first period, the film criticism 
of Diego Galán in Triunfo during the transición helps guide our approach, for what is 
important to highlight is, not how cinema prefigured the later cinema of the transición, 
but rather how it differed from cinema under Franco.  Galán’s criticism stretched over 
this historical divide.  He had developed his critical eye during the years of the 
apertura—or the ‘opening’ during the 1960s when the regime relaxed its social and 
cultural controls somewhat in order to promote tourism and attract foreign investment—
and had established cine-clubs in the early 1960s and wrote for Nuestro Cine, one of the 
most important Spanish journals to cover and contribute to the awakening and 
development of cinema under Franco.122 Of course, during the Franco years it was not 
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possible to present overtly political representations to the public. Instead, political 
articulations were made by metaphorical or allegorical inference, and this mode of 
symbolic representation continued during the dictablanda, or ‘soft dictatorship’ of the 
early 1970s by filmmakers such as Juan Antonio Bardem, Luis Berlanga, José Luis 
Borau, Victor Erice, Fernando Fernán Gomez, Marco Ferreri, and Carlos Saura.123 
After Franco died, there were further relaxations with respect to censorship.  
Slight at first—one no longer had to have script approval before beginning production, 
nudity was allowed ever more, and previously unmentionable topics like adultery or 
homosexuality could be addressed—the Suárez government then relaxed censorship to 
the point that a transition truly did begin with respect to how the political was represented 
in Spanish cinema, for representations of political possibility could be explicit in 
referencing history and ideological conflict. To an unprecedented degree, films near the 
end of 1975 could approach critical representations of history and ideology to engage the 
public’s contemplation about how the experiences of the past and the postwar period 
might be remembered.124  Yet, just as socio-political changes were slow to come at the 
beginning of the transición, so too were changes in representation. 
Galán, now writing in Triunfo after Nuestro Cine’s collapse, perceived that 
cinema had entered into a transition itself, now with the possibility of imagining Spain’s 
past from new perspectives, which required a symbolical mode of representation different 
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from the preceding years. In October of 1976, he argued for a new type of cinema: one 
more sophisticated and critical of history, one that could tell past stories long silenced by 
the regime, and one that would gesture towards the almost near democracy. At this point, 
he argued that Spanish films should have the audience consider Spanish history and 
society explicitly.  Because the transición seemed to promise that political articulations 
were possible, because it was more and more imperative that culture become critical as 
the transición seemed to need help getting off the ground, and because cinematic 
representation was becoming inclusive of previously unrepresented segments of the 
population, Galán maintained that the clear presentations of political alternatives should 
be a central concern for Spanish cinema. He recognized that, though films had become 
more technically advanced (in cinematography, editing, etc.) and thus more sophisticated 
on the surface, they were not yet critical enough in their representations of the Spanish 
history, past or present. He wrote that Spanish cinema demonstrated  
two fundamental aspects: on one hand, an indispensable ‘quality’ (well-
made, excellent casts, brilliant photography, etc.)... on the other, a dose of 
political criticism together with a complex anecdote to hide or dissimulate 
this criticism... films ‘critical’ of two matters that, hard up for years in our 
cinema, have never had the opportunity to be developed: the Civil War 
and its consequences and sex... films authorized by the administration, 
which possibly gives off a critical air by confronting Spaniards with their 
History and their responsibility, but such criticism is far from actually 
existing in the reality of these films.  They remain honest products that do 
not manage... to become real documents of determined aspects of our 
History or expositions of those who lost before.  
[dos aspectos fundamentales: de un lado, una imprescindible “calidad” en 
la factura (películas bien cuidadas, excelentes repartos, fotografía 
brillante, etc.)... De otro lado, una dosis de crítica política condimentada 
con una compleja anécdota que encauce esa crítica o la disimule... 
películas “críticas” a dos cuestiones que, arrastradas durante años en 
nuestro cine, nunca han tenido oportunidad de verse desarrolladas: la 
guerra civil and sus consequencias y el sexo... autorizada por la 
Administración, que pueda dar el aíre de una apertura crítica que enfrente 
a los españoles a su Historia y sus responsabilidades, pero que en la 
 
67 
realidad de estas películas está lejos de existir. Siendo productos honestos 
no llegan... a convertirse en documentos reales de determinados aspectos 
de nuestra Historia o en la exposición de una España vencida.]125    
 
In 1976, steps towards a more critical cinema were tentative, as the regime was very 
much still in place (Carlos Arias Navarro had just been replaced by Adolfo Suárez as 
president, political parties and labor unions were still illegal, the referendum to legalize 
them was two months away, and the elections another eight months, and the penal code 
was still undergoing reform). However, Galán did still detect initial steps towards a mode 
of representation to critique “the mythification of heroism and the crusade repeated to us 
so often.”126  
Retrato de familia (Family Picture, dir. Antonio Giménez-Rico, 1976),127 the film 
under review by Galán, does not tell the story of those who fought against Franco’s 
forces, thus does not bring to the screen the past experiences of those unseen and unheard 
during the regime. It represents the history of a family from the winning side that 
nonetheless loses all the same in the end. The family is held together by reactionary and 
repressive values—fear, brutality, hate, lies—that cause the family to break apart—the 
son sleeps with his father’s mistress, then dies on the battlefield, while the father rapes 
his wife to beget another son, then flings himself out the window when he is rejected by 
the mistress.  All of this undermines the image of family maintained by the regime during 
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its long reign, for it shows that behind the illusion of Francoism is a maligned and 
fragmented morality.  Galán applauded this film for presenting a different history of the 
past. It did not represent a national reconciliation—for example, showing ideologically 
differentiated families overcoming difference to survive the hardships of the Civil War or 
the postwar period—but did nonetheless project an image of the ‘victors’ differently than 
how the regime had often portrayed them. In the familial locus, we see vice instead of 
virtue, sacrilege instead of piety, and cowardice instead of nobility.  
What made this film different from the critical films during the regime was that it 
was a commercial release and not an ‘art film,’ attracting a large number of viewers 
instead of being a limited release, or being relegated to cinema clubs and film festivals. 
Retrato de familia had close to 1.4 million spectators in 1976. Compared to the 
allegorical/metaphorical films from before, this was almost five times the amount for 
Victor Erice’s 1973 film El espíritu de la colmena (Spirit of the Beehive), over three 
times that for Carlos Saura’s 1966 film La caza (The Hunt), and almost forty times that 
for Juan Antonio Bardem’s 1955 film Muerte de un ciclista (Death of a Cyclist)—
arguably the three quintessential films of Spanish cinema under Franco.128  A new 
moment in Spanish film history was underway, for not only was Retrato de familia 
critical of Spanish history and society, but it was also distributed into the mainstream 
market and was a commercial success.  
 In 1976, the attendance for Spanish films was greater than that for American films 
by more than 2 million spectators (and greater than British, French, and Italian films 
combined); and, when one considers that the bulk of attendance for American films was 
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derived from only a half dozen blockbusters, it is clear that Spanish films attracted a more 
stable viewing public.129  The stories that it told were free from censorship after the 
November 11th, 1977 royal decree as well, after which point the government had 
relinquished all control over production, though a judge could deny a film’s right to 
exhibition if it was somehow deemed threatening to the public order or too pornographic 
for release in non-specialized theaters, but this did not happen often. Some films were 
temporarily withheld from exhibition because of a deemed threat to the public order, but 
all were eventually released.130 Only Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Salo, or the 120 days of Sodom 
and Nagisa Oshima’s Realm of Passion were deemed too pornographic for release. There 
was a significant threat posed to Spanish cinema, however, as the liberalization of the 
economy subjected its weak industry to the onslaught of Hollywood’s might.  
The market became oversaturated by foreign competition following the royal 
decree of November 11th, 1977, which did away with the obligatory distribution of one 
Spanish film for every four imported films and only required that 120 days be reserved 
for the exhibition of Spanish films (though this would be further reduced to one day for 
every three days of foreign films, or a minimum of 90 days, near the end of the 
transición).131  Though there were no signs of a decreasing demand for Spanish films, 
distributors and exhibitors were no longer required to supply them if they did not chose to 
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do so, which happened less and less as more resources were directed towards importation 
than production, for it was always cheaper to book the bulk goods that Hollywood 
provided. The fact that there was no longer a dubbing tax imposed on foreign films to 
provide a monetary base for Spanish films (152 million pesetas in 1975, 170 million in 
1976, and 163 million in 1977) greatly affected Spanish production as well.132  However, 
though the number of Spanish films dropped from 112 in 1973 to 101 in 1978 to 88 in 
1979—and Spanish films would continue to struggle in the marketplace during and after 
the transición—Spanish cinema was able to maintain a constant enough presence on 
movie screens to ensure a share of the market and keep the industry afloat even with 
fierce international competition.133 Though the 1977 decree did slow the development of 
the industry and keep it from ever fully flourishing—causing Galán to exclaim that “just 
as Spanish cinema has some chance of truly connecting with the public, of breathing 
liberty desired for all these years, new decrees kill it off”—Spanish films did survive on 
the screen and were competitive at the box office.134   
The films that will be analyzed below all managed to attract nearly one million 
spectators. This could be because their critical representations of history and society 
matched the public’s experience of a changing history and society, and thus offered a 
visual vehicle to remember past experiences and situate expectations for the present or 
future.  However, this potential might be just as easily lost if a film were ideologically 
extreme, or its form incomprehensible—neither taken seriously, nor understood—which 
                                                 
132 Diego Galán, "La nueva ley del cine: tal cómo eramos," Triunfo, no. 821 (21 October 
1978): 46. 
133 Agustín  Sánchez Vidal, "El cine español y la transición," in Del franquismo a la 
posmodernidad: cultura española 1975-1990, ed. José B. Monleón and Carlos Blanco 
Aguinaga (Torrejón de Ardoz: Akal, 1995), 92.   
134 Galán, "Peligro de muerte," 22. 
 
71 
Galán warned against: “hackneyed, false, cheap topics, without an original or renewed 
approach to the already known” had to be avoided if cinema were to achieve “the 
cinematographic possibility of reconciling us with our History.”135 Galán argued instead 
that Spanish cinema provided a lens to the whole of society, “that has been until now 
limited to the few and privileged readers of expensive books,” by which they could now 
contemplate and imagine History: “the investigation and obtainment of little known 
documents and the transmission of information that—on occasion—can only be achieved 
by the image.”136  Galán took films to be the imagination, quite literally, of new 
narratives of history, or the representation of the “non-contemporaneity” of history, using 
Ernst Bloch’s terminology, or the “heterogeneity of the historical universe,” using 
Siegfried Kracauer’s: a present composed of “multiple temporal strands... [some of 
which] are residues of past eras, others are anticipations of future ones; the significance 
depends on the larger narrative in which they figure.”137  
At the beginning of the transición, narratives gave significance to the residues of 
the past. Galán recognized that after Franco’s death, the historical and social landscape 
was being reimagined and refigured in films.  As Walter Benjamin might have phrased it, 
the past was being burst free from the “prison-world” of the regime’s univocal narrative 
“by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung 
debris” the Spanish public might “go traveling” back through it.138 What was most 
important to Galán at this time was to imagine in creative and coherent ways the 
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democratic possibilities for the future that the present of the transición, and its loosening 
from the past, offered seemingly all at once.  The difference between the two critics was 
that Haro Tecglen argued that the concepts of social unity and democracy should be 
interrogated and constructed anew by politics in reality, while Galán focused on how 
films might contribute to and aid the political process of reimagining history and society 
in representation. Given that the present was yet to have clear definition, and that an 
ongoing disengagement with the past was forcibly clear, most Spanish films at this time 
turned attention to situating the present in relation to the past under the Francoist regime, 
and to how it instituted and maintained the socio-political sphere.   
Galán enthusiastically welcomed the return in Spanish cinema to question and 
remember history differently, its ideological conflicts and societal divisions, for he took 
this as the symbolic activity necessary to enable an expectation for a democracy that 
“Spain might one day happen to know truly.”139  A film like Retrato de familia narrated 
experiences of the past that were silenced or ignored. By remembering the past, and 
offering a history different from that maintained by the regime, it represented the 
Francoist social unity of the past as one of fragmentation and not cohesion, and it showed 
the desired national identity of Francoism to be diseased, thus working to deny its past 
ideology a place in the emerging present. Though the film did not advocate anything 
specifically political, it explicitly worked to free the socio-political of the present from 
any ideologies of the past to make way for a democracy, however it might take form.   
As Javier Hernández Ruiz and Pablo Pérez Rubio write, Retrato de familia was 
one example of the shift in 1976 towards “historical fiction... [that] reclaimed a 
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revision—a reconstitution—of certain events from a perspective incipiently 
democratic.”140  The film returned to the past to warn of a politically indifferent society 
by critiquing the passivity of the bourgeoisie in face of the approaching Civil War.  The 
protagonist “rejects any type of political compromise” because he believes that his own 
interests will best be served by maintaining political neutrality.141 Even though he does 
not explicitly take a side, he still pays a price, losing everything as the war consumes his 
family and business. Ultimately, he is drive to commit suicide. This film does not make 
an argument for a particular political project that the bourgeoisie should adhere to or 
support; it only demonstrates the undesirable, traumatic, and ultimately destructive results 
when one attempts to remain passive to the threat of an unethical regime and exist outside 
of its enforced social space: all become immoral and depraved in the end.  
There is no explicit demonstration of democratic values or liberties, for there is no 
display of a plurality of interests or political projects, but there is a clear statement made 
that individuals must take a stand if this history is to be avoided again.  At such an 
uncertain time in the transición, this call serves not to announce the actualization of a 
concrete democracy, but wants to establish a break from the past so that a democracy 
might be actualized.  Read negatively, what Retrato de familia makes clear is that the 
present needs a different sort of ethics than what Francoism foisted onto past society. In 
1976, it was still unclear whether or not there would even be a democracy in the future, 
but this film is one example among many films narrating the history of the past according 
to political desires of the present, or as Hernández Ruiz and Pérez Rubio suggest: 
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“Spanish cinema appeared to prepare itself to look forward, but also it became aware that 
to do this, truly, then it had to look back.”142  To look forward to a new social reality, first 
there had to be a look back to analyze social disunity during times of ideological conflict 
and divide and absent of any collective ethos.  
More often than not, the catastrophe of the past was represented as a result of 
political extremism. José Enrique Monterde argues this was because films were made 
with commercial success in mind and not a critical reflection on history or society: “the 
tendency towards centrism, understood as negation of any ideological extremism, 
political or aesthetic, in search of an ‘average’ public.”143 He sees this tendency in 
historical films, and especially in the films of the tercera vía, which were comedies 
representing the ‘new’ Spain and marketed towards the younger generations.144  To 
appeal to this large and consumerist segment of the population, who did not identify with 
either the militant left or the reactionary right, films represented moderation and balance. 
Yet, it must be remembered that at the beginning of the transición, political parties were 
still forbidden and there was not a clear path towards elections or the numerous other 
reforms that would take place, and thus this representation of moderation and balance 
cannot be said to correspond, like a reflection in the mirror, to the practice of consensual 
politics still to come in reality.  
Monterde is right to write that Spanish cinema tended to avoid ideological 
extremism, which is a clear “indicator of what will be the entire process of the political 
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transition,” but this is different from being the instigator.145  Monterde takes Spanish film 
history to reflect how the social and political history of Spain will be in the future, though 
it is yet to be at the beginning of the transición. There is another way to interpret this 
centrism, one that does not read film history in a flash forward to a still undetermined 
future; that is, one that does not conflate aesthetic centrism with the eventual practice of 
consensual politics. To imagine symbolically a collective ethos as a political desire for 
democracy is not the same as the real practice of a politics of negotiation and pacts, for 
the former is a social desire while the latter has social actuality as its referent. 
Furthermore, for historical melodramas at the beginning of the transición, any perceived 
centrism was an aesthetic effect of the melodramatic mode itself as much as any 
ideological intent or political desire on the part of their filmmakers.  
Melodrama has been understood variously, depending upon historical and 
national context, as well as whether it was written, performed, or filmed. David Mayer 
argues that melodrama has “substantially changed style, structure, and subject matter in 
response to various pressures and events.”146 As a film form, Linda Williams suggests, it 
is “marked by “lapses” in realism, by “excesses” of spectacle and displays of primal, 
even infantile emotions, and by narratives that seem circular and repetitive... [T]he form 
exceeds the normative system of much narrative cinema.”147 The excessiveness of its 
form has been understood in terms of affect, that it must exceed the limits of realism 
imposed by classical narrative style in order to elicit a sensational response on the part of 
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the spectator.  However, as Mayer insists, “sensational melodrama” is only one type, a 
minor one at that.148  What defines melodrama is less its intended effect and more its 
historical cause, less what response it elicits and more what it responds to through its 
mode of representation.   
Peter Brooks argues that “within the context of the French Revolution and its 
aftermath” melodrama is a fictional system that makes sense of experience:  
This is the epistemological moment which it illustrates and to which it 
contributes: The moment that symbolically, and really, marks the final 
liquidation of the traditional Sacred and its representative institutions 
(Church and Monarch), the shattering of the myth of Christendom, the 
dissolution of an organic and hierarchically cohesive society, and the 
invalidation of [forms]—tragedy, comedy of manners—that depend on 
such a society.149 
 
The context of the French Revolution and post-Franco Spain are quite different in that the 
specific content of what is liquidated, shattered, and dissolved is not the same, but there is 
still a similar structural relationship at play between reality and the representation of it. 
With both, there was a historical movement away from a notion of the Sacred that 
informed and fixed meaning and guided social relations, from the myths that instructed 
meaning and ethics, and from an organic and cohesive society instituted as a result. Of 
course, it can certainly be argued that society under the regime was hardly cohesive, and 
that the regime’s myths were pure fantasy, but this does not discount that its Sacred was 
still successfully instituted into the social, regardless of whether underneath its smooth 
veneer there were fractures. What does matter is that the fractures were made visible by 
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the transición, thus liquidating the regime’s myths and its Sacred notion of patria, 
familia, y Diós, and that a void was left over to be filled.  
As Kathleen Vernon notes, after the death of Franco, “[m]elodrama provides the 
mode of exploring the breakdown of old hierarchies and the resulting dissolution of 
barriers and boundaries in a post-patriarchal, post-religious Spain.”150 Yet, it is not only 
that it provides a mode of exploring, but also that melodrama provides a mode of 
representation to fill in the void, to substitute substance for the lack. Without the Sacred 
to guide actions, without an ethics learned through the reading of myths, and especially in 
a society uncertain of itself, melodrama offers up a representation of a Sacred—an ethical 
system to inform and bind the community—to counter its loss in reality. As Mayer 
observes, melodrama steps in “when events occurred that were not immediately subject 
to rational explanation or where explanations of phenomena were numerous and 
contradictory and the comforting presence of divine justice was absent.”151 This was 
certainly the case at the beginning of the transición, when it was unclear if the regime 
would fight to hold on, or if there would be a rupture and a historical movement beyond, 
and the question of social or ethical justice was unanswerable.   
Brooks is right to suggest that other forms such as tragedy refer to a notion of the 
Sacred that gives action and thought significance. Its narration is a tale of normative 
ethics, of how one should act, or the collision of multiple prescriptions. Melodrama, on 
the other hand, narrates descriptively, representing what one simply does. It is not 
concerned with asking what is right and wrong, or why, but rather displays clear-cut 
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distinctions between the two. Robert Lang defines melodrama as a demarcation of 
“clearly legible differences on all levels. It is a world of binary structures: men and 
women, masculine and feminine, the ‘right’ side and the ‘wrong’ side.”152 This is what 
makes melodrama excessive: precisely when an ethos is absent in reality, and seems to be 
a remote possibility, it represents an ethos unproblematically as if it were clearly present. 
Its villains and victims could not be more obvious, which provides a simple ethical order 
to counter the overwhelming disorder in reality.  As Mayer argues, melodrama is: 
an explanatory narrative that attribute[s] public disaster and private 
tribulation to the malign operation of evil seeking to overcome goodness... 
[whereby] evil [is] represented through the character and actions of the 
villain, and unwelcome events occur[r] because the villain, motivated by 
greed, avarice, lust, jealously, and other antisocial impulses, intentionally 
[brings] misfortune to good people.153 
 
Melodrama shows the dissolution of a cohesive society to be the work of antisocial 
elements motivated by their own individual interests.   
In melodrama, these villains are inflected ideologically. The ‘good’ of the 
community, its ethos, is threatened by villains not only motivated by profit and greed, but 
also by an ideology counterpoised to that of the demos. Melodramatic tension is built 
around the struggle between a universal, non-ideological, and particularities, represented 
as ideological. Of course, the ‘good’ community united through a shared ethics is just as 
much an ideology as the others. Ideology is not a party platform or a particular means of 
instituting the State, nor is it truth as opposed to bad faith.  It concerns social relations, 
much like Terry Eagleton’s definition of ideology as:  
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an organizing social force which actively constitutes human subjects at the 
roots of their lived experiences and seeks to equip them with forms of 
value and belief relevant to their specific social tasks and to the general 
reproduction of the social order [though] those subjects are always 
conflictively, precariously constituted.154   
 
Ideology institutes the social, constitutes subjectivity, and informs values and beliefs, as 
does the ethos of the democratic community.  However, in melodramas the democratic 
‘ideology’ is naturalized in representation—universal, informed by sacred notions of 
justice and equality, essential—while other values, beliefs, and social forces are 
represented as ideological villains. To fill the void left after the dissolution of the Franco 
regime, past ideologies from both the left and the right were represented as the villains, 
and an ethical demos as its victim.  
Pedro Olea’s Pim, pam, pum... ¡fuego! (Ready, Aim, Fire!, 1975) represents such 
a struggle between the universal essence of democracy, an ethos of equality, and the 
particular ideologies that undermine its possibility during the immediate postwar period. 
Olea was born in 1938, graduated from the Official School of Cinematography, and 
wrote for Nuestro Cine.155  He began directing television shows before his film debut in 
1967, though his first real success was Tormento (Torment, 1974), adapted from Benito 
Pérez Galdós’s novel.  He then went on to make La Corea (The Chorea, 1976), about 
homosexuals and prostitutes in Madrid; then, Un hombre llamado Flor de Otoño (A Man 
Named Flower of Fall, 1978) about a 1920s lawyer/transvestite living in Barcelona under 
the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.  
Monterde applauds the “filmic recuperation of memory” in Pim, pam, pum... 
¡fuego! because the film frames the postwar period “realistically” from the perspective of 
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those who were on the losing end after the war.156 However, this is a type of film 
criticism intent only on interpreting the content of the narrative and not the film form, on 
evaluating the story but not the melodramatic mode.  Monterde salutes the remembering 
of past experiences from the perspective of those who were victimized by Francoism, but 
does not analyze the melodramatic form used to render the film’s villains and victims. 
Taken simply as a story, Monterde can claim that Pim, pam, pum...¡fuego! offers a 
“radicality...rarely equaled” in its recuperation of the past, but the question of how a 
representation of the past, melodramatically, functions to fill the ethical void at the 
beginning of the transición and substitute the ideology of democracy for past ideologies 
is left unanswered.157 This film is ‘radical’ in that it is one of the first to offer a 
perspective of the past from the losing side, and it certainly represents the lives of those 
struggling to survive the initial years of the postwar period like no other of its time.  We 
see how the autarky instituted after the Civil War established a strict division between the 
few who had connections and controlled the exchange of goods, mostly on the black 
market, and the many who had to scrounge for food, employment, and housing.  
However, while in reality the haves and the have-nots were divided along 
ideological lines—nationalist or republican, blue or red, right or left—this is not the line 
distinguishing the film’s villains from its victims. They are instead differentiated by self-
interest or self-sacrifice, vice or virtue, depravity or civility: an ethical difference of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’ rendered melodramatically. Thus instead of looking for elements of 
correspondence between the ‘reality’ of the past and diegetic reality, it is more instructive 
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to identify how the past is represented, and what such a mode of representation signifies 
for the present of the transición.   
The film begins on a train traveling from Sevilla to Madrid.  In one shot, we dolly 
down the aisle of the train, moving from flamenco singers (the train is coming from 
Andalusia after all), to neighbors across the aisle sharing cigarettes and a wine skin and 
breaking bread together, then we arrive at our heroine, Paca. She is then framed in a 
medium shot, identifying her as our central protagonist, and in this case, our soon-to-be 
melodramatic victim.  Paca sits across from Luis, a maquis on the run to France, who 
shares his bread and chorizo with her when asked.  The collective sharing of goods and 
the congeniality of the shared space seems to be immune from the discord and misery of 
the postwar: a good-natured people unified even with the disorder of society just outside 
the windows.  But, this collective is broken up with the arrival on the scene of two 
officials demanding documentation. For Hernández Ruiz and Pérez Rubio, this scene 
shows the division between “those in power and their victims of oppression” and it 
condemns the ideology of Francoism as represented by the officials.158  This is like the 
division proposed by Monterde, a representation of the price demanded by Francoism and 
paid by society.  
However, this scene does not have such a clear ideological target. True, there are 
two authority figures, who are obviously members of the regime, but this is not what sets 
them apart from the people on the train; in fact, there are no looks of fear nor is there 
distress, except on the part of Luis, who flees the car, which would have been a moment 
of excessive brutality and repression if this melodrama were aligned around ideological 
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poles (guardias entering the car with menacing stares looking to ferret out any ‘reds’ and 
possibly injuring some innocent party along the way). Instead, the officials are first 
defined as separate from the collective of the car, as they move through it, then they are 
singled out as immoral individuals, when they approach Paca in the bathroom.   
After Luis flees, Paca pursues him and stops him from jumping recklessly off the 
train, then hides him in the bathroom with her.  When the officials knock to ask for her 
papers, she pulls her panties down, and opens the door. They take a full glance between 
her legs before shutting the door.  But, they are not the only one who takes in the view: 
Luis does too from the bathroom floor.  Here then we have possibly an unethical look 
from above and one from below. There is a difference in ideological perspective—
Francoism has the power to look down at Paca, while the maquis has to look up—but 
their gazes have the same victim: Paca’s virtue. This scene, instead of setting the stage 
for a series of ideological conflicts to be repeated throughout the film (in fact, regime 
officials are never seen again), signals the melodramatic body that will be victimized 
innumerable times and makes clear that both sides of the ideological divide will be the 
immoral villains.  
Looking back, now more closely, a similar proposition had already been 
announced in the dolly scene. The collective that the scene holds together—sharing 
resources, good-natured and respectful to others, singing and dancing—is ideologically 
complex. There are members in this group from both the losing and winning sides. There 
are flamenco dancers, working class Andalusians who by and large were opposed to the 
regime. Yet the man who asks for a cigarette is reading Pueblo, an unabashed and 
deliberate mouthpiece for the Falange, the Spanish fascist party, and the National 
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Movement party. Both the informal ‘you’ and the formal ‘you’ can be heard in 
conversations between those sharing bread and wine, which reveals an admixture of those 
from both the losing and winning sides. The organizing social force is not an ideology, 
but rather is an ethics, a sharing and concern for one’s neighbor, a recognition of each 
individual’s freedom and equality: an ethics fitting of a democracy.  However, the film 
does not represent this democratic space as a space in which ideologies that contest each 
other ultimately respect the other’s legitimacy. Rather, the scene acts to diffuse 
ideological differences symbolically by displaying these supposedly distinct ideological 
subjects sharing the same universal essence of a democratic ethos.  To this, in following 
scenes, will be opposed the immoral villains that threaten the collective, individuals who 
seek to impose an alternate organizing force upon society.  
After the train, we then follow Paca—the figure of the universal essence—and 
witness the spectacle of her victimization again and again. She is a singer struggling to 
support herself and her invalid father, a republican who was wounded during the war. 
Luis pursues her through the streets. He admits that he had been fighting Francoist forces 
in the mountains, and that he now needs to escape. He has to wait for a set of 
identification papers in order to cross the border, but he knows no one in Madrid. She 
allows him to stay with her and her father, though adding that just when it seemed that 
things could not be worse, he brings this additional ideological baggage with him, which 
only promises to add to the family’s hardship.  She will have to provide for him, just like 
her republican father, both of them confined to the house. They cannot enter into society, 
for their ideology is a disability, whether in body as for the wounded father, or in spirit as 
for Luis unable to escape from his shadowy existence.   
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She was barely managing to provide for herself and her father, so the addition of 
Luis has put her in a bind. Paca, now overwhelmed with financial responsibility, reaches 
out to Julio, a black market profiteer who will ultimately prove her undoing. Julio’s price 
for helping her gain employment and secure an apartment through his nefarious 
connections is that she sacrifice her virtue and become his mistress.  However, while he 
is brutal in his villainy, hitting and forcing himself upon Paca, Julio is not the only 
villain. Luis too performs a type of villainy albeit less extreme.  He watches Paca undress 
each night in the one-room apartment. After some time, she reaches out to Luis for 
comfort after Julio has exacted his price from her one night, at which point he does just 
the same.  Later, he watches her perform in the cabaret, taking in her scantily clad 
routine. Luis is not in a position to make demands of her like Julio, for Luis is ultimately 
powerless, but he profits from the weakened and compromised position of Paca that 
results.  He may not cause her demise as a direct result of his own immorality, but he is 
immoral all the same in that he takes advantage of the situation: Paca’s body, what goods 
she can scrounge up, and the protection of her apartment while he waits for identification 
papers. He then walks away from her when he thinks that he has secured legitimate 
documentation, which is precisely when she needs him most as protection from Julio, 
who has found about Luis and is homicidal.    
The fact that Julio contributes to the death of Luis—a newspaper announces that a 
maquis without proper papers, which Julio had procured, was shot by the police—and 
murders Paca—shooting her point blank then kicking her lifeless body into a ditch—has 
Hernández Ruiz and Pérez Rubio take Julio to be the sole villain in the end. They write 
that the most interesting aspect of this film is 
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not its tendency towards realism in the description of the devastation of 
Spain in the 40s, nor its dialectical approach to the traumatic and unequal 
lived experience of the powerful and the victims of oppression, but rather 
its useful... ideological formulation to confront two antagonistic concepts 
of morality: the supported one by way of corruption, blackmail, influence 
pedaling, and the abuse of power, and the accredited one by the reciprocal 
solidarity between the losers to palliate the voluntary inattention of a State 
more interested in taking revenge and exercising repression than in 
attenuating public misery.159 
 
According to them, the film represents the postwar period’s contrasting moralities to 
depict ‘realistically’ the cost of the regime’s “abject objectives” paid by those from the 
losing side.160 But, again, there is a single morality—the universal, non-ideological  
essence of Paca—that is victimized by both Julio and Luis—who are both ideological and 
immoral, only different in degree. That is, both Francoism and the ideology of the left 
(the film depicts it variously as pre-Civil War or postwar maquis republicanism) are 
indicted as villains.  Hernández Ruiz and Pérez Rubio read the film from a perspective, 
like Monterde’s, that looks to the story to find its meaning and significance for the 
transición, but do not analyze its structure.  As such, they are trapped in the diegetic 
reality, but do not perceive that the melodramatic form is structured around victims and 
villains in order to imagine a notion of the Sacred that binds society and makes it 
cohesive.  In Pim, pam, pum...¡fuego! this is the ethics of the collective as represented in 
the first scene, a collective to which Paca belongs, but to which Luis and Julio do not.  
Pim, pam, pum...¡fuego! has been interpreted by Hernández Ruiz and Pérez 
Rubio, and Monterde, to represent two conflicting ideologies in the ‘love’ triangle 
between Luis, Paca, and Julio, the latter who, through immoral means, exacts a price 
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from the other two and causes their deaths.  This kind of interpretation asks that the 
film’s representation of the conflict between morality and immorality be read as a ‘real’ 
depiction of the ideological struggle between the left and the right, republicanism and 
Francoism, in the postwar period, and that the film be read as an attempt to renarrate the 
past to allow a more ideologically nuanced representation of the past to appear on the 
screen.  However, the film is melodramatic in its mode of representation and tells the 
story of how Paca is a victim of immoral ‘love.’ Paca, the moral representative of the 
majority who collectively struggle and are made to suffer, is destroyed by those who are 
immoral in that they are motivated only by individual interests or ideology, which are 
both condemned. Thus the film works to renarrate the past, not to read the reality of the 
ideological conflicts of the time, but to symbolize the possibility of a democratic ethos 
lost because of ideological conflict in the past, and to imagine its possibility again for the 
present of the transición.  
Las largas vacaciones del 36 (The Long Vacations of 36, 1976), by Jaime 
Camino, is another melodramatic representation of the past. Born in 1936, Camino was 
licensed in law, wrote for Nuestro Cine, and was a member of the experimental 
Barcelona School, though he made more commercial films than others of this group.161 
His first feature was Los felices 60 (The Happy Sixties, 1963) was a contemporary 
picture; however, his documentary La vieja memoria (The Old Memory, 1977) was a 
historical film that returned to the past, which he focused on as well in El largo invierno 
(The Long Summer, 1991).  The historical focus of Las largas vacaciones del 36 is the 
Civil War, and its protagonists are the bourgeoisie, who are shown trying to remain free 
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of ideological conflict by retreating to a mountain village outside of Barcelona. Some 
take the funicular back and forth to the city to work during the day, and are subject to 
conflict there, but once back in the village, the closest signs of the war are distant rumbles 
or flashes in the night from either the city’s defenses or its bombardment. A school is 
even established so that the children never have to return. What was a place for 
vacationing becomes a place to live year round as the families hunker down to wait out 
the war.  
When the film starts, it seems that the war, or the ideological divide behind it, 
might upset the tranquility of the village, as there is a shootout in the village when four 
fascists and a priest attempt an right-wing uprising, but the working class villagers put it 
down. At the same time this is occurring, the film shows a pregnant bourgeois woman 
rushing to the doctor’s office to make sure that the pandemonium and gunshots have not 
upset the baby. What is represented here is a motif that will be repeated again and again: 
the bourgeois family threatened by ideological conflict even if they have not taken a side.  
The bourgeoisie is not aligned with the villagers, who are organized around the 
ideology of the left (a mixture of republicanism, anarcho-syndicalism, and Catalonian 
regionalism), and we never actually see members of the right except during the failed 
uprising. CNT-FAI trade unionists maintain vigilance around the village, administer its 
government, and at a local dance their banners hang everywhere, but the bourgeoisie are 
never represented in these spaces.  Instead, the bourgeoisie are only shown in familial 
spaces.  The worlds are distinct with no overlap.  While there are traces of ideology in the 
familial space, they have no real presence. The republican grandfather in Jorge’s home 
listens to war reports on the radio, while the children round up fascist spies and execute 
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them in the yard.  In another family, there is a fascist supporter who pretends to drive his 
car over the reds behind a bricked up wall. There does seem to be an exception: Quique, 
Jorge’s nephew, joins the republican army once he comes of age. However, his case is 
different. He is not a full member of the family—he only lives in Jorge’s house because 
his father died and their familial space was broken up—and his crossing over is not 
represented as a reconciliation of the two groups.  Quique is represented as a threat to the 
family order, for he upsets the household by engaging in an affair with the maid, which 
he had carried on secretly in his private room.  
The bourgeoisie’s shared dedication to family is an organizing force, but this is 
not an ideology because it functions to isolate familial space from social space. The 
bourgeoisie are not aligned with the ideologies of the left or right either. The two 
principle families of the film, Jorge and Ernesto’s, seem to support opposite sides in the 
war, yet they go on excursions together in the woods, have picnics, and create a school in 
the village for their children to share thus avoiding a return to the city or the war. Political 
allegiances are represented as inconsequential whereas the shared dedication to family 
and work is what binds the bourgeoisie together, which is best represented when they all 
discuss the war one day. Ernesto laments, and others agree, that there are militants on the 
right, anarchists on the left, while those tending to their families and businesses, the 
bourgeoisie, are trapped in the middle.  Ideological conflict is a threat to the family order 
no matter one’s supposed allegiance to a side.  The families are eventually forced to 
compete for scarce resources as the situation becomes more dire. However, the families 
are divided by blood and not ideology, a division that crosses ideological lines as each 
family unit attempts to survive the duration of the war. The bourgeois family is the victim 
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of the villainous war carried out in the name of ideology, and they are all scattered into 
individual parts when forced to evacuate the village on foot at the end of the film.   
One might read this film then as a melodrama built around the structure of the 
bourgeoisie as victims and the ideological conflict between the right and left as the 
villains, which posits an ethics based around family as the counter to the dissolution of 
society and its disastrous effects.  However, looking more closely at how the bourgeoisie 
are represented, the film offers an alternative reading of villain and victim: they are the 
villains because they extricated themselves from society instead of defending it, thus 
making the village the victim. That the villagers are represented excessively, as primal 
and infantile, reinforces their figuration as melodramatic victims. They are not victimized 
by the bourgeoisie in the sense of villains taking advantage of a sweet and simple 
disposition, but rather in that the bourgeoisie do not provide guidance, instruction, and 
resources (one scene stresses that Jorge would rather prefer performing clinical tests on 
mice in his home office than tend to the wounded). The film possibly renders the village 
as lost without the bourgeoisie, and subject to the threat of an opposing social force (the 
Francoist forces are never seen, but they approach steadily to destroy the village). That is, 
the bourgeoisie are not like the wretch who threatens the virtuous maiden in a sensational 
melodrama, but neither are they the man who saves her and foils evil at the end.  Instead, 
Las largas vacaciones del 36 offers a more complex melodrama in which the villainous 
act is that the bourgeoisie, flush with resources (education, money, etc.), did not integrate 
themselves into the social space, which was destroyed by its lack of participation.  In this, 
the village is symbolic of the ‘people’ to be ordered by an organizing social force, who 
fall prey to fascism because of an absconded bourgeoisie who leave the village to defend 
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themselves, and who cling to an form of left ideology that does not organize them 
effectively or save them from Francoism.   
The maid, both primal when seen dancing or copulating with Quique and infantile 
in histrionics, relies upon Jorge’s family to read letters from her brother fighting on the 
front. She needs their education to identify with the struggle occurring in the social space, 
but they do not identify with what they read to her, and eventually have no more time to 
give her. The teacher hired for the private school is from the village, and who is a vocal 
republican, remains silent in the classroom because he is sick and hungry. He provides a 
service to the bourgeoisie, but no care is given to his situation outside the classroom 
doors. Finally, when the CNT-FAI take over the administration of the village, they are 
unsure of what to do, except that all in the village should use the informal ‘you’ when 
speaking to each other.  The maid, arriving back at Julio’s home after the meeting, makes 
an impassioned demand that the informal ‘you’ be used, which causes all to promptly 
laugh and they continue on just as before. Symbolically, again and again, the interests of 
the village are stymied by the bourgeoisie, either by ignorance or in pursuit of their self-
interests. What is lost is the possibility of cultivating a universal essence combining both 
the villagers and the bourgeoisie, a cohesive social unity that could have resisted 
Francoism.  The ultimate victim in Las largas vacaciones del 36 is the loss of a unified 
society, in which the interests of the bourgeoisie and the working class villagers are both 
served.  
No collective is ever realized because the bourgeoisie never pushed to organize 
society, their lack of faith left the possibility of its Sacred status to perish, a ‘wrong’ 
disallowing the ‘right’ community to become. The ideology of Francoism filled the void 
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because no other ideology—or organizing social force—opposed and contested it.  In the 
end, both the families and the villagers are displaced by the forces of Francoism, which 
the film represents as the fault of the bourgeoisie, for only they could have directed the 
organization of the ‘people’ otherwise: a democracy requiring their participation to 
mature beyond its infantile expression by the villagers and become a bourgeois 
democracy. The final image of the film represents how Francoism forced the dislocation 
and division between and within the groups, as individually, figures scatter across the 
screen to travel alone into the immediate future. The victim in this film was the 
possibility of proposing an organization of society different from that which it would be 
become under Francoism.  Melodramatically, Las largas vacaciones del 36 offers the 
uncertain present of the transición a clear-cut representation of how now to form a 
cohesive society after its dissolution, imagining past experiences as a future expectation 
for a bourgeois democracy.    
This is different than the democratic ethos represented in Pim, pam, pum... 
¡fuego! In the former, the collective is organized around a universal and ethical essence, 
which is represented as Sacred and symbolizes the ‘good’ that is threatened by the ‘evil’ 
of all ideologies. In the latter, the collective never coheres because the sine qua non of its 
essence, the bourgeoisie, turned its back to the Sacred and isolated itself in a familial 
space, thus symbolizing the ‘wrong’ done to the possibility of the ‘right’ social force that 
could have opposed Francoism.  However, even though the films represent different 
social ‘realities’ diegetically, both offer melodramatically political codes for the reality of 
the present. As Manuel Trenzado Romero writes, “[t]his type of cinema [a recuperation 
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of collective or historical memory] intends not to realize rigorous analyses of the past, but 
rather to ‘re-read it’ from the new political codes of the present.”162  
The code of Pim, pam, pum...¡fuego! imagines the political to be an organization 
of society realized ethically and not ideologically, a reading of the past to represent the 
victimization of the demos by the immorality of a few, which the present should disallow 
with the institution of a democracy.  Las largas vacaciones del 36 offers up a different 
code, in which the political is the active constitution of a bourgeois democracy, which 
was victimized by the lack of responsibility on the part of the bourgeoisie in the past, and 
which requires their participation in the present to unify society.    
Pim, pam, pum...¡fuego! was released around Franco’s death, and Las largas 
vacaciones del 36 was released over a year later, three months after Suárez had been 
made president; thus these codes have to be understood in relation to the early years of 
the transición, a period of imagining the possibility of democracy and not one in which 
the political process of instituting a liberal democracy had begun. They both project the 
political desire for the establishment of a democracy, and do so by representing why the 
potential or possibility of democracy had been lost in history before. They both represent 
a set of obstacles to, or the destruction of, a democratic-like social unity in the past, so 
that democracy might exist now that Francoism has reached its end. They are not 
allegorical readings of the past, as they were (and had to be) in the 1960s and early 1970s 
before Franco’s death: instead of the past prefiguring the present under Franco, it is the 
Francoist past that disfigures the uncertain and conflicted present. For this reason, the 
mode of representation they employ to retell the past and project an image of cohesion in 
                                                 




the immediate future was melodrama: the excessively clear-cut depiction of ideological 
villains and its democratic victims. This is a new moment in Spanish cinema, a period of 
historical melodramas returning to the past and offering multiple narratives imagining 
democracy as a cohesive society precisely when the social was fragmented and between 
histories.  
Las largas vacaciones del 36 represents a political code to present a unified 
opposition to prevent the continuation of Francoism so that a democracy might take hold. 
Other films, like the aforementioned Retrato de familia or La guerra de papá (Daddy’s 
War, dir. Antonio Mercero, 1977), return to the past to represent how divisions among 
distinct, but not ultimately opposed, groups allowed Francoism to succeed. These films, 
too, represent democracy from the perspective of the bourgeoisie who absented 
themselves from society.  This absenteeism is demonstrated to be the villain that made 
democracy its victim by allowing Francoism to fill the void. Pim, pam, pum...¡fuego! 
represents a political code that presents democracy as a shared ethics unifying society, 
which was denied in the past because of the villainy of ideology. Imagined for the present 
is a cohesive society around an ethos of equality and fraternity, not victimized by 
ideology, which is represented similarly in such films as Los días del pasado (The Days 
of the Past, dir. Mario Camus, 1977) or Asignatura pendiente (Unfinished Business, dir. 
José Luis Garci, 1977) in which reconciliation is a return to the ethical. 
These codes structure political desires for a democratic future and not political 
positions from which to specifically participate in the construction of the democracy. 
That is, these films are signs of political anxieties concerning the past and political 
desires for the present as the transición began. It is important to consider these initial 
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codes in relation to the instability and uncertainty of the moment, and not just as 
demonstrations of the consensual processes still to come, as Monterde does in his film 
history; nor, as confronting the reality of the past, as Hernández Ruiz and Pérez Rubio 
take them to be, for they are melodramatic renderings of the past to symbolize political 
possibility for the present.  They are imaginary representations of a political desire for 
democracy, and examples of what Trenzado Romero calls a cine de reconocimiento, or 
recognition/examination: a cinema for recognizing in the past a means for “collective 
identification” by which to examine the present.163  
The films return to the past to represent a collectivity that has not coalesced in the 
present, a desire taking shape in representation for what reality might be. That the films 
represent such a collective either simplistically, as a clear-cut ethical community 
undermined by avarice and cruelty in Pim, pam, pum... ¡fuego¡, or from an elevated and 
possibly condescending perspective, as a ‘people’ who require the leadership of the 
bourgeoisie to guide and instruct them, is less important than the appearance of the screen 
of imaginations of political and historical positions oriented towards democracy. The 
“collective identification” here is a matter of returning to the question of how a social 
unity might be formed again after the fragmentation and dislocation imposed by the 
Franco regime, a crucial question to ask if there is to be a democracy at all.  John 
Hopewell writes, these films “drawing parallels between past and present found deep 
analysis difficult partly because they lacked present coordinates to work out their own 
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historical conditions.”164 Through the melodramatic mode, however, representation 
stepped in to provide coordinates that reality did not provide.   
After the Pactos of Moncloa and the process to draft and ratify the Constitution 
from 1977 to 1978, there would be other political codes offered by Spanish melodramas, 
not directed towards the past but towards the present and its different set of villains and 
victims. Following the institution of Spain’s liberal democracy, another period of cinema 
in the transición would begin, a cine de conocimiento, or knowledge/consciousness, 
intent on “reflection and political analysis” concerning the democracy that was 
instituted.165 As Trenzado Romero writes, “the political transition is a privileged moment 
of the interdependence between the logic that governs the political changes and that of 
the cinematographic changes.”166 As politics transitioned, so too did desires for and 
representations of political possibility, which means that film histories of Spanish cinema 
should not consider the entirety of films from 1975-1982 as a cohesive set of films, which 
Monterde, Hernández Ruiz and Pérez Rubio seem to do, for this disallows a reading of 
films as cultural artifacts involved in a melodramatically symbolical act that changed just 
as much as the socio-political landscape did in reality over these seven years.  
Before turning to the second half of the transición, and the changing logic of 
politics and cinema, I offer a few comments about the documentary, El desencanto (The 
Disenchantment, dir. Jaime Chávarri, 1976), as a segue.167  Trenzado Romero suggests 
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that it is the only film that can be cataloged as an example of cine de concocimiento at 
this point because it does manage a critical reflection and political analysis of Spanish 
history and society.168 However, as El desencanto is intent on deconstructing the 
Francoist myths of family and culture, and thus is part of the project to recognize the 
malignancy of past ideologies and their social effects, it is not an example of a cine de 
conocimiento of the present. Rather, it straddles the line between the two, reconocimiento 
and conocimiento, because it returns to the past through the memories of the protagonists 
narrated from the present.  It negotiates both the past and the present in the diegesis, 
which works to sever ties to the past by exposing the sham myths of Francoism, and also 
suggests how the political is becoming a matter of individual and not national identity in 
the present.  This political transition is not the explicit focus of the film, for it is more a 
narrative of the disenchantment with the past; instead, it is signaled in how the sons of a 
Francoist poet distinguish themselves from their father, and the past, by adopting new 
social and political expressions. Here already we have elements of the political that will 
take more solid shape during the second half of the transición after 1977, which include 
the performativity of the political, the politicization of lifestyles (drugs, sexuality, etc.), 
and the individualization of political expression and identity. The irony is that while El 
desencanto engages the past to free the present and possibly prepare it for democracy, it 
is a disenchantment with the institution of the liberal democracy and with the practice of 
                                                                                                                                                 
he went on to make El desencanto as well as A un Díos desconocido and Dedicatoria 
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in 1983 were the musicals Las cosas del querer in 1989 and its sequel in 1995. From 
Torres, Diccionario del cine español, 143-44. 




consensual politics that will come to reinforce these political positions of identification in 
the present. 
The “abyss” identified by Castoriadis in liberal democracy “between the ‘private’ 
and the ‘public’ spheres, between ethics and politics... and the resignation of the critical 
spirit before the gates of power” would grow as consensual politics became the norm and 
a rift was created between the State and a disenchanted public.169 Yet, in some 
melodramas near the end of the transición, the terms would reverse themselves: the 
private would become political.  In such films, the modern idea of an ethical essence to 
reconcile the Spanish demos and give it a national identity would be confronted and 
undermined by postmodern representations of private and particular identities victimized 
or threatened by its universality. In representation, a critical spirit would continue fill the 
screen, which raises the question of the next chapter: Why did opposition continue in the 
socio-cultural but fade to black before the gates of the State in the socio-political?   
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Disenchantment with Democracy 
 
 
Following the Pactos de la Moncloa, Eduardo Haro Tecglen recognized in 
October of 1977 that the consensual path towards democracy was less that of 
“agonism”—built around the idea of competing projects and clearly demarcated 
opposition—and more of a process of negotiation amongst elites. With the drafting of the 
Pactos, his writing became less the imagination of what a democracy should or could be 
and more a critique of the democracy being instituted. He wrote of the “pilfering of the 
democracy” that the pacts exemplified, drafted behind closed doors by select politicians:  
Consensus, following the term as it is used and applied in present 
democracies, is an acceptance of basic general ideas, of elemental 
principles, of a line of conduct, but does not mean the definitive 
elaboration of laws and pacts, of meticulous agreements. This is the work 
of the Congress and the Senate. 
[Un consenso, según el término está siendo utilizado y admitido en los 
regímenes democráticos actuales, es una aceptación de ideas generales 
básicas, de unos principios elementales, de una línea de conducta: no 
significa la elaboración definitiva de leyes y pactos, de acuerdos 
minuciosos. Eso es lo que corresponde al Congreso y al Senado.]170  
 
Even though the actual content of the pacts was not yet known, he was alarmed by the 
fact that only a handful of recently elected representatives drafted them, thereby negating 
the historical achievement of the elections to reintroduce plurality into the government 
after the lone party of Franco’s National Movement. Only the ten most established 
                                                 




leaders of the leading parties were involved in drafting the economic and political future 
of the democracy. They signatories of the Pactos de Moncloa, signed on the 25th of 
October in 1977, were: for the economic pact, Adolfo Suárez (UCD, center-right), 
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo (UCD), Felipe González (PSOE, socialist), Enrique Tierno 
Galván (PSP, socialist), Joan Reventós (CSC, Catalan/socialist), Josep Maria Triginer 
(PSC, Catalan/socialist), Miguel Roca (CDC, Catalan/Christian democratic), Juan 
Ajuriaguerra (PNV, Basque/nationalist), Manuel Fraga (AP, far-right), and Santiago 
Carrillo (PCE, communist); and, for the political pact, all the same except Triginer who 
did not sign and Fraga who abstained.171  
Haro Tecglen also worried that, for the most part, such debates about the future 
were not had in society or in the press: 
Public opinion does not cease to matter after its vote: it continues acting 
without end, it continues in permanent dialogue with its representatives 
and its parties, it wants to see and hear them in action. Debates within the 
political chambers are debates that should be held at the same time in the 
street and the plaza.  And in the press. 
[La opinión pública no termina en el momento de emitir un voto: sigue 
actuando continuamente, sigue en diálogo permanente con sus disputados 
y sus partidos, quiere verles y escucharles en sus actuaciones. Los debates 
de las Cámaras son debates que se mantienen al mismos tiempo en la calle 
y en la plaza.  Y en la prensa.]172 
  
However, even with his growing disenchantment with the democracy being instituted, 
Haro Tecglen still held tightly to his idea that a demos—involved in the pursuit of a 
singular goal, in the street, press, and parliament—was possible if there was greater 
involvement and, as a result, more opposition. More troubling then when the pacts were 
voted on in parliament and there was only one dissenter, Francisco Letamendía from the 
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Euskadiko Ezkerra coalition (the Basque left nationalists), who opposed the failure to 
grant Basque autonomy (he would also be one of the few who would vote against the 
Constitution).173  It might be asked then: Why did Haro Tecglen continue to expect 
anything other from the State than consensus and backroom deals, especially given that 
the only type of opposition did not critique the foundations of the State? Why did he 
continue to believe that there was a collective identity formed around an ethos of equality 
and freedom that each subject shared its essence?  Especially after it would become clear 
soon enough that the Moncloa Pacts were “in many respects the culmination of the 
policies of moderation and self-sacrifice pursued by both the Socialists and Communists 
throughout the transition period,” which meant that “the government fulfilled few of its 
promises and, in consequence, the Spanish working class bore the brunt of the economic 
crisis.”174 It was because Haro Tecglen was lost in time, historically that is. 
Alberto Medina argues that Haro Tecglen conceived of democracy as “a 
privileged political form of modernity, built around the idea of progress and thus focused 
upon the future.”175  Accordingly then, Haro Tecglen would have understood Francoism 
as the impediment of modernity, an unfinished project that would be complete with the 
establishment of a democracy, or so Haro Tecglen hoped. This appears to be like 
Habermas’s idea of the unfinished project of modernity waiting to be completed, though 
his is much more ambiguous with respect to what part the State would play. As Fredric 
Jameson points out, “Habermas’s formula remains usefully ambiguous, and allows one to 
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entertain the possibility that modernity is incomplete because it is never completed by the 
middle class and its economic system.”176 That is, while Habermas posits that modernity 
might be complete once ‘communicative reason’ is at its essence, this process is stymied 
by the economic system, and its class structure, and not the actions of the State or its 
representatives.   
For Haro Tecglen, there is nothing ambiguous about the role of the State. If it, 
internally, is formed around consensus amongst a few and not an opposition that the 
many would introduce, then it cannot institute a social and economic democracy, and 
modernity will remain incomplete. The idea of opposition being necessary for modernity 
suggests that modernity involves self-reflection ( “a reflective process, a more-or-less 
advanced attempt at critique and auto-critique in a bid for knowledge”177 as Henri 
Lefebvre puts it), which is like Castoriadis’s definition of democracy as unlimited 
interrogation in contrast to a society informed by unquestioned laws given by God, 
Nature, or any other absolute.178  
With respect to Spain’s history, and Haro Tecglen’s past and present position in 
it, his conflation of modernity and democracy is understandable, given that Francoism 
was a reaction to modernity and a stifling of any interrogation of laws, norms, and values, 
by imagining itself as absolute and disallowing any political opposition that might openly 
interrogate this.179  Thus he essentially imagines the present to be everything that 
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Francoism was not and what it got in the way of: the 2nd Republic’s transition into 
modernity and its pursuit of democracy that involved a continual interrogation of itself.   
Of course, it must be remembered that the Republic’s antagonistic form of 
opposition always prevented stability and the institution of democracy, with its changes 
in government not the result of some collective interrogation of democracy, but rather as 
radical reactions to each other.180  However, for Haro Tecglen, the transición was not a 
return to the actual Republic, but instead was a new beginning to the historical movement 
that the Republic began, and for which the necessary progress to its future completion 
was denied.  His imagination of democracy was motivated by a symbolic and nostalgic 
remembrance of a possibility denied that waited for completion.  What he did not realize 
at the time was that this thoroughly ‘modern’ idea was a historical antinomy, for the 
transición could not complete some possibility denied in the past, a remainder waiting for 
time to suture it into social space, for it was a transition away from modernity into 
postmodernity.181 Haro Tecglen’s imagination of the institution of democracy through 
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political activity in the social and by the State, together forming a demos with a shared 
national ethos, was as much part of the past as the Franco regime.  
 However, Haro Tecglen’s conception of the transición as a historical completion 
of a past remainder is not unique.  The historian and political scientist, and active 
member of the PSOE’s cultural foundation, Santos Juliá also sees the transición as a 
return and renewal of what the 2nd Republic began.  He writes that  
[because of the popular mobilization and cultural dynamism that drove the 
Republic], what defines the Spain of the 1960s and 1970s is not, therefore, 
the beginning of a change that sociologists call modernization, 
industrialization, advanced capitalism, or the reconstruction of a bourgeois 
hegemony over new bases, but rather the resumption of a history begun at 
the beginning of the 20th century, accelerated in the 1920s and 1930s and 
paralyzed by a victorious political will after a war of three years.182    
 
Modernity, for Juliá, began when Spain embraced democratic liberalism and 
consequently experienced a cultural dynamism following the brief 1st Republic and the 
constitutional monarchy that followed. Unfortunately, just when the essence of the demos 
was being accelerated and cemented in the years surrounding the 2nd Republic, it was 
paralyzed by the Francoist regime; that is, its history was not lost but just frozen in time.  
With the transición, Spanish history (understood here to be the temporal drive towards a 
liberal democracy) simply picks up where it left off and progresses towards a cultural 
flourishing and a popular mobilization. For this reason, the transición was not a new 
moment in history, but rather was a “new phase” in an already begun history to complete 
the unfinished product of modernity.183 This has nothing to do with changes in socio-
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economic externalities, the earlier autarky or the later consumerism; for Juliá, modern 
history is not material. Instead, modernity is a movement towards the realization of the 
people’s democratic essence, denied before and to be fulfilled now. 
Yet, there is a difference in Haro Tecglen and Juliá’s historicizations of 
modernity, though both take its completion to be the realization of a demos. Haro 
Tecglen’s idea of political opposition is the motor driving history along towards this goal, 
while Juliá’s historical motor is some sort of progression away from any political will.184 
Elías Díaz, of the journal Cuadernos para el Diálogo (a socialist/Christian democratic 
publication prominent in the 1970s) and of the PSOE, takes a position in the middle by 
arguing that “the motor of the transition” was the “democratic and political opposition” 
working together with the “forces and institutions rooted in the regime, without which the 
whole process would have been even more difficult than it actually was.”185 It is political 
consensus, not political opposition or disappearance, that allows for a break from the 
Francoist past and an improvement on the fractious and divisive ‘democracy’ of the 2nd 
Republic. He writes: “the transition in Spain was carried out through a difficult process of 
reform (characterized by pacts and consensus) which resulted in a genuine political 
ruptura.”186  For a demos to be realized, it is not a matter of overcoming a historical 
blockade to finish off what was previously started, but rather there must be a 
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reconciliation between the two elements. Díaz believes that if the Spanish democracy 
were not built around reform and consensus, then there would have been revolution or 
violent upheaval, as direct competition and contestation of political projects would have 
disrupted its precarious position.187 It is not a matter of breaking free from history, “a 
radical break from the past” that would imply some institution of State and society as 
completely distinct.188  Rather the project of the transition to democracy was to return and 
resolve the conflicts and divisions of the past.  
Though these different understandings of how the transición would complete a 
project whose history stretched back to near the beginning of the century—either 
finishing off modernity’s progression towards democracy, or reconciling disparate 
histories encompassed by modernity—each takes the transición to be another phase in 
History. Given Spain’s history, the weight of the past cannot be denied, for it is full of 
incompletion and instability, which can be traced far beyond the 2nd Republic and deep 
into the 19th century to include the Carlist Wars, the brief 1st Republic, and the various 
authoritarian rulers along the way.189 For this reason, Mouffe’s “agonism”—democratic 
adversaries with irreconcilable political projects—was maybe quite difficult to expect, 
though Haro Tecglen did.  However, this is not to say that it was not a possibility, but it is 
an admission that any attempt to render a political landscape around the idea of 
“agonism” would have required intensive care during the transición, though this does not 
mean that history required political opposition to disappear or be negotiated away by 
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consensual decree either.  Perhaps, history demanded an entirely new understanding of 
politics for a democracy. 
This is not addressed by conceptualizations of the transición as a completion of a 
past project, or a reconciling of the present with the past, imagining democracy with a 
demos in mind: a collective sharing of an essence of equality and freedom that was 
denied in the past but was possible in the present. However, what if the lost and nostalgic 
demos could never be because its conditions were historically past, that the transición 
was the beginning of a new historical epoch, that of postmodernity, historically ruptured 
and far flung from the past? Then a resolution of, or reconciliation with, modernity is 
simply begging the question, and any consideration of democracy or the political should 
not have the past as a referent, but should ask how these concepts are now different; how 
they have been inflected and redirected by history.  Is democracy and the political to be 
found roaming the corridors of parliament or the royal palace, or ambulating about the 
streets and the plaza? Or was it that there was no totality (resolution) to be had in the 
present that might complete an essentialist conception of the demos—a national body 
sharing an identity grounded in an ethos of equality? Instead of another phase of 
modernity, quite possibly the present was marked by newly emerging and always 
morphing particularities (rupture) best understood as postmodernity.  
Those like Juliá and Díaz—and this list could be very long, including not only the 
names of politicians like Adolfo Suárez, Felipe González, Santiago Carrillo, and 
eventually even Manuel Fraga, but also the names of such intellectuals as Raúl Morodo, 
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Enrique Tierno Galván, Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, and Ramón Tamames190—for whom a 
liberal democracy was the telos destined by history, did not look critically at what form 
of democracy was instituted during the transición.191 As Juliá writes, “the election results 
[in 1977] were a breath of fresh air: freedom blew across the whole of Spanish 
society.”192 The end of history, that is of modernity, had been reached. Haro Tecglen 
presented a different case, however, for there was no end in sight for him.  
As he believed that the democracy instituted did not complete or fulfill any 
historical progression, he began to imagine the political possibility for democracy as a 
loss. For Haro Tecglen, the transición hardly brought about an electoral representation of 
interests and needs, except those of a small cadre of elites, but rather constituted, as 
Jacques Rancière might put it, an “‘oligarchy’ that leaves enough room for democracy to 
feed” but that does not satiate.193 That the ‘opposition’ agreed to sit at the table and 
negotiate with their adversaries only left one hungry still for a more just and equal society 
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and for a democracy. His writing began to critique the “utopia of consensus” and its 
foreclosure of future possibility for a genuine democracy.194  
Suárez’s address to the nation on April 5th, 1978 to announce that the Constitution 
would be drafted by seven representatives (three from the center-right UCD, one from the 
far-right AP, one from the far-left PCE, one from the center-left PSOE, and one from a 
nationalist Catalan party, the Convergència i Unió)195 signified that consensus was not a 
one-time event—the Moncloa Pacts—but would be the continued practice of politics in 
the new democracy, that backroom deals between political leaders would be the norm. 
The utopia of consensus now made a reality was taken to be the successful end to the 
transition: democracy had been achieved. But, this was taken as a democracy in name 
only, concealing an undemocratic reality: “It seemed as if the opposition—that from the 
right, that from the left—would be, really, an opposition.  And the Congress a congress, 
the debate a debate. But... the grand deception revealed itself.”196 
There was a measure of self-deception as well, for Haro Tecglen knew that Spain 
was already integrated into outside markets, and that Spain’s ongoing process of 
modernization was tied to international capital, all to say that the institution of a capitalist 
and liberal democracy was not altogether surprising.197 However, attached to the past as 
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he still was, he did not realize that his expectation for political opposition was a utopia in 
itself, a remnant of his modernist hope for the transición. That González said that 
“nothing but the politics of consensus will allow a better form of government” and 
Carrillo that “a politics of consensus or convergence is indispensable” should have 
signaled to Haro Tecglen that politics had entered a new historical stage different from 
before.198 To paraphrase Rancière, politics was no longer a matter of opposing worlds, 
but only of differing opinions.199 Haro Tecglen did recognize that the evacuation of 
opposition in politics created a rift between representatives and their constituents:  
the political parties have become weaker than ever because of this process 
of legislation that bypasses the productive nature of a debate, one that 
should instead take place amongst the whole of the nation not taking 
comfort from their daily losses. 
[los partidos políticos hayan quedado más débiles que antes, ante un juicio 
que desborda el producido en el debate: el del conjunto de la nación, que 
no se consuela de sus pérdidas diarias.]200  
 
However, he still held onto the very modern idea of demos as a possibility.  What he did  
recognize though was that a politics of consensus denied any real possibility for a fuller 
measure of democracy: “The politics of consensus, in the present reality—much closer 
than any utopia—is always a politics of compromise, and a politics of compromise tends, 
generally, to lead to nothing.”201  
Haro Tecglen held the PSOE most responsible for the transición’s failure to bring 
about a democracy complete with opposing political projects, one which might have 
realized his hoped for vision of the future as the historical actualization of social and 
economic equality. For Haro Tecglen, the PSOE was the only oppositional party that 
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stood a chance to serve as a check and balance against the UCD and, more important, 
make demands to force significant changes in how power and wealth were distributed.  
However, he realized that past experience had misled his future expectation. As the 
Constitution neared referendum, Haro Tecglen’s writings turned to document the failures 
of instituting democracy fully into all spheres of public life: economic, political, social, 
and cultural. The Constitution was understood as not only another instance of consensus 
and but also as a foreclosure of immediate change, for it cemented a lasting foundation in 
the structural organization of public life, which the opposition helped to draft along with 
the former members of the regime still in power. 
Before the Constitution came up for referendum, Haro Tecglen offered one last 
attempt to shake politics free from its consensual bind by calling attention to the 
incompleteness of what had been achieved.  He stressed that the hour was nearing when it 
would be almost impossible for the left to extricate itself from the current practice of 
consensual politics: 
The democratic left has fallen into the trap of having to defend the 
“situation,” with all of its imperfections, as well as Suárez and the 
permanency of the UCD in power; as the situation is unsatisfactory, the 
left’s defense of the situation has undermined the credibility of its parties. 
[La izquierda democrática ha caído en la trampa de tener que defender “la 
situación,” con todas sus imperfecciones, y al propio Suárez, y a la 
permanencia de la UCD en el poder; como la situación is insatisfactoria, 
su defensa hace perder credibilidad a los partidos de la izquierda.]202   
 
The left did not address the lack of infrastructure, the artifice of the economy’s success, 
the continued emigration for a decent wage, the crackdown on strikes or protests, or the 
                                                 




status quo, as they did not want to lose their place at the table.203 By backing a 
Constitution that did not promise any real reform, they made themselves responsible for a 
form of democracy that did not promise anything different. Haro Tecglen wrote:  
What the nation needs, and what the Government and those who support it 
still do not admit, is a rapid and true reform, a reform at the foundation of 
the structure of Spanish society, which does not allow for antiquated or 
past molds and maneuvers free from the elocutionary twists of the 
Constitution still being written, but rather leads to rapid and direct 
actuation. If consensus has served for something, it has not been the 
promotion of a defensive, resigned or frightened attitude, but rather has 
been the revelation of society’s problems with all the clarity and 
profundity that is necessary. 
[Lo que necesita el país, y ya se le está yendo el tiempo al Gobierno y a 
quienes le apoyan, es una reforma rápida y verdadera, una reforma a fondo 
de la estructura de la sociedad española, que no cabe ya en los moldes 
antiguos y férreos, y que está desbordando incluso los ambages de la 
Constitución aún no hecha, sino una actuación rápida y directa.  Si el 
consenso ha de servir de algo, que no sea para una actitud defensiva, 
retraida y asustada, sino para abordar los problemas con toda la claridad y 
la profundidad que hace falta.]204 
 
He read the days just before the Constitution was voted upon as the last chance to put 
forward an opposing set of demands, to realize a more just and equitable society in the 
institution of a democracy that might come closer to completing what he understood as 
the project of modernity, and to avoid the growing desencanto and pasotismo 
(disenchantment and indifference) as a result “not of the democracy, but of a non-
democracy.”205 
Of course, none of this happened. As Gregorio Morán explains, the transición 
was a “defeat of all that which were considered inevitable anti-Francoist objectives for 
the future: liberty without oligarchies that might limit it, the transformation of society and 
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politics as a result of the now active citizenry.”206  There was no return to the past to 
resolve its incompleteness or instability, no completion of or reconciliation with 
modernity. The idea of democracy that was conceived of as the opposite to Francoist 
repression and authority when the regime still stood, the idea of a democratic future that 
motivated the anti-Francoists towards a future that would free the Spanish people and 
grant them liberty, the idea of democracy that constituted the political project of the 
opposition when they were still denied the right of representation—these never came to 
be a reality after the 1977 elections.207 Once the opposition was in position to make 
demands and debate the future of the Spanish state, they no longer had the anti-Francoist 
political project in mind. Instead, during the transición, the project was to negotiate and 
make concessions to assure a continued rise to power, to win the backing of the 
influential by assuring them that their idea of democracy did not entail a significant 
transformation of politics or society except in the expansion of individual rights that 
would in turn best serve an economic expansion.  As Juliá states, though without a hint of 
irony, the ‘opposition’ “saw themselves as replacements for the bourgeoisie, ready, 
willing, and capable of carrying out the task of transforming the country into a modern 
[liberal] democracy.”208   
One could counter that the socialist-led opposition was simply trying to foment 
‘revolutionary’ reform within the confines of the State.209 Surely, however, even this 
would not have necessitated a free market liberal democracy over a social democracy. 
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There was to be no ‘revolution’ even in reform, as the opposition made it clear that they 
were as equally invested as the center-right in steering the transición towards a liberal 
democracy by working with them freely and fully committed. The only distinction made 
was that the PSOE appeared as more ‘modern’: they were not tied to the regime, and they 
did work for enhanced freedoms of expression and choice (for example, phasing out the 
penalization of adultery or the use of contraceptives, a more public debate over abortions, 
an end to censorship, etc.). However, at the same time, they distanced themselves from 
the earlier emotional promises to do away with the concentration of power—the 
oligarchies, the entrenched elites, the monarchy, etc.—which revealed a self-directed 
depoliticization of opposition within their ranks.210 As Morán puts it, “the transición 
converted itself into a treaty of how to make politics disappear from society.”211  
Morán seems less concerned with the PSOE’s disavowal of their historical 
constituency—the workers’ movement—than he does with the ideological reconstitution 
of the PCE during the transición. Carrillo’s willingness to turn a blind eye towards the 
past receives most of his criticism, for Morán takes the ‘price of the transition’ to be the 
continued influence of the past (the Civil War and the postwar regime) on the national 
body and psyche in the present.212 Cristina Moreiras also suggests that the present was 
“constituted precisely over the ruins of phantasms still living without having been put to 
rest,” which demonstrates a continuity between an injurious past and a wounded 
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present.213  As Morán points out, because of this continuity, “the primary equality that the 
transición established for Spanish democracy was that we are all equal in relation to the 
past. A guaranty for maintaining inequality for the future.”214  Even for these critics of 
the transición, then, the present is not seen as resolving wounds or inequalities from the 
past, thus not establishing a ruptura or historical break.  
Possibly, as Jameson writes, “the only satisfactory semantic meaning of 
modernity lies in its association with capitalism,” which does seem to offer a means of 
understanding why there would be a continuity.215 The transición did demonstrate, at the 
level of the State, a continuous historical progression towards and completion of a liberal 
democracy in the service of capital after the failed 2nd Republic and the dark years of 
Francoism. Zizek would point out that “every rise of fascism is a sign of a failed 
revolution,”216 which was the Republic, and that “fascism emerged as an attempt to 
master capitalism’s excesses, to build a kind of capitalism without capitalism,”217 like the 
consumerist middle class developed by the regime in the 1960s and 1970s following the 
Economic Stabilization Plan in 1959 that began the so-called ‘Spanish Miracle’ that was 
all the while firmly controlled by the State. The institution of a liberal democracy 
motivated by the demands of capitalism in the transición then would have been a 
continuation of this process, completing the project of modernity in the form of a free 
market economy and a democratic society.  
                                                 
213 Moreiras Menor, Cultura herida: literatura y cine en la España democrática, 17. 
214 Morán, El precio de la transición, 108. 
215 Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present, 13. 
216 Slavoj Zizek, "Ethical Socialism? No, Thanks!," Telos 129 (Fall-Winter 2004): 187. 




However, while the liberal democracy could be taken to be a completion of the 
unfinished project of modernity, whether through depoliticization and reconciliation (the 
‘end of ideology’) or late-stage capitalism (the ‘end of history’), Haro Tecglen continued 
to imagine a different type of democracy for society that did not only serve a selected 
few. He would mourn the loss of what he saw as modernity’s potential, but he would 
continue to look for promising signs that a people’s democracy might still be a possibility 
for the future, much like Jacques Derrida’s promise  
that can only arise in such a diastema (failure, inadequation, disjunction, 
disadjustment, being “out of joint”). That is why we always propose to 
speak of a democracy to come, not of a future democracy in the future 
present, not even of a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or of a 
utopia—at least to the extent that their inaccessibility would still retain the 
temporal form of a future present, of a future modality of the living 
present.218 
 
With the betrayal of the opposition and the desencanto and pasotismo all around, and the 
dislocation of democracy and the opposition from the practice of politics, what was 
needed was not a historical phase, but rather a new historical stage.  
Political participation in the State did not have any value beyond the symbolic one 
bestowed by the act of voting, which was limited to choosing between parties who 
appeared different on the surface but worked together towards a shared end.  Haro 
Tecglen argued for something different than the “democracy that has not been easy to 
comprehend, that has moved along fearfully, with hesitation, with moderation and vague 
words, and that has made it so that the nation coming into being is met only with negative 
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reactions.”219  The disenchantment and indifference signaled a break between the public 
and the practice of politics, which meant the impossibility of his imagination of 
democracy from becoming, for just as “one should consider that if a form of destroying 
democracy is by fire and sword, another form of destruction is with a negative attitude of 
disdain or a type of autism that prevents us from communicating with it.”220  Democracy 
was now outside the realm of perception, neither to be seen or touched, but hopefully not 
too far off in the distance. 
Haro Tecglen recognized its absence in that the Constitution was approved by an 
overwhelming majority, almost 90%, though a third of the public chose not to participate 
in the referendum.221 Besides the abstention by the extreme right, those protesting the 
failure to resolve regional autonomy, or the usual amount of people unable to vote (the 
sick or infirm, absentees, etc.), the high amount of non-voters suggested other factors 
contributing to the low turnout, which was not only the lowest of the transición, but was 
also one of Europe’s lowest in recent times.222  Haro Tecglen argued that these factors 
were:  
the “pasotismo” on the part of the youth included for the first time as 
members of the voting public... and the “desencanto” of recent times on 
the part of the population dissatisfied by the insufficient change of life that 
was hoped for during the democracy or pre-democracy as well as the lack 
of credulity in “historical change.” 
[el “pasotismo” de una parte de la juventud incluida por primera vez en el 
censo de votantes... el “desencanto” de los últimos tiempos de parte de la 
población por la insuficiencia en el cambio de vida que ha supuesto la 
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democracia o predemocracia, y la falta de credulidad en el “cambio 
histórico.”]223   
 
The indifference and disenchantment were symptoms of a liberal democracy that 
minimized “agonism” by means of a politics of consensus, and as a result created a 
vacuum of political alternatives to question the measures of equality or justice that a 
liberal democracy offered. Because there was no opposition, no political projects 
fundamentally different from those making decisions and maintaining the rule of law, 
Haro Tecglen concluded that the public would only continue to lose interest in the merely 
symbolic act of voting. The number of those participating in the electoral process did 
continue to decline. After the March 1st, 1979 elections, the UCD won again, though 
paradoxically those voting in their support, 24% of the total number of possible voters, 
were less than the number of abstentions, 33%.224 The winner was determined by a 
number of votes fewer than those who decided not to participate. There did not seem to 
be much in the way of democratic promise for the immediate present. 
Yet, the municipal elections on April 3rd of the same year resulted in the left 
winning control in 1800 municipalities, representing 70% of the population and an 
overwhelming majority of the largest cities, including Barcelona and Madrid, which Haro 
Tecglen quickly suggested signified “something more than reform...it is a ruptura.”225 Of 
course, any promise for democracy of a political opposition was premature, as the 
municipalities did not have much power beyond their borders. However, Haro Tecglen 
was overwhelmed by this “first true rupture,” which he thought would reinvigorate the 
possibility for opposition and democracy  
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if the parties of the left do not allow themselves to be carried away by 
triumphalism and do not fall back on consensualism, so politics in Spain 
can begin to take on different dimensions. And the future can begin to be 
seen with less pessimism. 
[si los partidos de izquierda no se dejan llevar por el triunfalismo, pero no 
vuelvan a caer en el pactismo, la política en España puede empezar a tener 
otras dimensiones.  Y el future puede empezar a verse con menos 
pesimismo.’226  
 
Haro Tecglen admitted that “this is still just a hope,” as nothing still had not changed at 
the level of the State.227 He further tempered his optimism later on, writing that 
what should be a most urgent work is to create a political culture, an 
understanding of History, a global conception of the world, an ideological 
study of Spanish reality and that of other countries...For the left, the time 
of a negative culture, or a counterculture has passed: they have to realize 
their own positive culture. 
[la urgencia en crear una cultura política, un sentido de la Historia, una 
concepción global del mundo, un estudio ideológico de la realidad de 
España y de los otros países, debería ser una tarea más urgente... Se ha 
pasado el tiempo, para los partidos de la izquierda, de la cultura negative, 
de la cultura en contra: tienen que rehacer su propia cultura positiva.]228  
 
It was time for the opposition to create and not continue to respond, time to rupture and 
not work towards consensual reform.  
However, what he conceived of as a political culture was a conjoining of politics 
as practice and politics as poetics in the same pursuit of an unfinished project of 
modernity.  Haro Tecglen continued to fall back on his modernist conception of the 
republic, which he did not cast off into the dustbin of history though the possibility of 
democracy seemed absent from the corridors of a State formed as a liberal democracy, 
which only served to complete the expansion of capital and depoliticize opposition.  It 
certainly did not want to posit anything radically new, which he continued to hope from 
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it.  Nor was it clear that any conjunction between politics and culture could be had at this 
point in history.  
Teresa Vilarós argues that such a conjunction was an impossibility given the 
“collapse of political-cultural practices on the part of the left in the face of the 
progressive and massive capitalization of the global market.”229 She maintains that 
beginning with Spain’s induction in the United Nations in 1955—though possibly a more 
appropriate marker is 1959 when the International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
restructured the Spanish economy with the first of many development plans—Spain 
followed an economic path directed by the expansion of capital, which had a complex 
effect on the relationship between politics and culture. While Juliá argues that the 
creation of a consumerist culture generated a middle class and a political desire for 
democracy, which ultimately led to the end of the regime,230 Vilarós interprets 
international capital as the historical cause of a rift between politics and culture that 
would continue into the transición, which generated a social desire for expanded 
consumerism and a mistrust for anything other than the ideology of capitalism.231   
Juliá and Vilarós seem to reach different conclusions, but they are essentially 
saying the same thing: what was desired was a liberal democracy, or capitalism, but what 
was not desired was a politicized culture. Unlike any past period when politics and 
culture were wedded—say during the 2nd Republic when culture was an extension of 
politics in posters, literature, and films, or to a different degree, during the post-War 
movements of social realism in literature and neo-realism in film—there was no longer a 
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clear link between politics and cultural politics.232  Yet, while there was a depoliticization 
of politics as practice during the transición, this might have in fact further fueled cultural 
politics. Cultural politics were not tied to a larger political movement that included 
parties and politicians, but cultural texts were a last refuge of opposition, evidenced by 
the surge of critical texts, which Jo Labanyi reads as the means available at that time to 
negotiate the “apocalyptic sense of the ‘end of history,’ exacerbated, as capitalism has 
moved into its post-industrial phase, by the collapse of the liberal belief in material 
progress and, crucial in Spain, of the Marxist dream of a more just future.”233  Cultural 
politics were not easily identifiable as part of a liberal or Marxist project, but they were 
still involved in the critique of history and society.   
All of this to say that Haro Tecglen was a bit misguided to assume that it was up 
to the State to develop within society the means of approaching an “understanding of 
History, a global conception of the world, an ideological study of Spanish reality,” 
especially given how much the PSOE and PCE seemed more to desire a depoliticized 
society.234  However, as he grew more disenchanted with the ‘progress’ of the transición, 
Haro Tecglen did seem to realize that this notion was of the past, based more in a 
nostalgia for linkages between politics and culture.  It seemed that his idea of modernity 
had reached a historical end (not completion). There would be no totality instituted and 
no demos constituted in the present.  The transición was marked by an economic and a 
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social crisis, and also a crisis of human relations and ideologies...a crisis of protagonists 
and spectators” in which “reality is partially described, but not totally, and democracy 
cannot yield more because of these crises that are part of this civilization, this system.”235 
Because there was little in the way of oppositional political projects to confront and 
correct the glaring crises and contradictions in reality—for the projects of the left, which 
had traditionally been opposed to the anti-democratic tendencies of capitalism, had by 
this time ideologically aligned themselves with the project of democratic capitalism and 
renounced their historical ties—there was not a political resolution to be had in the 
foreseeable future.  
Haro Tecglen took note of the fact that the changes and crises occurring in Spain 
were much the same as elsewhere in the Western world, for which Spain served as a 
microcosm to perceive them in a more exaggerated and visible manner: 
In Spain, the new limitations of the democracy are more noticeable 
because it is incipient, because the antidemocratic influence has infiltrated 
deep into the organisms of authority... This is not only a Spanish 
phenomenon, but also a European one sharing the same reason for being: 
the reduction of the revolutionaryisms, the perplexity of the left, the slow 
loss of faith in democracy, all united by the profound economic crisis, fear 
of the middle class—especially their ascension—and the return of class 
warfare... All this is what has shaped the scarcity of happiness in the 
1970s. Years in which if anything positive was produced it was 
immediately transformed into a negative. 
[En España, las nuevas limitaciones de la democracia son más sensibles, 
porque es incipiente, porque el peso de lo antidemocrático está más 
infiltrado en los organismos de autoridad... No es sólo un fenómeno 
español, sino europeo, y tiene una razón de ser: la reducción de los 
revolucionarismos, la perplejidad de la izquierda, la pérdida paulatina de 
fe en la democracia, unidos a la situación profunda de crisis económica, al 
miedo de las clases medias—sobre todo, de las ascendidas—, el regreso de 
la lucha de clases... Todo esto es lo que configura la escasa fecilidad de los 
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años setenta.  Unos años en los que todo lo que sucedió de positivo se 
transformó inmediatamente en negativo.]236 
 
Spain was not the only one to experience the negation of democracy, common to other 
States and societies sharing the same form of democracy. A liberal democracy did 
provide a relative calm and stability, order and security, what Haro Tecglen termed “the 
sensation of democracy,” which deflated any collective desire for “revolutionaryisms,” or 
political opposition, even though individually there were often also sensations of injustice 
and inequity.237 Possibly these individual sensations, if they were ever experienced as 
shared, would one day encourage opposition again, though Haro Tecglen could only 
locate this possibility “in a future far away, when a certain type of revolutionaryism may 
reappear... with a panoply of ideologies and philosophical innovations.”238  
This future might have been closer than it appeared, if Haro Tecglen had looked 
in the right place, for such a panoply of ideologies and, if not philosophical at least 
aesthetic, innovations were already present in the present of the transición. However, 
they were to be found in a sphere distinct from that of politics and politicians, as an 
oppositional imagination of democracy was flourishing in the socio-cultural sphere, 
fueled more and more by the disenchantment in the socio-political.  He could not see this 
because his historical vision had been oriented towards the past in his imagination of 
democracy, and the modern idea of a demos that could be instituted by the State, which 
still looked for longing in future possibility. His writings betray an unwillingness or an 
inability to see the transición as a new historical situation to be ruptured from 
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modernity—to imagine democracy and political opposition historically different—which 
Medina reads as the attempt to turn “the absence of a political reality, the interruption of 
the republic, into a... view of the ruins and a script that nostalgically invokes the return of 
an ideal situated in the past.”239 
The corresponding absence of the political reality that Haro Tecglen gave 
representation to in his editorials might help explain why Triunfo struggled to maintain 
its readership, then eventually had to shut down.  There was no social desire to match 
what he desired of and for society. “We were products of our time, and also killed by the 
time, or by the evolution of customs, thought and people, if this appears less abstract,” 
Haro Tecglen provided as an answer to why Triunfo closed down in 1982.240 Three 
months before the PSOE won the general election on October 28th of 1982, Triunfo could 
no longer afford to publish, even though they had already reduced their output from 
weekly to monthly. In 1992, he tried to explain why Triunfo, widely popular before the 
transición, paradoxically experienced a steady decline in readership through the 
transición:  
Readers believed that after the death of Franco they had entered directly 
into paradise and did not need any viatica: we had accompanied them on 
their trip towards the democracy, and for some we had provided a guiding 
light, but then they didn’t need us anymore.241   
 
To Haro Tecglen, it did not appear that 1982 Spain was a paradise, but what might 
explain the decline of Triunfo is the difference of time that Haro Tecglen alludes to with 
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the use of ‘our time’ and ‘the time,’ a difference between his imagination of democracy 
and what possibility it had in reality.  By the transición’s end, the history that he had 
attempted to write became quite distinct from the history that came to be, for while he 
remained attached to the idea of democracy as the completion of modernity, the 
transición was a transition into postmodernity.  
‘Our time’ might then refer to the 2nd Republic and the regime, while ‘the time’ 
refers to the period of the transición.  His imagination of democracy was rooted in the 
past, which helps to explain Haro Teclgen’s disenchantment with the present situation in 
which there was no discernible possibility of instituting a demos with an ethos of equality 
and freedom. However, as Teresa Vilarós points out, this idea of an interruption in the 
past that can be resolved in the present is a nostalgic remembering of history because of 
the uncertain and contradictory present. She writes, referring to Manuel Vázquez 
Montalbán’s tongue-in-cheek suggestion that the left thought “Against Franco we were 
better” just as the right maintained that “With Franco we were better” that there are two 
elements to consider: 
One makes reference to the willingness to rethink the immediate past as a 
politically unified goal, already with a post-Franco nostalgia on the part of 
the right (with Franco) and a nostalgic resistance by those on the left 
(against Franco).  The other, more volatile and difficult to point out, gives 
evidence precisely of the division, disintegration, and most important, 
depoliticization of a great majority of the Spanish population, not only 
after Franco’s death, but rather, and above all, before it produced itself as 
such.242 
 
Vilarós’s two elements help to expand upon the difference between ‘our time’ and ‘the 
time’: the past is mourned as a lost political resistance, or opposition, even though what 
the transición makes visible is that there was already division and depoliticization under 
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the regime. A cathectic reading of Haro Tecglen would suggest that he mourned the past 
because he cannot locate political opposition in the present, nor any signs of a demos, 
which he then imagined as possibilities in the past that could have been completed had a 
different type of democracy been instituted in place of a liberal democracy organized 
around negotiation and consensus to guarantee, as Teresa Vilarós puts it, the “integration 
of Spanish society into the globally economic apparatus of late capitalism.”243   
As such, the institution of a liberal democracy required the deadening of 
oppositional ideologies—the end of ideology, save that of the market of course—to gain 
full entrance into the global economy.  This idea of democracy did not center around 
political projects engaged in constant contestation of norms, values, and beliefs instituted 
in the name of democracy, but instead was more concerned with reducing politics to 
consensus so as not to disrupt the socio-economic foundation of the State. To be sure, 
there would still be differences between political parties, but these differences were not 
fundamentally opposed to one another. They differed as a matter of opinion about social 
and cultural issues—such as sexual freedom (intercourse outside of marriage, adultery, 
homosexuality), individual choice (abortion, contraception), regionalism, and 
immigration—but not ideologically. There was still a right and a left, but these were not 
designations tied to opposing political projects that demanded alternative state practices 
and institutions, for both were committed to the liberal and capitalist democracy. Instead 
of introducing oppositional perspectives, politics in practice flattened opposition to make 
way for consensus and negotiation.  
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The only real possibility for political opposition was the PSOE, but the same 
charge that Stuart Hall levels at New Labour’s ‘double-shuffle’ can be applied to its 
leadership: they turned “democracy into a particular variant of free market neo-
liberalism” all the while promising both transformation and stasis to maintain electoral 
support from both their historical constituency and the established oligarchy.244 It was, of 
course, impossible to achieve equal measures of both, so stasis was the operating norm, 
while transformation was always the promise of something more to come.  As Mouffe 
points out, this variant does not offer a means to confront the inequality and instability of 
capitalism, for there is no countering hegemony.245 As a result, in Spain, there was no 
“possibility for citizens to decide between different ways of organizing society.”246 The 
liberal democracy offered nothing except for what Castoriadis calls the “capitalist 
imaginary of the unlimited expansion of production and consumption.”247 He goes on to 
say elsewhere that after 1950, with the “waning of social, political, and ideological 
conflict,” as a result of the conformist and consensual practices of politics, the ability to 
imagine “a new vision of society and to face the overall political problem as such” has 
been severely diminished.248   
While the critics above do highlight significant shortcomings of politics in a 
liberal and capitalist democracy—its inadequate practice of consensus that cannot 
imagine anything outside of itself, not offering oppositional projects, not self-reflecting 
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on its own limitations—they all look for a political solution as a function of the State, or 
at least its institutions.  That is, they all evidence a tendency to envision the political from 
a theoretical perspective that takes the socio-political to be the primary pressure point 
necessary to restart the motor of history stalled in the presentism of capitalism that is 
shrouded behind a veil of democracy.  As such, there seems to be no way out in the 
foreseeable future: “politics as collective activity... has been able to be present so far only 
as spasm and paroxysm, a bout of fever, enthusiasm and rage, a reaction to the excesses 
of a Power.”249 Given capitalism and a liberal democracy’s ameliorative effect, the 
relative order and security experienced in everyday life, moments when politics as 
collective activity have surfaced, have been few and far between. 
The analysis and interpretation of Haro Tecglen’s writings have not revealed 
anything different, for the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain yielded the 
same situation: a depoliticization of opposition, an absence of collective activity, a 
disenchantment with politics, and a feeling of comfort and stability. All of this motivated 
Haro Tecglen’s critique of how the transición squandered the possibility to complete 
what he took to be the unfinished project of modernity: a democracy that truly would 
institute full equality and freedom because an active demos demanded it and a political 
opposition guaranteed it.  He desired that Spain would have indeed arrived at the end of a 
history begun long ago, progressing even with interruptions to the point of achieving a 
social democracy. His timetable misled his imagination of democracy, however, for it 
was not modernity but postmodernity in which the democracy was instituted, which left 
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him mourning the past, skeptical of the present, and hoping for an unperceivable and 
unrepresentable future in which the necessary conditions would arise for a genuine 
democracy to come into being. This is not that different from what any ‘modern’ political 
theory proposes as a possibility for the State or its institutions, an ability to mediate or 
negotiate a plurality of interests that might be realized one day. All hope rests upon 
whatever the future may provide. 
For now, let us assume that a socio-political democracy in postmodernity is 
synonymous with a capitalist and liberal democracy. There is no transition from here into 
an unknown future, which to borrow from Benjamin, takes the transición to be “a present 
which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop.”250 This is 
not the final conclusion of my study, but it does enable us to approach the questions of 
democracy and political opposition another way.  We can discontinue, for the time being, 
a further consideration of any ‘modern’ political theories, as they seem to offer many 
different criticisms of the current state of consensus and stasis, but any solution seems to 
argue for a different form and content for the State while accepting the primacy of its 
place.   
If we move out and away from the socio-political into the socio-cultural we can 
consider democracy and political opposition as “movement of thought and action that 
frees itself from dominant statist subjectivity and proposes, summons and organizes 
projects that cannot be reflected or represented by those norms under which the State 
operates,” as Badiou suggests.251 That is, we can question how ‘post-modern’ theories of 
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opposition and democracy, and the perplexing problem of performing political activity in 
postmodernity, might play out in representation.  If the answer is not to be sought within 
the corridors of parliament or the palace, then we are left to imagine political possibility 
in the socio-cultural realm. The difference to highlight is how ‘post-modern’ political 
theory argues against an instituted resolution of the social order by means of politics, 
opting instead for an uninterrupted irruption of its always and only contingent imposed 










Filming the Present: The Politics of Melodrama 
 
 
 Though Cristina Moreiras has the post-transición in mind when she writes that 
“Spain had little temporal space to assimilate, with hardly a transition, the arrival of 
modernity and the passage to postmodernity,” it is my argument that this is already 
happening during the transición, in that both modernity and postmodernity defined its 
present.252 Two different historicizations of what the present signified were imagined, 
with the rift between them signaling two different ideas of democracy and political 
opposition.  In the socio-political sphere, democracy was conceived of as a project of 
modernity, its progress measured by the diluting of opposition until it could no longer be 
tasted in the watered down reformism of negotiated difference. In the socio-cultural 
sphere, there was an insistence on rupture, a historical beginning emerging 
simultaneously just as modernity’s history had ended, a democracy of disruption and 
difference to feed freely on all fruit with no norms to dictate which were forbidden.   
This is different from thinking of the rift as a result of the desencanto that resulted 
from the emerging practice of consensual politics. Haro Tecglen read the public’s 
disenchantment with democratization as such, but only because he held onto the idea of 
an active citizenry engaged in political opposition like that experienced during the 2nd 
Republic, at least in his remembering of it. Politicians were understood to have betrayed a 
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public desire for political alternatives, so it was imperative to stimulate the public to 
demand once again opposition in the practice of politics. His account of the rift considers 
the transición as another historical stage of modernity, a present in direct relation to the 
past. 
Some trace this rift back to the rise of a consumerist culture, encouraged and 
expanded during the 1960s and early 1970s, and carrying through into the transición. 
Teresa Vilarós argues that the Spanish population “turned their back on political 
projects,” especially those aligned with the historical Marxists, as the desire for Spain to 
be integrated into the global economic apparatus was greater than any desire for political 
alternatives during the transición.253  As such, the desencanto should not be thought of as 
a reaction to the institution of a liberal democracy, but rather both evidence a similar 
depoliticization in State practices and social desires because of Spain’s pursuit of its 
integration into the global market.  For this reason, then, Vilarós takes 1993 to be the end 
of the transición with the signing of the treaty of Maastricht and the granting of full 
membership in the European Union.  Her account of the rift considers the transición to be 
a phase of a history determined by the logic of late-stage capitalism, which is 
conterminous with postmodernity  
Vilarós is right that the logic of capitalism certainly explains both the practice of 
consensual politics and the disillusionment that the State serves the interests of the public, 
but her reading of the transición as a continuous process does not explain the emergence 
of a new politics of aesthetics not tied at all to those from the 1960s or 1970s. Haro 
Tecglen is right too in suggesting that the liberal democracy failed to offer political 
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alternatives, but he does not ask if there was a pursuit of alternatives outside of the socio-
political sphere. Such readings of the transición as a unified event and situation with a 
single historical point of reference—global integration or a new ‘republic’—does not 
explain why there was continuity at the level of the State, while there was also rupture at 
the level of culture. What is lost in these versions of history is that the transición displays 
a simultaneous experience of modernity and postmodernity in the transition to a capitalist 
and liberal democracy.  
By these two terms I do not mean two distinct historical periods, but rather two 
different conceptions of history and ideology. That there were two conceptions, at the 
same time, leads away from the debate of whether the transición evidenced either 
continuity or rupture, for instead both were in evidence, only in two distinct spheres: 
continuity in the socio-political, and rupture in the socio-cultural. This makes 
inconsequential the question of whether the transición demonstrated memory or 
forgetting, at least for this study, for while the argument could be made for one side or 
the other concerning the socio-political transition (though an argument that past cracks 
were covered underneath a tapestry of democracy, a type of forgetting, would be most 
convincing), any such argument seems inappropriate when considering the socio-cultural 
transition because there was no past to speak of in that most often the present was 
conceived of as year zero. Instead, what is important is how the simultaneous experience 
of modernity and postmodernity, respectively, in reality and representation, provides two 
different imaginations of democracy and political opposition, and how this is a result of 
the transition to a liberal democracy, which is what ultimately severed the socio-political 
from the socio-cultural and introduced the seemingly unbridgeable rift.  
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By ‘modernity’ I do not mean a sociology of modernization, rationality, and 
atomization resulting from the expansion of capitalism and its effect on social beings, as 
best articulated by Georg Simmel, Max Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies.254  Rather, this 
study approaches the concept of modernity through ‘modern’ political theory, as a project 
whose completion requires that differences be mediated and overcome by reasonable 
dialogue and debate, and which has democracy as its telos. There is an overlap, however, 
between a sociology and a political theory with modernity as its reference in that the 
critical task for both is to overcome the fragmenting elements of irrationality found in 
modernity, as it is not a matter of too much rationality, but rather too little of it that has 
kept history stalled in an eternal present and society from totality.255 By modernity, then, 
what is meant is a political project directed towards universality, a totality formed around 
an ethos of equality and freedom binding particularities, which is taken to be essential in 
a democracy, and which requires rational mediation.  
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In Spain, after the Franco regime, it seemed for a time that the possibility for 
national reconciliation and the forging of a new national identity was possible with the 
institution of a democracy, which would complete the progression of its experience of 
modernity, which had been continually interrupted by ideological conflict and 
fragmentation. In the transition away from authoritarian and fractious rule, and the 
conflicts and trauma engendered under it, democracy was taken to be a means to assuage 
historical wounds and unify the national body as a universality. Also, the relative stability 
and sensation of freedom and equality that a democracy would provide in relief to the 
past made it seem for a moment that such universality was possible.  However, the 
problem, as we have seen, is that while this project was said to have reached completion 
by the consensual politics of the transición, a critical look at the inequity and injustices of 
its liberal democracy reveals that any resolution was still waiting for a future still to 
come.  
This presents the separate problem of how to push the stalled motor of 
modernity’s history, progress, toward some fuller measure of democracy— defined by, 
for example, ‘communicative reason’ or ‘autonomy’, to use Habermas and Castoriadis’s 
language—when the entity responsible for stasis, the State, is also the requisite engine of 
change, even though it has shown no discernible signs of recognizing its own limitations. 
In Spain, there was reasonable dialogue between politicians, and there was an economic 
totality established—that of the free market—but there was no social totality ever gained. 
If anything, the liberal democracy instituted during the transición only fueled more 
fragmentation in the social order by not representing the plurality of the public in the 
corridors of power nor opening doors to them. Consensual politics did not conjoin the 
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particular and the universal, which is antithetical to any resolution required by ‘modern’ 
political theory’s imagination of democracy. 
These problems of ‘modern’ political theory are dismissed by ‘post-modern’ 
political theory because they miss the point: democracy is not associated with the State, 
especially if it has instituted a liberal democracy.  In fact, the resolution of opposition in 
universality is taken to be thoroughly undemocratic.  Instead, the social order should be 
ruptured by oppositional particularities, continually revealing any seeming totality to be 
contingent and unstable, in a battle that pits social groups or individuals against the 
political will of the State.  Against the universalizing rationality of consensual politics 
and dialogue, politics is defined to be “that activity which has the rationality of 
disagreement as its very own rationality,” as Jacques Rancière puts it, which does not 
intend resolution through its activity, but rather disruption of the social order.256  
Democracy is not to be conceived of as a totality, for this is taken to exclude even 
if it attempts to unify, for history will always offer up new subjects “not previously 
identifiable within a given field of experience.”257 For this reason, that resolution will 
always exclude that which has not yet appeared, equality is not something created in 
advance. It must constantly be reestablished, and “the form in which confirmation of 
equality is inscribed [is] the setting up of a dispute, of a community existing solely 
through being divided.”258 ‘Post-modern’ political theory resists the idea that democracy 
signifies a collective, for society is always divided, as well as the idea that equality and 
freedom are always ensured, as what these terms refer to or mean are always in dispute. 
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‘Post-modern’ political theory imagines democracy as becoming and not to be; there is 
no completion, only pursuit.  
However, while ‘post-modern’ political theory still has reality as its referent, what 
is often understood as postmodernity in relation to Spain, as Jo Labanyi points out, is a 
privileging of representation because no political alternatives are be had in reality, which 
she reads as a result of the PSOE’s adoption of monetarist policies in line with the 
supposed ‘opposition’.259 Representations now display “an attitude apparently non-
ideological and fundamentally ahistorical,” according to Moreiras, because political 
alternatives no longer reference reality in that a liberal democracy denies them extension 
outside of the symbolic realm.260 That they seemingly evade engagement with ‘real’ 
history and ideology does not mean, however, that there was not a critical move against 
representing the present in relation to the past, as if it were simply another historical 
phase of modernity.  
As Moreiras suggests, by not mentioning the past, and by only representing what 
was ‘new’, a critical position was taken with respect to the past.261  Representations of 
ideological and historical positions different from the ‘reality’ confronted the idea of the 
present as a historical phase tied to past ideologies. However, while Labanyi and 
Moreiras focus more on the explosion of such representations onto the scene and screen 
after the PSOE formally put an end to the transición with their electoral victory in 1982, 
especially in the movida of Madrid—a lifestyle as much as a movement to express 
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everything new—this study will show that they were already present at the end of the 
transición. Simultaneously, while the socio-political was being imagined as a 
reconciliation of a society divided, as a national identity, the socio-cultural was 
expressing new conceptions of identities that had nothing to do with the past. In this 
sense, then, both modernity and postmodernity, as reality and as representation, were 
present in the transición: the reality of the liberal democracy that had the past as its 
referent (even if it was to be forgotten), and the representation of a present ruptured free 
from it (an original beginning). 
Yet the question remains of how to understand a relationship, if any, between 
postmodern representations evidencing rupture and new conceptions of identity and 
‘post-modern’ political theory’s imagination of democracy as a disruption of the social 
order and the inclusion of subjects not previously identifiable. Were these representations 
involved in a critique of the liberal democracy, or did their representation of particular 
identities and historical rupture not inform critical understandings of reality? What does a 
new politics of aesthetics centered around opposition mean for reintroducing political 
opposition into a society instituted as a liberal democracy? That is, were postmodern 
representations political beyond their cultural politics? Answers to these questions can be 
approached through a study of Spanish cinema’s melodramatic mode, its sensibility and 
style, at the end of the transición. Just as melodrama functioned to give order to the 
disorder of the social at the beginning of the transición, so too was melodrama used to 
represent the social order distinct from its experience in reality as the rift between the 
socio-political and the socio-cultural widened.  
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We have seen how a national identity informed by a shared ethos and absent of 
any political opposition was imagined in films at the beginning of the transición. There 
was a symbolic desire to have the present complete a project began in the past: the 
creation of a demos that was denied before by ideological conflict or imposition.  It is 
important to remember, however, that they imagined the possibility of democracy for a 
reality that had yet to institute one, a referential “relation of melodrama and modernity, 
demonstrating the degree to which if becomes the form both to register change and to 
process change, in particular mediating relations between a lost but problematic past and 
the present,” as the melodramatic mode has been defined during moments of chaos and 
uncertainty.262  In this instance, the melodramatic mode was used to provide order to a 
reality that was without one, an order based upon ‘right and wrong’ instead of ‘right and 
left’; that is, a moral order to displace the political disorder that fractured the present at 
the beginning of the transición. By surmounting what was taken to be a past society split 
by particularity, with the evacuation of political ideology and will, a universal identity 
and body was represented as a possibility for the present: the dual recognition of the 
melodramatic mode, as identified by Linda Williams, “of how things are and how they 
should be.”263  
However, as Walter Benjamin warns, “[b]eware of the smooth surface of history, 
looking backwards, making everything make sense” when thought of in reality.264 These 
melodramas imagined democracy much like ‘modern’ political theory’s ideal notions of 
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universality and essence, though it was very different to imagine their possibility than to 
institute such a democracy. Though it was possible in representation to make sense of the 
past in order to push forward a present imagined as a national reconciliation and an 
ethical order not threatened by political disorder, the already established economic 
structure of capitalism at the foundation of the socio-political would not make such a 
project so easy. These melodramas offered a way to conjoin the present and the past in 
imagining what a democracy might signify. In reality, however, the form of democracy 
necessary for the further expansion of the market economy and global integration was a 
liberal democracy, which would not confront the past, but would fix an eternal present 
through a consensual politics of forgetting of past conflict and of future change. That is, 
while melodramas at the beginning of the transición might have represented a possible 
completion of modernity’s unfinished product begun but stymied in the past, the reality 
of the situation did not live up to expectations for the immediate future. The present was 
yet another installment in a history of opportunities lost.   
In reverse fashion, however, melodramas at the end of the transición did not 
represent the past, nor did they imagine an order to countermand the uncertainty of 
reality.  Instead, they began to introduce disorder into social space by representing 
particularities in the process of becoming; not identities rooted in or implied by the past, 
but wholly new constellations of norms, values, and beliefs. That these films appeared on 
the scene just as the disillusionment with the established order of the liberal democracy, 
which was taken by many to be firmly established with the new Constitution that 
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officially declared Spain a constitutional monarchy on December 27, 1978,265 might seem 
to imply that they were interrelated events; that such films reacted to the failure of 
modernity to realize a genuine democracy, disordering the instituted order to rearrange 
the pieces once again.  
However, that they did not reference the past at all, except by absence, resists 
such a line of thinking. Instead of taking them to be motivated by the same historical 
concerns of earlier melodramas, and the project of modernity, they can also be 
understood as postmodern representations of a present that had nothing to do with the 
past. As Siegfried Kracauer points out: 
history consists of events whose chronology tells us but little about their 
relationships and meanings [s]ince simultaneous events are more often 
than not intrinsically asynchronous, [so] it makes no sense indeed to 
conceive of the historical process as a homogenous flow. The image of 
that flow only veils the divergent times in which the substantial sequences 
of historical events materialize.266 
 
While earlier melodramas represented the past and the present as one homogenous flow, 
which is similar to the idea that a democracy in the present would complete an 
interrupted project of the past, melodramas near the end of the transición represented a 
divergent time, or rather “a time of its own—which implies that the way it experiences 
temporality may not be identical... You must, so to speak, jump from one period to 
another.”267 Or, another way to say this, representation jumped into postmodernity, which 
was a rupture from the continuous temporality that the liberal democracy evidenced, 
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which might have consensually forgotten about the past, but these representations were 
only about the present.  
Here then we have a jump from one period to another in representation, a rupture 
of sorts with material reality that was still involved in a history conceived of as a 
homogenous flow. For this reason, it is not instructive to interpret postmodern 
representations only as a response to the failings or inadequacies of the liberal 
democracy—and to read them as a deliberate forgetting of the past like the practice of 
consensual politics intended—but rather they can be approached as tales of another 
history whose temporality was distinct from modernity’s flow.  As such, they can be read 
for how they might gesture towards another way of imagining democracy, a disorder of 
disagreement that has nothing to do with the State, but might yet symbolize a political 
possibility in the sphere of the socio-cultural.   
 In relation to one filmmaker, Pedro Almodóvar, Kathleen Vernon argues that 
melodrama has allowed him  
to articulate a moment of rupture in Spanish history, nor merely imagining 
a Spain in which Franco never existed but constructing a repertoire of 
stories and images for a post-Franco Spain that is perhaps yet to be.268 
 
One of the most popular directors by the mid-1980s, Almodóvar began making Super-8 
shorts in the 1970s that documented the beginnings of the Madrid cultural movement, la 
movida.269 His first feature film was Folle... folle... fólleme Tim! (Fuck, Fuck, Fuck Me 
Tim!, 1978). Most of his films are melodramatic, though he has made some that have 
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more of a comedic component, such as the Mujeres al borde de un ataque de nervios 
(Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, 1988). His melodramas are oriented in 
the present, representing a world becoming and, maybe, to be: a rupture of the present 
from the past performed through the melodramatic mode, a temporal beginning that does 
not simply flow from the past, but rather leaps into postmodernity.  
Almodóvar has always said, quite famously, that he made films as if Franco had 
never existed, that the world of his films started after Franco and therefore has nothing to 
do with the past.270  Carne trémula (Live Flesh, 1997) begins in 1970, but then quickly 
jumps twenty years ahead, the protagonist born during the Franco regime but without 
reference to any time before he is a mature adult or an individual. La mala educación 
(Bad Education, 2004) does reference the 1960s and the 1970s, though the past is 
represented more in terms of individual sexual politics than as a reconciliation of any 
ideological conflict dividing the social.  However, most interesting, is that Almodóvar 
had written a story treatment for this last film already in 1975, the year of Franco’s death, 
which suggests that while he waited thirty years to return to the past explicitly in this 
film, he was also thinking about it all the while more than he admits.271 
His film Pepi, Luci, Bom y otras chicas del montón (Pepi, Luci, Bom and Other 
Girls of Many, 1980) certainly represents an image of Spain that had never appeared on 
the screen before, as well as a reflection on lingering elements from the past, then an 
ultimate rejection of them through the melodramatic mode. Of the three main 
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characters—as is evident from the title, though as it suggests as well, these three are 
representative of women in general, a small collection of a possible many—we are 
introduced first to Pepi.  The film begins with a very rough handheld pan that takes in the 
large amount of marijuana plants on Pepi’s window sill, then comes to a stop on her 
lazing about in bed cutting and pasting pictures of Superman into a collage. This shot is 
not only a testament to the small budget of the film, but also to a realism that the film will 
continually exceed with the melodramatic mode: “where realism ignores and modernism 
exposes gaps in bourgeois ideology, melodrama insists on the realities of life in bourgeois 
democracy and, at the same time, implicitly recognizes the limits (inadequacies) of 
conventional representation,” and exceeds them to a significant degree.272  Pepi, Luci, 
Bom, however, is not an indictment of the bourgeoisie, but rather is an insistence on the 
reality of the present that is constrained by the past, which it wants to exceed. For this 
reason, the first shot immediately sets us in the present, in an apartment of a young 
woman living alone, fully occupied by leisure, surrounded by pop culture and 
recreational drugs.  It also sets up the conflict to be resolved by the film’s end, for there is 
a knock on the door by a policeman who lives next door and who has noticed the plants. 
He threatens to denounce Pepi, but he is quickly distracted from this when she hikes up 
her skirt and exposes herself. As he moves in, she squeals and laughs, but when he takes 
out his penis, she tells him that he should go “in the back,” as she is more accustomed to 
this because she has been saving her virginity.  
However, he ignores her, which then makes her thirsty for revenge, as announced 
in the intertitle, and introduces the melodramatic framework of the film: as Williams 
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argues “melodrama begins, and wants to end, in a space of innocence.”273 Though the 
‘innocence’ in this first scene is quite different from, say, that in Hollywood melodramas 
from the 1950s, there is an innocence lost. But it is not Pepi’s maidenhood that falls 
victim to the brutal villain, for as Paul Julian Smith points out, Pepi is actually abstaining 
because she wants to sell herself to the highest bidder.274 The innocence lost, which 
demands vengeance, is that the past forced itself upon the present, the latter’s new set of 
norms, values and beliefs not respected and violated. Pepi is not to be interpreted as a 
virtuous maiden, but rather symbolizes the ‘new woman’ embodying new virtues: sexual 
frivolity and libidinal liberation. Pepi is not opposed to being penetrated, she actually 
suggests it, but she does oppose that her terms are ignored and disregarded. The rape that 
occurs is not one signified by a penile penetration, but one symbolized by the penetration 
of the past into a space of the present, a brutal overpowering and disregard of a spatio-
temporal world established at a distance from the past, an intrusion of past desires and 
their imposition on her symbolic postmodern body that shares nothing with the past.275     
The victim is the present and the past is the villain, and the struggle between them 
is to rupture one free from the other, to finally break beyond, not through reconciliation 
but through confrontation. For this, Pepi has to enlist help. She visits Bom, who is 
rehearsing with her band. In fact, Bom is played by Alaska, a fifteen year old wunderkind 
of the movida who often appeared with the real-life band in the film, The Pegamoides.  In 
this sense, the film also serves to document the main figures of the movement, including 
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appearances by the drag-queen Fabio, or Fanny McNamara, and the painters Costus. Here 
we have another representation of the present: they are a ‘punk’ band, all dressed in 
leather pants, mini-skirts, and neon leopard-print shirts, squatting in an abandoned 
building, signifiers of the new urban culture. After they finish playing their song on 
screen, another instance of capturing the reality of the present digetically, Bom and the 
band agree to beat up the policeman in exchange for the pot plants. Following this, we 
have another melodramatic excess that spills over the limits imposed by realism and 
signals another confrontation between the past and the present. 
The film cuts away from the band rehearsal to the street, where they wait to spring 
upon the policeman. In order to get close enough to him, without giving anything away, 
Bom and the band are dressed as majos, the traditional and dignified working-class of 
19th century Madrid, and as they approach him, they begin to sing as if in a zarzuela.276  
A moment of ‘melos’ is introduced into the drama, but in such a way as to reinscribe 
these traditions of the past with new meaning. Bom and the band members self-
consciously act the part, parodying the performance of tradition, then attack the 
policeman and soundly beat him. They use the lure of tradition to ensnare the past and 
free the present from its grip.  The film reworks the melodramatic mode again in that 
‘melos’ is used to bring disorder into the drama by unleashing excess, and not to force 
order by containing it. What Geoffrey Nowell-Smith identifies as the primary function of 
music in ‘traditional’ melodramas is turned against itself. He writes that the more “plots 
press towards resolution the harder it is to accommodate the excess... The undischarged 
                                                 
276 Paul Julian Smith argues that these “traces of tradition were the very condition of 
possibility for future art, future lives” in that they have to be re-adapted to be superceded.  
See Smith, Desire Unlimited: The Cinema of Pedro Almodóvar, 17. 
 
146 
emotion which cannot be accommodated within the action... is traditionally expressed in 
the music.”277 Here the music is expressed to represent a rupture from the past, a punk 
reinscription of tradition.   
However, just as in ‘traditional’ melodramas, Pepi, Luci, Bom does not achieve 
resolution either, for the beat up man is the twin brother of the policeman, thus the 
struggle continues. The next step taken by Pepi is to wreck her vengeance upon the 
policeman’s wife, Luci.  Pepi invites her over to knit, another performance of tradition 
done self-consciously in order to turn tradition against itself.  Luci is lured in, talks for a 
bit with Pepi, then Bom shows up. She has to urinate, at which point Pepi tells her to do it 
on Luci, though this does not have the intended effect. Luci is turned on by this, actually 
lapping the urine up as it streams over her face. She confesses that she is “a dog” dirtier 
than one might think, who does not even respect her mean-spirited husband, for he is not 
brutal enough, treating her instead like he would his mother. Luci is a masochist, her 
desires constrained by past traditions too, but this is not to say that she is representative 
of the present like Pepi and Bom.  
Instead, there is a strange shift in the film’s identification of the melodramatic 
victim from Pepi to Luci at this point, as it is now her body upon which the struggle 
between the past and present will be carried out, with Pepi and Bom dedicated to saving 
her from the holds of the past that her husband represents. The “dialectic of pathos and 
action” Williams identifies as the principle structure of any melodrama will play out 
through Luci, for we begin to pity how she is trapped, unable to emerge fully into the 
                                                 




present, though she acts to free herself again and again.278  The “triangular relationships” 
between victim, villain, and savior common to the melodramatic mode is also now 
established, as Pepi and Bom seemingly try to help Luci free herself from the grip of her 
husband.279 Though just as the scenes before diverged from the more ‘traditional’ 
melodramatic mode in its representation of innocence and its use of music, the triangular 
relationships and the dialectic of pathos and action will diverge from such melodramas as 
well. What follows in the film is not so much saving Luci from sexual predation as it is 
from sexual norms. The new present is one in which desires are to be fulfilled, and Pepi 
and Bom introduce Luci into this new world where anything goes.  
In the next scene, this is expressed most excessively. A party is held. We see 
Luci, now Bom’s lesbian slave eating dried snot from Bom’s nose, and dressed now in a 
skirt that does not cover anything, though before she was covered head to toe. We meet 
Roxy, a drag queen. Neighbors watch from above: an effeminate husband and a bearded 
wife. They begin to have sex, though while she sits on his lap looking inside, he has his 
binoculars trained down on the males outside revealing themselves for the party’s main 
event: ‘General Erections,’ a not so subtle reference to the general elections held a year 
before when the script was written.280 A handful of men pull their pants down to reveal 
their members, which are then measured and judged (by none other than Almodóvar 
himself) and recorded by Pepi, who laughs with delight along with the raucous crowd. 
The winner is selected and gets to pick someone to fulfill his wish. He chooses Luci to 
fellate him, who kneels down and obliges, continuing on even when the party breaks up 
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because of another neighbor’s complaints. An orgy of the present is represented, or as 
Paul Julian Smith reads it, the film proclaims a “blatant assertion of the autonomy of 
pleasure” that defines identity in the present, and which has nothing to do with a liberal 
democracy.281   
There is an autonomy of pleasure, experienced for itself, expressed by 
transgressing lines of gender, sexuality, and identity, pushing past any imposed limits, a 
liberation and a satisfaction in excess. This excess carries through into the next scene, 
when Pepi decides that she needs a job. She sees an announcement for an advertising 
agency, and imagines three outrageous underwear advertisements that play out on the 
screen: one pair hides the scent of a woman’s flatulence while she drinks champagne, one 
soaks up her urine as she releases it while out in public, and one pair turns into a dildo for 
her pleasure as she lazes about the home. All are designed to help women “do what they 
do” with convenience, products that allow women to express their urges on the go and 
satisfy them without excuses or constraints.  All are tied to a new idea of identity.  
In two other scenes, we again see Roxy, the drag queen. In the first, s/he 
introduces Bom and the band on stage, screaming incomprehensibly in English to the 
audience, bringing them to a fever pitch. Later, s/he visits Bom’s home. A telegram 
arrives and Roxy pounces on the messenger, the camera lingering on them for an 
excessive amount of time while Roxy screams, moans and climbs over him, all without 
adding anything to the narrative. While “acknowledging the limitations of the 
conventions of language and representation, [melodramatic excess] proceeds to force into 
aesthetic presence identity, value, and plentitude of meaning,” which Roxy’s 
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performances and Pepi’s ads symbolize.282 The difference here is that these 
aestheticizations of gender and sexual fluidity free from constraint provide no meaning to 
the story except to provide an excessive display of new identities and values found in the 
present, but they do provide further examples of how this film diverges from the 
‘traditional’ melodramatic mode.  
However, there is a distinction to be made between the pleasure experienced by 
Pepi and Bom, and those at the party like Roxy, and Luci’s experience of it. Luci is the 
melodramatic victim that yearns to be free like the others. Once she has entered Pepi and 
Bom’s world, there are signs that she is satisfying her masochistic desires: we see her 
being dragged around on a leash by Bom; when she moves in with Bom, she must fetch 
things and obey commands. However, as Bom grows tired of this, though Luci continues 
to delight in her masochistic plight, her desire is not represented as liberation but as 
servitude, not as positive but as negative. For her, masochism never becomes a game to 
break limits and perform new roles, but instead is always a depraved form of abuse. She 
is the melodramatic victim that cannot rupture herself from the past: her masochism is a 
way to remain enslaved and not break free. Even as a “groupie” to the new scene, she 
fails “to act in a way that could shape the events and influence the emotional 
environment... The world is closed, and the characters acted upon,” as Thomas Elsaesser 
notes of melodramatic victims.283 Luci cannot enter into the world of the present. Of all 
the central protagonists, she is the only one who has a past, which guarantees her 
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suffering.  She is a victim of history while those with no roots in the past are free and 
satisfied in the present.  
As the victim, Luci bears out Elsaesser’s idea of melodrama conferring upon the 
victim “a negative identity through suffering” which by the film’s end will have her 
“emerge as [a] lesser human bein[g] for having become wise and acquiescent to the ways 
of the world.”284 Pepi, Luci, and Bom go to a nightclub, and when Luci leaves to get Bom 
cigarettes, her husband steps out of the shadows to confront her.  Luci laughs at him, calls 
him a coward who cannot give her what she needs, and tells him that he is all bluster. 
Then we witness a most disturbing scene: he throws her down on the ground, beats her 
savagely, and rapes her amongst the scattered garbage. Later, as she convalesces at the 
hospital, he twists her broken arm while she grimaces in pleasure made more extreme 
because she has refused any pain pills. Bom and Pepi visit to make sure that Luci is all 
right, but she tells them to go away because she needs someone who will almost kill her 
again and again. The film ends as Pepi and Bom leave the hospital, Bom saying “so many 
changes for one day” and Pepi saying that they have begun a “new life” that will bring 
many more. They go back to their lives in the present, while Luci returns to her past life, 
a lesser human being in that she is now depraved to the point where she does not care if 
her life is brutally extinguished or not. Pepi and Bom detach themselves from her without 
a care except for what happens next. They tried, but in the end, there is no overlap 
between the postmodern present and that which preceded it.  Here again the film diverges 
from the more typical melodramatic mode, for the would-be heroes at the end do not pity 
the ultimate victimization of Luci at the hands of a villainy rooted in the past, but they 
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simply move on and think of what to do next, for themselves: they alone have entered the 
innocence of the present without a care for the perversity of the past.  
Clearly, this is not a typical melodrama, even though it continually employs the 
melodramatic mode to introduce excess and to drive the narrative. The film still is similar 
to Elsaesser’s understanding of melodrama as “the struggle of a morally and emotionally 
emancipated bourgeois consciousness against the remnants of feudalism,” though the 
struggle is now against the past tout court in order to emancipate postmodernity.285 
However, Pepi, Luci, Bom is more a pastiche of melodramatic moments than a 
‘traditional’ melodrama, which is why the film diverges so much from the mode: 
introducing excessive representations of excess that do not serve to smooth over logical 
contradictions in the narrative, but rather enhance its illogic; employing a triangular 
relationship of victim/villain/savior to push the narrative forward, but then once at an 
end, simply discarding it; swelling music once to signal the confrontation of a moral 
injustice (the zarzuela), but mostly music used to document the ‘realism’ of the movida.  
What the film performs then, besides any rupture of the present from the past 
diegetically, is a rupture from a past melodramatic mode.  
The pastiche of melodrama is a new mode that introduces disorder, rather than 
any attempt to make sense of reality by giving it order; and, subverts traditional morality 
by representing values and norms as individual, rather than insisting on a shared morality 
that shapes collective experience.  Pepi, Luci Bom not only registers a struggle and 
emancipation in content, but also works to emancipate the melodramatic mode from how 
it has been used.  It does not provide certainty and order in historicizing Spain’s past and 
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crafting a national identity. Instead, it is used to increase the uncertainty ushered in by the 
transición, to introduce a measure of disorder to the enforced order within society that the 
liberal democracy portends. We do not have “victim-heroes” who articulate “the moral 
structure of feeling that animates” a democracy, which we identify with through a 
“recognition of their virtue,” as Williams suggests is the sine qua non of most 
melodramas.286  In Pepi, Luci, Bom, it is through an identification with the victim-heroes’ 
libidinal anarchy that all moral structures are upset.  In contrast to the melodramas from 
the beginning of the transición that represented Spanish society as a demos, bound by 
clear-cut ethical distinctions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, here we have a representation of 
society as individuals, freed by sexual ambiguity making anything permissible as long as 
it is new. 
Marsha Kinder writes that this type of ‘subversive’ melodrama, best exemplified 
by Almodóvar and Eloy de la Iglesia, “foreground[s] the ideological contradictions that 
[melodrama] normally glosses over,” which makes them part of a “political struggle.”287 
Through “lurching ruptures in the narrative” that call attention to the performance of 
melodramatic excess, the naturalization of contradictions through mise-en-scène or 
swelling music is denied.288  Melodrama is not used here to smooth out the disorder of 
reality through the controlled measures of representation, but instead representation is 
used to upset the experience of reality as ordered and fixed.  However, is this political, as 
Kinder suggests, or is there a difference between identity politics in representation and 
the political with respect to reality, and more specifically, to a liberal democracy?  
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The subversion performed by Pepi, Luci, Bom might only represent a playful 
world that has no reference beyond itself, or at least beyond the limited numbers part of 
the movida scene in Madrid. That is, possibly this film does not reference actual reality. 
While there is a performance of the ambiguity and fluidity of gender and sexuality, a 
rupture from moral and traditional constraints through melodramatic excess, and a 
reinscription of the past as perversity and the present as purity, the film does not reach 
beyond its diegetic world. The melodramatic mode is used to rupture the present from the 
past, but its temporality is very specific to those few individuals who make up the new 
urban culture: the movida of the culturally sophisticated, seemingly unaffected by the 
spiraling unemployment or inflation, without a care in the world except for libidinal 
excess and satisfaction. Melodrama is used here to signify a freedom, but from what? 
Does Pepi, Luci, Bom represent a present free from the past only as an imagination, as a 
playful construction of some world removed from reality? 
The political potential of Almodóvar’s postmodern pastiche is not so easy to 
discern, for while on the screen there is certainly a liberation of new identities and 
desires, each individually satisfied, it is questionable if such a representation presents a 
political opposition to critique the idea of democracy in reality. Its diegetic representation 
is possibly diametrically opposed to reality, which is precisely why Pepi and Bom are 
able to enter the new present in innocence, for they are free from both the hold of the past 
and reality.  
Such a ‘happy ending’ is not possible in Eloy de la Iglesia’s Navajeros (Knife-
fighters, 1980), which introduces another example of a distinct melodramatic mode. De la 
Iglesia was the most commercially successful filmmaker of the late 1970s and early 
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1980s.289 He began making films in the late 1960s, but always had problems with the 
censors, which is why he turned to making police thrillers that did not openly critique the 
regime or social mores. After Franco’s death, his films became much more erotically and 
politically charged, referring openly to homosexuality, zoophilia, and politics. In the 
1980s, he began to focus on juvenile delinquency and drug use, often in sensational 
melodramas that managed to provoke critics on both the right and left.   
If Pepi, Luci, Bom ruptures the present from the past by representing experience 
as divorced from reality, by employing excess to break away from the everyday and 
showcase the liberation in the performance of alterity, Navajeros wants to demonstrate 
the brutal reality of the present as plagued by a set of problems newly created by the 
liberal democracy, which imprisons working-class youths by severing them from past 
experiences and offering them no future expectations. This film does not represent a 
world distinct from the everyday, but rather wants to represent it fully so as to indict 
those responsible for its institution.  To capture reality, the film offers a pastiche of sorts 
as well: a measure of realism to document the experience of the present democracy and a 
measure of melodrama to sensationalize the misery of its effects.  As Kinder suggests, the 
tie between these two styles already exists, for melodrama is “rooted in realism yet highly 
idealized and hyperbolic.”290 Williams too acknowledges that melodrama borrows from 
realism, only to exceed it.291 However, Navajeros goes beyond any ‘traditional’ 
melodrama rooted in or borrowing from realism, for its conflation of styles, which also 
includes some modernist narrative devices, is excessively postmodern. 
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Navajeros begins with a black screen and the statement: “This (hi)story [historia] 
is based on real facts even though its characters are imaginary.”  Then a long shot takes in 
an oppressive sky while panning over the suburbs of Madrid, largely made up of the 
working-class living in housing complexes or shanties and stricken by crime and drugs. 
The shot, without showing any human characters, comes to rest with a penitentiary as its 
final image. Another intertitle appears: “People do not become criminals because they 
want to, but rather they are led to commit such acts because of misery and necessity.”  
Much like the beginnings of other Spanish films that told the (hi)story of working-class 
youths fighting to survive amidst urban poverty, and sometimes turning to crime as a 
result—such as Luis Buñuel’s 1950 film Los olvidados or Carlos Saura’s 1961 film Los 
golfos—Navajeros gestures towards a ‘neo-realist’ sociology: it is society that determines 
the character of its individuals in how they are forced to experience it. Thus Navajeros 
announces from the beginning that it will represent the social reality of the present as 
experienced by youths, and will show how such a reality forces them to become 
criminals, not because they want to, but because they have no other option.  
However, just as quickly as the film form of neo-realism is deployed, we cut into 
the penitentiary when Navajeros then employs the melodramatic mode. The principal 
character, el Jaro, stands in front of a gated wall.  As a lawyer approaches him, he turns.  
An extreme close-up frames his face, snarled and defensive like an animal surprised and 
on guard. This shot with its overwrought emotion establishes an important motif that will 
be stressed throughout the film: Jaro, though only fifteen, is not a child, nor is he a man. 
He is forced to fend for himself, to defend himself, which he does as best as he can, 
though he is hardly wise in the ways of the world, or self-consciously deliberative. This 
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melodramatic moment signals the storm beneath the surface that will shape the trajectory 
of the film, for the storm will eventually find release as we know from the preceding 
intertitle as well as the title of the film itself.  Yet, as soon as we find out through his 
conversation with the lawyer that Jaro is there to visit his brother, we see him walk 
towards the visitor’s entrance and the film stops in a freeze frame: a modernist narrative 
device.   
Less than two minutes into the film and three different film forms have been used. 
Navajeros demonstrates both ‘realist’ and ‘modernist’ styles, but at the same time 
interjects sensationalized melodrama in between. The film distances itself from art 
cinema, either as representation for itself or capturing reality in itself, by bringing 
melodrama into the story. As Paul Julian Smith suggests, de la Iglesia “subverts 
conventional forms and conflates disparate genres,” to reject any pretension to art cinema 
and enable an engaged political cinema.292 Yet, melodrama’s tendency towards 
establishing order and offering a clear moral structure is disrupted by these ruptures in 
style, for the mode is bracketed in between and exposed self-consciously. All at once, 
Navajeros distances itself from art cinema by introducing melodrama, but also inflects 
the melodramatic mode by placing it in relation to art cinema.293  
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In Navajeros, the melodramatic mode will be primary in driving the plot, but only 
in the conflation of styles will a political cinema emerge. The experience of reality must 
be sensationalized and exposed as representation for it to be engaged, to feel what Smith 
calls “the immediate irruption of the real into the text.”294 This requires a melodramatic 
excess that calls attention to itself and to that which it refers, which is the plight of 
working-class youths caught in the consumerist world of a liberal democracy, to which 
they have no access except through purposeless force. Yet the irruption of the real must 
be a jarring experience so as to not be naturalized by containing excess through 
melodramatic devices like elaborate mise-en-scène and swelling music. Excess must 
become excessive by making it cinematically artistic, in the sense of using ‘realist’ or 
‘modernist’ devices at the same time. As such, fact and fiction will be conflated, with 
representation informing a new look at reality, and reality being experienced anew in 
representation.  
After the freeze frame, we hear a reporter’s interior monologue as he types, which 
will occur sporadically throughout the film. He recounts the facts concerning Jaro: five 
hundred muggings and purse snatchings, two hundred cars robbed, three bank robberies, 
fifty store robberies, twenty-nine escapes from the reformatory, three major criminal 
cases, and he is not yet sixteen. However, this story will be written about Jaro only after 
he starts his exploits, which have not yet begun. Temporality is disrupted by this 
modernist flash forward, while the reporter’s sociological approach to the problem of 
juvenile delinquency is similar to the omniscient narrator of realism. At the same time, 
the sensational and staggering numbers that defy belief add a melodramatic dimension.  
                                                 
294 Smith, "Homosexuality, Regionalism, and Mass Culture: Eloy de la Iglesia's Cinema 
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This brief scene employs at once all three styles—modernism, realism, melodrama—in 
order to document facts of social reality, to make them into an excessive hyperreality, and 
at the same time to resist a passive viewing of it as entertainment.   
The film unabashedly admits its desire to elicit an emotional and engaged 
response, but it also suggests that this fictionalization of reality might be more real than 
expected. The conflation of styles puts reality and the representation of it in relation to 
one another, with neither fact or fiction privileged because of a constant disruption that 
undermines both: making fact into sensationalized fiction to see it with fresh eyes, but 
interrupting fiction to enable a return to the facts and see them now from a critical 
perspective.  Just as quickly as we left Jaro, the film then jumps back to him, the stage 
now set for how to experience what will unfold on the screen. 
He talks to his brother behind bars, which provides the viewer an account of 
Jaro’s everyday life from a personal, not sociological, perspective. He says that he sleeps 
in the street, finding shelter wherever it might be at the end of the night. After this, we get 
an extended montage of Jaro and his gang unleashed: robbing purses, breaking open pay 
phones, stealing motorcycles and cars, and breaking into stores. The pacing of the 
montage and the driving music does draw us in, having us enjoy the rampant destruction 
and breaking the law symbolically, all achieved melodramatically.  However, we do not 
fully identify with Jaro and the gang, for while we are drawn into the sensationalized fury 
of action, the music is antinomic in the sense that it is from Tchaikovsky’s The Sleeping 
Beauty. The melodramatic mode draws us in only to reveal that it is artifice, which allows 
us to experience Jaro’s world at the same time that it forces a distance by which to 
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observe it,  just as the anterior scene with the reporter suggests that we are to ask why 
they commit such acts. 
The mode performs the same effect in the next scene, bringing us deeper into 
Jaro’s experience of the social while putting at us a distance to observe the consequences 
or causes of this. We see him naked in the tub, and the camera lingers long on his body 
while he splashes around then dries off.  Needless to say, such a long take of a naked 
male body, from the back and front, of a fifteen year old in reality, was not a common 
shot seen on the screen.  Here again sensationalist imagery not only fascinates the viewer, 
but also shocks by what it reveals: the pleasure of a spectacle that might cross some 
moral line, but drawn out to such a degree that it causes an objectifying discomfort.  
This is especially pronounced when Jaro walks to the bedroom doorway and 
stops, a full frontal framing as he displays himself not only to his diegetic lover but also 
to the camera positioned as if we were looking through her eyes. As the camera turns to 
her, we see that she is much older, and the eroticism is lost with the irruption of the real 
into the film once again. Jaro is with a prostitute, who professes to love him, but whose 
devouring gaze suggests more a fascination with his young body. She will say later that 
each time they have sex she feels like it is her first time all over again. However, he is not 
completely naive and this is not abuse, for he uses her just as much for the comfort and 
the stability of her home. This scene depicts instead how Jaro is both a man and a child, 
involved in consensual sex but dependent on her to provide a security lost when he left 
home at twelve years of age and ended up in the streets. The scene is divested of any such 
‘lofty’ emotions of love and happiness, presenting instead a picture of desire as a will to 
survive and a means of coping with a harsh reality.  
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To this reality we return in the next scene where we find the gang hanging out in 
an empty lot above a cemetery, listening to the radio, smoking a joint, and drinking. One 
of them, Pirri, pops some pills as well.295  Aimless with nothing to do but get high and 
pass the day, these ‘hooligans’ have no structure and therefore no consideration of 
temporality outside of the immediate present.  Action is taken in the moment without any 
conception of consequence or effect.  John Hopewell argues that such figures, 
represented as only living in the present, comforted audiences who were fearful of past 
conflicts and future uncertainties.296 Experience in the present tense alleviated historical 
discomfort.   
However, while there is a historical distance from the past or the future, the 
melodramatic mode represents the present as unstable and uncertain, a disaster waiting to 
happen, a chaos about to be unleashed.  True, we see these figures living day to day, but 
the excessive amount of intoxicants taken all at once coupled with what happens next 
introduces a sense of dread that will power the film from this moment on: Jaro appears 
holding a bag, draws a sawed off shotgun, and the boys become ecstatic while the music 
from the radio now blaring non-diegetically. Violence and self-destruction are imminent, 
which is certainly not a comforting picture of the present, at least not how they must 
experience it.   
                                                 
295 Fact and fiction would collide in the cases of ‘Pirri’, or José Luis Fernández Eguia, 
and ‘Jaro’, or José Luis Manzano.  Both were born in the notoriously rough and drug-
infested marginal suburb of Vallecas, chosen because they were authentic for the roles, 
and who would both appear in many more de la Iglesia films.  Even though they gained 
fame and a bit of fortune through acting, they never left behind the lifestyle of 
delinquency and drugs, and both would be dead twelve years later from heroin overdoses.  
296 Hopewell, Out of the Past: Spanish Cinema after Franco, 223. 
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The next scenes are shot on-location near the Puerta del Sol in downtown Madrid, 
in an area known for ‘cruising.’ Like before, there is a ‘realist’ grounding of the narrative, 
a reference to the actual social reality outside of the diegesis, such as the real-life Cine 
Carretas, an infamous rendez-vous point. Yet, melodramatic excess once again enters into 
this representation of the real to introduce a critical distance by which to view it. They are  
looking for their friend Johnny, who as a male prostitute, can arrange a ‘house party’ for 
them to crash and rob. All the while they are solicited by gross exaggerations of gay men, 
stereotypical depictions that become laughable in the next scene at the chosen house. We 
see a large group of men, including a drag queen, a flamboyant host, and some in suits, 
all having a gay time. When Jaro and his gang smash through the sliding glass door, 
taking the time to break out each individual shard, storming the party with gun drawn, at 
which point they are invited to dance, we have an example of a “relation between 
melodramatic comedy and melodramatic excess [that] is often ironic or parodic.”297   
The melodramatic excess performed by both Jaro’s gang and the group of gay 
men does more than disrupt the ‘realism’ of the street scene. This ironic, or parodic, 
representation of exaggerated performances—both those of the homosexuals and of the 
gang—reveals something that the marginalized share: for those outside of the established 
moral or economic order of society, action is always excessive, a means to disrupt 
reality’s order with disorder so as to gain access. However, there is a difference of class 
between the two groups, for the gay men are represented as quite comfortable, belonging 
to the bourgeoisie, while the hooligans are clearly members of the working class. This 
difference is what separates comedy from pathos. While the bourgeoisie is lampooned, 
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Jaro’s attempts to gain access into the social, while comedic at times, are always failures 
with disastrous consequences, such as when the police approach him in a shopping mall 
and want to open his bag of booty from the house party.  We pity him because his 
experience is full of impasses in moving towards a goal, pathos caused by “action made 
difficult to implement” common to melodramas, for the poor decisions he makes are the 
only ones seemingly available to him.298 
 Singer has in mind melodramas from earlier times, however, so his understanding 
of pathos in relationship to “psychic energies and emotions which the narrative 
“represses,” blocks from full expression, gratification, or resolution” is turned on its head 
by Navajeros:299 there still is no final resolution or gratification, but this is because the 
narrative takes the energies and emotions to such an excess that they are incompatible 
with reality. This postmodern reversal of the melodramatic mode—not to release the 
repressed through swelling music and non-naturalistic mise-en-scène, but instead to make 
excess so excessive that it spills out of the text—ruptures the narrative to expose 
contradictions instead of introducing an ordered surface to smooth over them.  This is 
why scenes of ‘realism’ are continually reintroduced after moments of melodramatic 
excess, for its contradictions are to be exposed by melodrama in order to be perceived by 
the viewer: a collision between the vicious ‘reality’ of the present in a liberal democracy 
and a marginal identity victimized by being denied access except through destructive 
excess.   
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The dialectic of realism and melodrama is repeated again and again for the rest of 
the film, with modernist devices employed from time to time to expose this relationship 
as one that is enabled by the cinematic apparatus.  This postmodern pastiche of styles, 
however, is utilized to reveal through rupture the contradictions of the dominant 
ideology—that of a capitalist liberal democracy—and not, as Jean-Louis Baudry writes, 
“to obtain a precise ideological effect necessary to the dominant ideology” by 
naturalizing them.300 The narrative never stabilizes around either reality, as the social, or 
melodrama, as Jaro attempts to gain access.  The next scene returns us to the reporter, 
narrating more facts to ground the fiction on the screen—45% of crimes are committed 
by juveniles, 50% of those detained are less than 18—only to then rip this ground away 
via melodrama. Jaro is saved in the nick-of-time from sure arrest by his lover, followed 
by a sex scene that is so grotesque in framing and acting—extreme close-ups in shot-
reverse sequence of their faces, contorted with tongues hanging out while groaning—that 
melodrama comes crashing back in excessively.  Then a scene of intense reality—shot on 
location, traveling along on motorcycles, natural lighting—though Tchaikovsky blares 
again and the scene is interrupted by rapid jump cuts: reality, an experience of it that is 
sensationalized and excessive, followed by the self-reflexive revelation that this 
relationship between fact and fiction is a representation. 
The scenes that follow function to ramp up the stakes in this collision between 
fact and fiction, reality and melodrama—and the modernist revelation of a self-conscious 
cinematic representation—but never deviate from this established structure.  We follow 
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Jaro’s downward spiral towards his eventual death, all the while knowing how it will end, 
yet drawn in deeper emotionally, which makes the harshness of reality all the more 
poignant, and our condemnation of it all the more pronounced. We follow his determined 
path to selling and abusing drugs, his mistreatment by those who control the drug 
business as well as by the police, his incarceration, his escape, and his attempt at playing 
house with a young woman whom he impregnated. Interspersed in all of this are constant 
interruptions by the narrator cum journalist: 2% of delinquents are from the upper class, 
5% from the upper middle, 19% from the middle, and 74% from the working class; then, 
we see a montage of him traveling out to the suburbs to understand Jaro based on his 
social “situation.”  Meanwhile, there are jump cuts and jarring angles in shots to reveal 
the cinematic apparatus. Melodrama and realism, modernist representation, all as 
postmodern pastiche.  
The list could be even longer, for the film’s excesses constantly spill off the 
screen: a fight with neo-fascists to the music of Chopin; Jaro being raped by a dealer’s 
henchman followed by hundreds of hooligans storming the streets in retaliation; Jaro 
losing a testicle after a battle with the police, who machine-gun his friend; Jaro and his 
gang getting involved in a shootout between the police and Basque terrorists; Jaro getting 
in a knife-fight to protect his prostitute mom from her pimp, though she picks the latter 
over him; and, then his death at the same moment that his son is born. This last scene is 
worth mentioning, however, for the most excessive conflation of styles is displayed in the 
film’s closure.   
Jaro and the soon-to-be mother of their boy, Toni, have a fight.  He berates her for 
wanting to smoke a joint while pregnant.  She ridicules him for acting as if they will have 
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a ‘normal’ home, when he still continues to rob and steal.  They can pretend they are part 
of society, but in fact they persist at the margins only able to perform the part.  He storms 
out of the apartment, on his way to collect the gang and rob a car.  Tchaikovsky swells up 
again. This moment reiterates the statement at the beginning of the film, that Jaro is only 
a criminal because of necessity and misery, with the melodramatic mode to give 
expression to his “symptomatic behavior [that] emerges out of irreconcilable or 
inexpressible” contradiction, as Laura Mulvey explains the melodramatic protagonist.301  
However, it is not as if we take Jaro’s side, as if he were to be admired for any heroism. 
Instead, through the dialectic of realism and melodrama, and the modernist self-
reflexivity of the film, we are made to experience how he is victimized by the present—
he is a criminal out of necessity and misery—a consequence of the unjust, immoral 
system of capitalism that forces parts of society to the margins, limiting inclusion and 
voice. Those on the margins can only express themselves through the melodramatic mode 
of excess, which is comical or destructive, but never acquires legitimacy. Democracy is 
the victim, for meaningful inclusion is denied, making opposition an inarticulate cry 
recognized only to be destroyed.  
The sequence at the very end, beginning with this fight and ending with Jaro’s 
death and the birth of his boy, demonstrates through parallel editing that the present as 
such seems to offer only an eternal repetition of the same. We are shown Jaro traveling 
from the outskirts into the city, while Toni travels to the hospital to give birth.  Jaro and 
the gang attack a man getting out of his car in an affluent neighborhood, while Toni is 
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carted into the delivery room.  A man in a house comes out with a shotgun, all run off 
except Jaro, who turns and approaches with his knife drawn.  The man blasts him once in 
the chest, and the second rips his face apart, which is presented in extreme close-up.  He 
bleeds out on the pavement, as we cut to an extreme close-up of the baby crowning, 
blood covering his body as he emerges from the birth canal. Jaro in the street, a chalk 
outline around his body, then a jump cut to the outline now absent of his body.  The baby 
is cleaned off, passages cleared, and the music that has blared for the entirety of the 
sequence stops.  With this last image frozen on the frame, the baby’s wail exceeds the 
diegetic reality, as we continue to hear his cries even though the image-movement has 
ended.   
The present reality of the liberal democracy revealed in its brutality, destroying 
those who cross the lines of exclusion and make attempts to be recognized: a 
disarticulation of the invisible in melodramatic excess. “The melodramatic mode is an 
ideology of the spectacle, propelled by narrative and powered by emotion.  If it can be 
turned into a story and made legible in images, the experience is legitimate, real,” as 
Lang observes.302 However, what de la Iglesia manages in Navajeros is to inflect this 
mode using realist and modernist devices, thus creating a spectacle that is hyperreal, 
exceeding reality and positioning ideology at a critical distance: we see a grotesque 
vision of reality that might be more real than everyday experience or passive 
entertainment.  A representation ruptured from material history, but not cohering as a 
stable text either, instead self-consciously revealing the contradictions of both fact and 
fiction through cinematic affect. Is this a politics for postmodernity?  
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Navajeros does manage to avoid the pitfall of what Johannes von Moltke cautions 
against: the “function of emotion as a totalizing response” by charging a “historical 
moment emotionally... to subsume its various aspects, and even its contradictions, under 
the totalizing grasp of an affective response.”303 The film turns the ‘traditional’ 
melodrama on its head, using the mode instead to have the viewer feel the contradictions 
of the present while also interrupting the process of affect and response to create an 
emotional distance through realist and modernist narrative devices.  As such, the film 
does seem to coincide with Rancière’s  understanding of the politics of aesthetics:  
configurations of experience that create new modes of sense perception 
and induce novel forms of political subjectivity... a battle fought yesterday 
over the promises of emancipation and the illusions and disillusions of 
history [that] continues today on aesthetic terrain.304  
 
Navajeros is political in the sense that it offers new experiences of reality and the 
representation of it to enable the sensation and the critical disruption of the illusion that 
emancipation exists in the present. But does it register a “political signification” for 
reality in which “modes of narration or new forms of visibility established by artistic 
practices enter into politics’ own field of aesthetic possibilities”?305 
 What the film does register is the invisibility of the working class youths, and 
their recourse to melodramatic excess as discourse, which however, is a reaction, not a 
position.  These youths are excluded from the social order, and thus ‘act out’ to an 
excessive and criminal degree. They rail against the society that denies them access, 
which is very different than a political signification to represent any inclusion through the 
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gaps of the social order exposed as sheer contingency. That is, the film works to 
demonstrate how the liberal democracy crushes these youths, but these figures are never 
made visible or heard as meaningful subjects. They never articulate anything other than 
melodramatic excess. This experience of reality is discomforting, provoking a pathos of 
the historical moment that is depicted that makes criminals out of kids and denies them 
both a present and a future.  Yet, there is no sign of what to do next, as we perceive more 
the impossibility for change rather than what is possible.  
The film does not propose, summon, or organize a political project in opposition, 
which Badiou takes to be political activity.306 There is no projection of how the particular 
situation symbolized by Jaro might be made part of a “collective multiplicity,” which is 
not to imply a totality or a bounded universality, but rather refers to a collection of 
political positions that all have the freedom to speak equally and individually.307  Instead, 
the final image of Jaro’s baby boy gestures towards a repetition of the same 
disarticulation and denial.  The film is a more ‘political’ representation than Pepi, Luci, 
Bom, in that Navajeros offers a critical experience of the present instead of taking refuge 
from it by representing a removed spatio-temporal realm; yet, Pepi, Luci, Bom is more 
‘political’ in that it offers a representation of particularity that has a firm voice and a 
commanding presence.   
Neither film, however, seems to signify a politics of opposition that would 
translate beyond the symbolic realm and take real form. What then are we to conclude: Is 
the gap between the political, as represented, and the political, in reality, a result of an 
excessive melodramatic mode that can only render oppositional identities as either mute 
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or unreal? Or is it more complex, and perhaps more troubling: ‘post-modern’ political 
theory may have misplaced democracy in imagining political opposition as an actual 
possibility for and in reality? These films might come closer to realizing any actual 
‘political’ possibility for the postmodern present by offering images of oppositional 
particularities, though they represent identity either made possible in the escape from 








Conclusion: Political Possibility 
 
 
 The Pactos de la Moncloa sealed the fate of the transición, Tom Lewis maintains, 
and foreclosed the possibility for a politics of difference or opposition, as well as for any 
clean break with the past regime or authentic democracy for the future: “[t]alk of a 
ruptura democrática after the end of 1977 became stigmatized as immature political 
fantasy.”308 The fantasy was that the transición would bring about significant political, 
social, or economic changes that had been imagined at its beginning, but instead of 
change there was continuity, at least for the working and middle classes. The consensual 
politics practiced behind closed doors by the UCD, PCE and PSOE managed to limit 
wage increases to 20-22% though inflation was soaring above 29%; tight restrictions 
were placed on credit and borrowing; public spending was drastically cut; concessions 
were demanded from the unions to desist striking (previous to this Spain had the highest 
strike rate in Europe); and, unemployment grew from 7 to 13%.309 The democracy 
instituted did not have the ‘people’ in mind: it was a liberal democracy to develop further 
the expansion of capitalism first introduced under the regime and now fully instituted as a 
free market, nationally and internationally.  
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Following the Pactos de la Moncloa, “the PCE and the PSOE repudiated flat out 
the political opportunity to pursue a clear constitutional alternative during the referendum 
campaign.”310 The democracy being instituted would not serve the interests of those 
without power, influence, or wealth.  In a rapid reversal of their earlier rejection of “any 
path of accommodation to capitalism” in order to take “political and economic power, the 
socialization of the means of production, distribution and exchange by the working class” 
during the December 1976 party congress, the PSOE instead embraced the institution of a 
free-enterprise monarchy to serve capital and Spain’s elites.311 The PCE, likewise, 
surrendered “its radical impulse in the initiation rites of bourgeois-monarchist 
democracy... laying the ground for the desencanto that would sweep the Left and [the 
PCE’s] membership in the years to come.”312 The lack of political opposition by the PCE 
and the PSOE, both of whom should not be understood as capitulating to the UCD but as 
working with them in drafting the Pactos and the Constitution, diminished the belief in 
and desire for political possibility.  A “political apathy” followed this disenchantment, 
and as Lewis points out, would then become more of a “political irony, even cynicism” 
following the failed coup d’etat on February 23rd, 1981, which for but a moment 
stimulated public desire again only then to fade away.313   
This political cynicism was not misplaced or misdirected desire, but was a result 
of the practice of politics limiting possibilities to only one. Once the PSOE won control 
of the government following the October 1982 elections, there was no turn to the avowed 
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project of building a social democracy by and for the middle and working classes, but 
instead things became much worse for those without influence or power.  Unemployment 
rose to 22% by 1985, though already by 1983 over 50% of youths aged 16-19 and 38% of 
20 to 24 year-olds were without a job, and instead of the promised creation of 800,000 
new jobs, the PSOE “presided over the destruction” of 484,000 jobs.314  Even with the 
PSOE in charge, there was no change in the practice of politics except to service even 
more deliberately the demands of the free market.   
Political cynicism was not only a result of what the PSOE did not do, but also 
resulted from what they did accomplish: “nothing less than the wholesale socioeconomic 
assimilation of members of the new ruling class to the old ruling class,” establishing a 
line of continuity between the totalitarian regime of the past and the ‘social democrats’ of 
the present: a continued relationship between politicians and the public that alienated the 
latter from the equation of profits and power accumulated by the former.  Instead of any 
social democracy, the PSOE pushed Spain into the international market economy 
following the transición, “developing an economic strategy whose principal aim was to 
foster and deepen the restructuring of big capital that was already under way,” and reaped 
the rewards: holding onto power until 1996 and amassing many fortunes along the 
way.315 The political irony was that the PSOE, a socialist party, administered “capitalism 
just as efficaciously for the times as the avowedly capitalist parties,” which certainly did 
not help to counter the “profound disillusionment with the professed [political] 
alternatives.”316 
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 In chapters two and four, I outlined how the political euphoria for democratic 
possibility at the beginning of the transición became diffused by the practice of 
consensual politics and the diminishment of opposition, which led to a desencanto with 
the practice of politics by the transición’s end. Eduardo Haro Tecglen’s writings during 
the transición help to document the transition from a political desire to a political 
dissatisfaction or disbelief in the possibility of further change, that is, for any eventual 
institution of anything remotely resembling a democracy to serve the majority’s interests 
and ensure freedom and equality, a feeling which would only increase under the reign of 
the PSOE (to which the contemporary constitution of the PSOE today performs almost as 
a corrective, as José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s Nueva Vía, or New Way, was announced 
as a project of political and social change for democratic socialism that would restore 
credibility to the PSOE’s public image and restore faith in its message).317  
My analysis and interpretation of this transition, however, was not only performed 
to bring to light the transition in politics for a specific place, Spain, at a specific time, 
1975-1982. Rather, by looking at this transition to a liberal and capitalist democracy, 
which is not that different from other such democracies around the globe, the question 
can be asked: how can political possibility be perceived by ‘modern’ political theory to 
exist for the democratic State, which does not reveal much potential to complete the 
historical project, finally, of achieving liberty, fraternity, and equality? If there is no 
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viable opposition, because of an absence of agonism or direct competition between 
opposing parties, or because the ‘oppositional’ parties themselves, socialists and 
communists in the Spanish case, administer capitalism just as or more efficaciously as the 
bourgeois-moderate-liberal parties, then the political possibility for anything other than 
stasis and an eternal present for the current state of affairs should be acknowledged, as a 
desire never to be fulfilled.   
 The other political possibility that was put forth as an alternative, that of ‘post-
modern’ political theory, envisages opposition as disagreement and disruption instead of 
debate and dialogue, occurring either against or outside the realm of the State.  In this 
sense, political possibility does not rely upon professional politicians to mediate 
differences and bring about consensus, but instead relies upon the activity of social agents 
fighting to be recognized and heard in the social sphere. This type of political theory 
perceives society to be composed of particular groups or individuals, who work towards 
inclusion into the social order, thereby demonstrating at the same time a dialectic of 
particularity and universality as well as the sheer contingency of any social synthesis or 
stability. There is no historical project to complete, except to drive history forever 
forward through continual change and reordering.  
However, the transición reveals a concurrent transition towards social 
demobilization and disenchantment. This would suggest that social apathy or cynicism, 
besides in relation to the practice of politics, stands in the way of considering any totality, 
however tenuous or fleeting, beyond the fragmentation and isolation of particularities. 
There is no social desire to call upon in order to reorder the social around a universal 
essence or identity, group or amalgamation, that might bind together disparate 
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particularities, however contingent this might be. While political possibility might exist 
in making demands to be heard and included within the social order, are there signs that 
the social order has ever changed except to include more and more particularities?  Has it 
been revealed that the contingent social order is contingent, or that it accommodates 
difference while remaining the same all along? If the latter, then an oppositional social 
order, such as a global ‘multitude’ against Empire or a radical ‘populism’ vying for 
hegemony,318 seems to be as much a desire not to be fulfilled as the ‘good State’ that 
‘modern’ political theory proposes: neither representing any tenable social or political 
realities that oppose the inscribed democracy and social order according to the logic of 
capitalism, a postmodern present stretching as far as the eye can see.319  As Slavoj Zizek 
writes  
the failure of the reality to live up to its notion always bears witness to the 
inherent weakness of the notion itself. But why should the same also not 
hold for democracy itself? Is it also not all too simple to oppose to the 
“really existing” liberal capitalo-democracy a more true “radical” 
democracy?320 
 
What then is political possibility in and for postmodernity?  Is democracy even an 
option? 
Postmodernity, itself the historical age of late-stage capitalism, might also be the 
cause of any theoretical impasse to imagine democracy or political possibility beyond its 
temporal or spatial borders. Present democratic reality, both politically and socially, has 
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become naturalized and accepted, with both ‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’ political 
theories imagining change to come from within what is already given, no matter if this is 
through resolution or rupture, for both take the elements for change to be already existent, 
even if they have not yet been heard or seen either as consensual partners or parts to be 
included in the whole through disagreement. The debunking of metanarratives, 
epistemologically, politically and socially, and the resistance to put forth organized and 
total visions of realities (utopias really), even if it is accepted that the socio-political is 
contingent and in flux, makes it hard to represent alternate realities guided by a logic 
different from that of late-stage capitalism. Paraphrasing Cornelius Castoriadis, 
postmodernity marks a historical point when there is more interpretation than creation, or 
put another way, if one cannot create an alternate reality then one interprets the given 
reality anew.321 The future has been reduced to interpreting the present state of things in 
order to find possibility within:  there is no outside, historical or material.  
Leaving ‘modern’ political theory aside, because of its historical confusion in 
situating any contemporary democracy as an extension of modernity’s unfinished project, 
which is more a reaction against postmodernity than a way of negotiating a possible way 
out, how can ‘post-modern’ political theory begin to look at the problem of political 
possibility from a fresh perspective, while acknowledging contingency and disruption, 
but also breaking the reified shell that the idea of democracy has become? Protests 
against capitalism, or globalization, hold on to the idea of democracy as a counter to the 
inequities and contradictions of the present situation. However, ideas of ‘radical’ 
democracies seem only to suggest a better practice or institution of liberal democracy that 
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might ameliorate capitalism’s most excessive consequences, thereby leaving the 
foundation still intact.  Perhaps, as Zizek suggests, this means that ‘democracy’ needs to 
be reimagined or discarded outright, for most often “the reference to democracy involves 
the rejection of radical attempts to “step outside,” to risk a radical break, to pursue the 
trend of self-organized collectives in areas outside the law.”322 Yet, again, how does one 
step outside when material history holds us fast inside? The answer could be: 
representation. 
 It is important to consider once again the relationship between representation and 
reality, for now there is also a consideration of the ‘real’ that is necessary in order to 
orient the direction of our gaze searching for political possibility on the horizon. Jesús 
González-Requena’s Lacanian distinction between the ‘real’ and ‘reality’ helps:  
Reality is the realm of an organized, categorized, predictable world, where 
the singular obeys the law, where meaning reigns. In other words: the 
reality of the world exists only insofar as it is submitted/subject to the 
order of discourse... In opposition to it we have the real, which is the realm 
of the uncategorizable, of the chaotic, of the unpredictable, where the 
singular is affirmed in all its irreducibility, in its radical capacity to make 
meaning impossible.  The real escapes the order of discourse.323   
 
Political possibility should be looked for, not in reality, but in the gap between reality and 
the real. Criticisms of late-stage capitalism and the politics of the State, of the economic 
and political realities of the day, must depart from the existing reality in toto, for what 
must be performed is a return to the real to then construct a wholly new organization and 
categorization that will predict new laws, norms, and meanings that have nothing to do 
with that now signified by ‘democracy.’ This cannot be done without anything short of 
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ultimate rupture and repudiation, for a disruption or rearticulation of particularities within 
an existent social order does not seem to escape from the bounds and limits of an already 
given order.  “The only “realistic” prospect is to ground a new political universality by 
opting for the impossible, fully assuming the place of the exception, with no taboos, no a 
priori norms (“human rights,” “democracy”),” says Zizek, which requires letting go of 
the pieces now ordered together to fall back again into the chaos of the real, then to be 
rearranged and given alternate meaning through discourse: a discourse that grants time 
and space to the impossible.324  
This task falls to representation, to fix for a moment the real according to laws 
and norms that refract those of reality, allowing them to be contemplated from outside. 
“We find ourselves with more codes, more discursive apparatus, more specialized fields 
of knowledge—in sum, a more refined semiotic apparatus to configure reality,” writes 
González-Requena, but “at the same time, we find ourselves in the most fragile reality of 
times” because of our theoretical impasse to imagine beyond.325 However, in an age of 
discredited metanarratives and absent of utopias, the narrative function to reach beyond 
reality might still exist and offer a way, especially in cinema’s unique framing and 
figuration of the real, as a represented reality different than, yet tied, to material reality.   
Georg Lukács, the early philosopher of souls and forms, perceived the potential of 
cinema to extend beyond reality while referencing it at the same time: 
Not only in their technique, but also in their effect, cinematic images, 
equal in their essence to nature, are no less organic and alive... Only they 
maintain a life of a completely different kind.  In a word, they become 
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fantastic. This fantastical element is not a contrast to the living life, 
however, it is only a new aspect of the same: a life without the present, a 
life without fate, without reasons, without motives, a life without measure 
or order, without essence or value... Even when the soul still—and often—
longs for this life, this longing is for a foreign abyss, for something far off 
and internally distant[,] the world of the “cinema.”326 
 
Cinema gives a collection of images, organized and categorized, a fantasy referring to the 
reality of “living life,” but removed from its present, distanced from its reasons, motives, 
essence, or value, a world that attracts our desire, but which we cannot fulfill yet, for this 
‘other’ world  is foreign, far off, a world like our own but inextricably separated and 
distinct. Yet, the perception of this ‘other’ world’s possibility, the contemplation of its 
organization, values, norms, and essence, the desire to occupy its spatio-temporal 
domain, all of this might power political activity to remake a cinematic reality in material 
form, from the abyss to an actuality, opposed to the social, political, and economic reality 
of lived life.  
At least, this potential would seem to be possible if cinematic representation 
provided for a departure from lived reality, access into the real, and a critical return to see 
reality as a concept no longer contained: that is, if filmic representations were politically 
sublime, revealing present reality as no longer controlled, bringing forth an exhilaration 
in breaking free from it, making meaningful through affect a desire for an alternate 
future.327 A postmodern aesthetics of the sublime could be the first step towards political 
possibility, towards a reality not yet represented. To Zizek’s question—“What could be 
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more sublime than the creation of a new liberated territory, of a positive order of being 
that escapes the grasp of the existing order?”—I would add only that, while the creation 
of a liberated territory in reality might be far from actuality, the representation of such a 
territory and positive order is where one might conceive of its possibility in 
postmodernity.328 
We saw in chapters three and five that certain fantasies of reality were represented 
melodramatically in films during the transición, and that these fantasies differed at the 
transición’s beginning and its end. Before the socio-political situation became bounded 
by the logic of capitalism and formed as a liberal democracy, melodramatic fantasies 
appealed to the moral register of politics, representing what ought to be done—the 
evacuation of political opposition and ideological conflict—in order for a national 
reconciliation to proceed. The turmoil and trauma of the past were represented in 
historical melodramas in order that they would not spill over into the present.  Such an 
aesthetic affect of a clear-cut distinction between good and evil, and its message that ‘we 
should all get along’, however, should not be understood as part of the practice of 
consensus that would come to define the politics of the transición, for the films were 
released well before such practice began.   
The ethical treatment of history and society, and the desire for reality not to be 
split into two ideological camps, can still be understood in terms of political possibility, 
but they need to be situated with respect to temporality. These earlier melodramas were 
representations of ethical import—of what ought to have happened in the past instead of 
what did—so that the threat of a recurrence of the same failure might be averted in the 
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present through an affective experience of national reconciliation and identity. These 
earlier melodramas were not motivated by an aesthetic sublime of postmodernity, for to 
the disorganization of reality they wanted to bring order and tranquility. They represented 
desires to make a reconciled and organized reality out of the undefined and chaotic real, a 
political possibility taken to be resolution and not rupture.  
In this sense, the films represented political possibility much the same as the 
unfinished project of ‘modern’ political theory—a project denied in the past that the 
present can make right—and a social reality that should be harmonious and complete, if 
not for the imposition of the ideological villainy of extreme individualism and self-
interest. The representation of a demos, whose identity preexists the enemy’s attack upon 
it, and for whom the enemy is an external threat, also shares something with the 
contemporary turn to populism, which posits a hegemonic universality to counter the 
antidemocratic elements within a democratic space: democracy is constrained “not [by] a 
fatal flaw inscribed into the structure as such but [by] an element that doesn’t play its role 
in the structure properly.”329 Both ideas, modernity’s unfinished project or populism, 
imply a universality that should be striven for, and can be achieved, if only the system 
itself be cleansed and purified of elements standing in democracy’s way.  This too is how 
these earlier melodramas prefigured democracy before its entrance onto the Spanish 
stage. 
However, the socio-political situation quickly changed with the institution of a 
liberal democracy, the disappearance of opposition in politics, and the demobilization and 
disenchantment in the social. To this, just as ‘post-modern’ political theory responds to 
                                                 




the new historical inflection of democracy and political possibility by late-stage 
capitalism and postmodernity, some melodramas responded as well by disrupting the now 
ordered social and political realities in order to consider them from new perspectives. The 
films analyzed and interpreted in this study were examples of a melodramatic mode, not 
to present an ethics to order and organize reality like earlier, but instead to enable a 
perspective to perceive the instability and disorder of reality. For this reason, it is this 
mode and not the earlier one that we need to interrogate for its potential for representing 
political possibility in postmodernity, as this age cannot contemplate the idea of 
democracy from without but must perform an immanent critique from within the confines 
of what democracy has become.  
Pepi, Luci, Bom offers one example of a representation of reality distinct from the 
socio-political reality of the times. The present is given an identity that has no history, 
and for this reason identity is free to cross all boundaries of sexuality and gender that had 
been imposed in lived life. Though victimized at times by vestiges of the past, present 
figurations of identity in the film heroically overcome these obstacles by its end to 
achieve full expression. In this representation, the order of the social order is disrupted so 
that marginal identities can make themselves heard and seen. The film seems to suggest a 
postmodern politics in that elements of the real have been reoriented according to new 
laws and norms, thus symbolically presenting an alternate reality to counter the one 
existing in actuality.  
However, there is a problematic location of democratic potential as already 
existent in diegetic reality, just as with ‘post-modern’ political theory’s positing of much 
the same in lived reality. In the diegesis, the possibility for ‘democracy’ already exists, 
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though it is stubbornly resisted by antidemocratic elements—like the police officer who 
has served since the regime—a conflict that provokes the melodramatic moments of the 
film.  In this sense, even though the film is more of a melodramatic parody, there is the 
same clear-cut distinction made between the victim and the villain as in the earlier 
melodramas of the transición, but in this instance there is no absolute victimization of 
those without power or control: instead the would-be victims become heroes in control of 
their own destinies and desires and manage to punish the would-be villains, turning the 
melodramatic mode on its head.  There is no democratic inclusion into society to be won, 
for it is already given, while struggle instead centers around getting revenge on the 
antidemocratic elements that persist. Though the film does reveal the contingency of the 
social order, and the multiplicity of identity, it does not position a critical perspective by 
which to see actual reality anew. We are given a beautiful picture of the present— 
democracy is alive and well—that suggests an aesthetics of assurance, which runs 
counter to a sublime aesthetics.   
 Pepi, Luci, Bom instead demonstrates what Fredric Jameson calls the “aesthetics 
of postmodernism... in which sensory beauty is once again the heart of the matter.”330 It 
provides a sensory feast of outlandish sexual perversities, bearded women, cock contests, 
and rock performances by popular musicians. In its represented reality, all is fun and 
carefree, with no concerns or threats except those that are easily tamed, and with a happy 
ending as well to show the protagonists fully gratified by the new democratic life of the 
present.  Of course, such a reality makes only slight reference to the actual present, the 
movida, for the film was made in 1980 and released just before the coup d’etat in 
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February of 1981.  Like Jameson’s idea of postmodern “art as a substitute for politics and 
the work of art about art,” this beautiful picture of the present is an aesthetic 
representation to be enjoyed for itself no matter the socio-political situation in reality.331 
Instead of offering a representation that might inform a consideration of political 
possibility for reality, the film is a self-contained aesthetic democracy: if not the 
experience of democracy in reality, then at least the experience of it in representation.  Its 
example of the melodramatic mode does not seem to provide much for political 
possibility in reality, for much like Zygmunt Bauman’s assessment of stories told in 
postmodernity, Pepi, Luci, Bom articulates “individual lives in a way that excludes or 
suppresses (prevents from articulation) the possibility of tracking down the links 
connecting individual fate to the ways and means by which society as a whole 
operates.”332  We experience the fanciful fate of Pepi and Bom, rendered as a beautiful 
picture made possible by the present, but there is no link made between the 
individualized lifestyle of the movida and the lived life of the social. 
 Navajeros offers a different example, however, as a cinema of poverty in imagery 
and content. The rough nature of the film owing to its location shooting, its non-
professional actors from the streets themselves, its disregard for continuity editing, all 
oppose a tendency towards beauty, which is further reinforced by the ugliness of its 
representation of the present as brutal and undemocratic, if this is to mean the guarantee 
of freedom and equality.  This alone does not make the film sublime.  Its melodramatic 
mode to suture the spectator into an affective experience of such a reality does. The 
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excess of cinematic form to represent the excesses that its protagonist, Jaro, is pushed to 
in his pursuit to be recognized and heard forces the viewer into the chaos and 
disorganization of the real, a realm outside of the law, without value or essence, inchoate 
and inarticulate, the world that Jaro inhabits. The film itself, as an aesthetic 
representation, does organize and categorize these elements to a degree, but there is never 
a complete order or meaning given to diegetic reality because its pastiche of film forms 
prevents any unified counter to the fragmentation of the aesthetic parts.  However, 
because of this use of the cinematic apparatus to represent the chaos and uncertainty of 
the real, any symbolic meaning is also incomplete.  To what effect then does the film 
bring through affect a consideration of political possibility in reality? 
The diegetic reality of Navajeros is not a mimetic copy of the socio-political 
reality, but it does reference the reality of the times, especially that of the working class 
and homosexuals living on the margins. At the same time, its pastiche maintains a level 
of fragmentation that self-reflexively reveals the film’s own artifice.  It is not an aesthetic 
stand-in for reality, but rather wants to turn a critical eye on the failures of democracy. 
What is shown is that in a liberal democracy, types like Jaro will never find freedom or 
equality, nor will they find a voice or be recognized outside of melodramatic discourse, 
which reduces them to particularity because of the self-destructive and violent excess that 
prevents any collective will from developing.  But, again, what political possibility is 
this?  Jaro is crushed by the present, represented as an absence on the screen by the film’s 
end, and it is not inferred that his son or mates will fare any better. Nor does the film 
offer an assessment of what specific problems need to be addressed or what issues have 
to be rectified to prevent the same from happening again and again.  In fact, Pepi, Luci, 
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Bom seems to offer more in the way of a ‘liberated territory’ or ‘positive order of being’, 
though any possibility for reality it could have offered is denied by its retreat into the 
aesthetic. What Navajeros does manage is an experience of reality as inherently 
undemocratic with no foreseeable future change, a world in which all are victims and 
there are no heroes, a world without villains except for the socio-political space itself, and 
yet the doors to this world of representation are left open. The world of the film is 
revealed as a fiction, fragmented so that it never coheres as only an aesthetic object.  The 
political possibility that is given then is that reality is experienced anew through 
representation and, possibly, the viewer returns through its open doors to experience the 
real and see now from a critical perspective the artifice of social reality just as clearly as 
the artifice its representation. There is nothing free or equal about the contemporary 
democracy, and nothing perceived that is redeemable in a reality as such.  This film 
offers up a picture of an entirely negative order of being and territory that cannot be 
liberated, a return to the real so that it is left chaotic and unstable, which makes it 
possible that an alternative reality might be reorganized or categorized by different means 
for future meaning, but far from certain. Navajeros does not present a political project for 
the future, but it does represent that one is needed, given the capitalo-liberal democracy 
of the present. 
After our travels through the transición, and its political, social, and cultural 
transitions over the years 1975-1982, the movement from modernity to postmodernity, 
from dictatorship to a liberal democracy, where do we find ourselves in terms of political 
possibility?  It is my argument that an answer is not necessary for the discussion to be 
meaningful, but rather what is required is that the question be asked without being 
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resigned to make do with the situation as such, which is to say, without finding the 
answer immanent to the reality of our times. Nothing less than a complete rupture from a 
capitalo-liberal democracy is required, though to say so is akin to standing on the edge of 
a veritable abyss, historically and epistemologically, for I am unable to offer up an 
opposing project that might direct a path towards the future. However, this lack on my 
part does not deter me from believing that political possibility does exist, even if as a 
vague shadow, tendrils and wisps that catch my eye but which I cannot not yet decipher.  
For just as I cannot perceive the future, I can still make out, like Zizek, contours of 
the fateful limitation of the present global capitalist system, inclusive of its 
democratic form of political self-legitimization... [so] I am not ready to... 
endorse the standard “postmodern” political solution to turn defeat into a 
blessing in disguise, i.e., to abandon the horizon of radical change in favor 
of the prospect of multiple local practices of resistance, etc.—today, it is 
more crucial than ever to question the very foundations of capitalism of a 
global system, to clearly articulate the limitation of the democratic 
political project.333  
 
To question the foundations of capitalism and articulate the limitations of democracy 
requires a conceptual understanding of their costs and consequences, which is political in 
nature, but equally important is to experience the instability of capitalism and inadequacy 
of democracy through perception and affective sensation, for which the melodramatic 
mode provides, so as to consider the possibility of what might be.  
It is hoped that the study of the transición to postmodernity, its culture and 
politics, has helped to ask the question of political possibility again, to orient our gaze 
beyond the situation we still find ourselves in now: a dark time for emancipatory politics, 
but still illuminated by flickers of light serving as faint reminders on the screen that 
history and society are mutable. Such reminders do not exemplify what Jameson suggests 
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would be political art in postmodernity, if there ever is to be any: the means by which “to 
grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects [to] regain a capacity to act 
and struggle which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our social 
confusion.”334 We are still confused, and still unable to position in representation 
collective subjects in addition to individual ones, but this is not to say that there are no 
signs of a desire to act and struggle against the contradictions of capitalism and 
democracy in the present day.  Just as I demonstrated how the transición was the 
beginning of postmodernity in the Spanish context, it is hoped that this study’s return to 
the beginning allows the question of political possibility to be asked again, for the politics 
and culture then are not that much different from what we find ourselves with now.  We 
do seem to have come closer to the limits of postmodernity, but this is only a feeling. By 
returning to analyze and interpret its beginning, rounding the concept so as to understand 
postmodernity historically and not as eternal, an expectation for the future can possibly 
be imagined in our global context still mystified by the presentism of capitalism and 
democracy.  
 
                                                 









Abellán, José Luis. "The Function of Thought in the Political Transition (1975-1980)." In 
Spain 1975-1980: The Conflicts and Achievements of Democracy, edited by José 
L. Cagigao, John Crispin and Enrique Pupo-Walker, 25-38. Madrid: J. Porrúa 
Turanzas, 1982. 
Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory. Edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. 
London; New York: Routledge & K. Paul, 1986. 
Aguilar Fernández, Paloma. Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in 
the Transition to Democracy. New York: Berghahn Books, 2002. 
Almodóvar, Pedro. Pepi, Luci, Bom y otras chicas del montón. Figaro Films. 1980. Film. 
Alted Vigil, Alicia. "Del olvido y recuperación de la memoria." In Triunfo en su época: 
jornadas organizadas en la Casa Velázquez los días 26 y 27 de octubre de 1992, 
edited by Alicia Alted Vigil and Paul Aubert, 309-14. Madrid: École des hautes 
études hispaniques; Casa de Velázquez; Ediciones Pléyades, 1995. 
Aranguren, José Luis L., and Antonio García Santesmases. La izquierda, el poder y otros 
ensayos. Madrid: Trotta, 2005. 
Aumente, José. "¿Estamos preparados para el camino?" Triunfo, no. 656 (26 April 1975): 
51. 
Badiou, Alain. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. London; New York: 
Verso, 2001. 
———. Metapolitics. London; New York: Verso, 2005. 
 
190 
Baudry, Jean-Louis. "Ideological Effects of the Basic Apparatus." In Narrative, 
Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, edited by Philip Rosen, 286-98. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
Bauman, Zygmunt. The Individualized Society. Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity; 
Blackwell, 2001. 
Benjamin, Walter. One-Way Street. London: Verso, 1997. 
———. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." In Illuminations, 
edited by Hannah Arendt, 217-51. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 
———. "Theses on the Philosophy of History." In Illuminations, edited by Hannah 
Arendt, 253-64. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 
Besas, Peter. Behind the Spanish Lens: Spanish Cinema under Fascism and Democracy. 
Denver: Arden, 1985. 
Bratton, J. S., Jim Cook, and Christine Gledhill. "Introduction." In Melodrama: Stage, 
Picture, Screen, edited by J. S. Bratton, Jim Cook and Christine Gledhill, 1-8. 
London: British Film Institute, 1994. 
Brooks, Peter. The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and 
the Mode of Excess. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. 
Buckley, Ramón. La doble transición: política y literatura en la España de los años 
setenta. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 1996. 
Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek. Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: 
Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso, 2000. 
Camiller, Patrick. "Spanish Socialism in the Atlantic Order." New Left Review, no. 156 
(March-April 1986): 5-36. 
———. "The Eclipse of Spanish Communism." New Left Review, no. 147 (September-
October 1984): 122-28. 
Camino, Jaime. Las largas vacaciones del 36. José Frade P.C. 1976. Film. 
 
191 
Campillo, Óscar. Zapatero: presidente a la primera. Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 
2004. 
Caparrós Lera, José María. El cine español bajo el régimen de Franco, 1936-1975. 
Barcelona: Publicacions i Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 1983. 
———. El cine español de la democracia: de la muerte de Franco al "cambio" socialista 
(1975-1989). Barcelona: Anthropos, 1992. 
Carr, Raymond. Spain, 1808-1939. Oxford: Clarendon, 1966. 
———. The Republic and the Civil War in Spain. London; New York: Macmillan; St. 
Martin's, 1971. 
Carr, Raymond, and Juan Pablo Fusi. Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy. London; 
Boston: G. Allen & Unwin, 1981. 
Casanova, Julián, Santos Juliá, Antonio González Quintana, and Archivo Histórico 
Provincial de Guadalajara. La transición a la democracia en España: Actas de las 
VI Jornadas de Castilla-La Mancha sobre Investigación en Archivos, 
Guadalajara, 4-7 de noviembre 2003. Guadalajara: ANABAD Castilla-La 
Mancha, 2004. 
Castoriadis, Cornelius. "Culture in a Democratic Society." In The Castoriadis Reader, 
edited by David Ames Curtis, 338-48. Oxford; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997. 
———. "Power, Politics, Autonomy." In Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in 
Political Philosophy, edited by David Ames Curtis, 143-74. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
———. "The Crisis of Culture and the State." In Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays 
in Political Philosophy, edited by David Ames Curtis, 219-42. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
———. "The Ethicists' New Clothes." In World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, 
Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, edited by David Ames Curtis, 108-
22. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
 
192 
———. "The Greek and Modern Political Imaginary." In World in Fragments: Writings 
on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, edited by David Ames 
Curtis, 84-107. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
———. "The Movements of the Sixties." In World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, 
Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, edited by David Ames Curtis, 47-
57. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
———. "The Retreat from Autonomy: Postmodernism as Generalized Conformism." In 
World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the 
Imagination, edited by David Ames Curtis, 32-43. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997. 
Chávarri, Jaime. El desencanto. Elías Querejeta P.C. 1976. Film. 
D'Lugo, Marvin. Guide to the Cinema of Spain. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997. 
Del franquismo a la posmodernidad: cultura española 1975-1990. Edited by José B. 
Monleón and Carlos Blanco Aguinaga. Torrejón de Ardoz: Akal, 1995. 
Derrida, Jacques. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the 
New International. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Díaz, Elías. "Ideologies in the Making of the Spanish Transition." West European 
Politics 21, no. 4 (October 1998): 26-39. 
Dopazo, Antonio. "La transición democrática en el cine español." In El cine y la 
transición política española. Valencia: Filmoteca Valenciana, 1986. 
Eagleton, Terry. Ideology: An Introduction. London; New York: Verso, 1991. 
———. The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Oxford; Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990. 
"Editorial." Cambio 16, no. 0 (October 1971): 5. 
Elsaesser, Thomas. "Tales of Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama." 
Monogram 4 (1972): 2-16. 
 
193 
Encarnación, Omar. "Spain after Franco: Lessons in Democratization." World Policy 
Journal 18, no. 4 (Winter 2001/2002): 35-44. 
Espejo, A. Ramos. "Louis Althusser, en Granada." Triunfo, no. 689 (10 April 1976): 29. 
Ezcurra, José Ángel. "Apuntes para una historia." In Triunfo en su época: jornadas 
organizadas en la Casa Velázquez los días 26 y 27 de octubre de 1992, edited by 
Alicia Alted Vigil and Paul Aubert, 43-54. Madrid: École des hautes études 
hispaniques; Casa de Velázquez; Ediciones Pléyades, 1995. 
———. "Crónica de un empeño dificultoso." In Triunfo en su época: jornadas 
organizadas en la Casa Velázquez los días 26 y 27 de octubre de 1992, edited by 
Alicia Alted Vigil and Paul Aubert, 365-690. Madrid: École des hautes études 
hispaniques; Casa de Velázquez; Ediciones Pléyades, 1995. 
Ferrán, Ofelia. "Memory and Forgetting, Resistance and Noise in the Spanish Transition: 
Semprún and Vázquez Montalbán." In Disremembering the Dictatorship: The 
Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to Democracy, edited by Joan 
Ramon Resina, 191-222. Amsterdam; Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000. 
———. Working through Memory: Writing and Remembrance in Contemporary Spanish 
Narrative. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2007. 
"Fraga inventa su centro: "Entre 'Triunfo' y 'Fuerza Nueva'"." Triunfo, no. 674 (30 
August 1975): 15. 
Frisby, David. Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, 
Kracauer, and Benjamin. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986. 
Galán, Diego. "España debe saber." Triunfo, no. 736 (5 March 1977): 55. 
———. "La nueva ley del cine: tal cómo eramos." Triunfo, no. 821 (21 October 1978): 
46-47. 
———. "Nuestro cine es un desastre." Triunfo, no. 812 (19 August 1978): 53-55. 
———. "Peligro de muerte." Triunfo, no. 806 (8 July 1978): 22-23. 
 
194 
———. "Retrato de familia." Triunfo, no. 714 (2 October 1976): 57. 
García Delgado, José Luis. "Economía e incorporación a la comunidad europea." In 
Historia de la transición, 1975-1986, edited by Javier Tusell and Álvaro Soto 
Carmona, 236-51. Madrid: Alianza, 1996. 
García Santesmases, Antonio. Repensar la izquierda: evolución ideológica del 
socialismo en la España actual. Madrid; Barcelona; Iztapalapa, México: 
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia; Anthropos; Universidad 
Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Iztapalapa, 1993. 
Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990. 
Giménez-Rico, Antonio. Retrato de familia. Sabre Films S.A. 1976. Film. 
Gledhill, Christine. "The Melodramatic Field: An Investigation." In Home Is Where the 
Heart Is: Studies in Melodrama and the Woman's Film, edited by Christine 
Gledhill, 5-39. London: British Film Institute, 1987. 
González-Requena, Jesús. "The Television Newscast: A Postmodern Discourse." In 
Critical Practices in Post-Franco Spain, edited by Silvia L. López, Jenaro Taléns 
and Darío Villanueva, 28-42. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. 
Goytisolo, Juan. "Hemos vivido una ocupación." Triunfo, no. 705 (31 July 1976): 26-27. 
———. Juan sin tierra. Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1975. 
———. Libertad, libertad, libertad. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1978. 
Gracia García, Jordi. La resistencia silenciosa: fascismo y cultura en España. Barcelona: 
Anagrama, 2004. 
Gracia García, Jordi, and José-Carlos Mainer. Estado y cultura: el despertar de una 
conciencia crítica bajo el franquismo (1940-1962). Toulouse: Presses 
universitaires du Mirail, 1996. 
 
195 
Gracia García, Jordi, and Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer. La España de Franco (1939-
1975): Cultura y vida cotidiana. Madrid: Síntesis, 2001. 
Graham, Helen, and Jo Labanyi. Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction, The Struggle 
for Modernity. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987. 
Hall, Stuart. "New Labour's double-shuffle." Soundings, no. 24 (July 2003): 10-24. 
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2000. 
Haro Tecglen, Eduardo. "De quién es la crisis." Triunfo, no. 861 (28 July 1979): 14-15. 
———. "El estado actual de la revolución." Triunfo, no. 14 (December 1981): 8-12. 
———. "El feliz mundo del consenso." Triunfo, no. 794 (15 April 1978): 18-19. 
———. "El hurto de la democracia." Triunfo, no. 769 (22 October 1977): 6-7. 
———. El niño republicano. Madrid: Alfaguara, 1996. 
———. "El odio y la violencia." Triunfo, no. 715 (9 October 1976): 6-7. 
———. "El referendum: una base de analisis." Triunfo, no. 829 (16 December 1978): 18-
19. 
———. "Entre la bomba y la indeferencia." Triunfo, no. 827 (2 December 1978): 18-19. 
———. "Grecia: la caida de otro fascismo." Triunfo, no. 618 (13 August 1974): 6-7. 
———. "La cultura de la izquierda." Triunfo, no. 852 (26 May 1979): 26-27. 
 
196 
———. "La historia y el miedo en las elecciones." Triunfo, no. 745 (7 May 1977): 6-7. 
———. "La primera ruptura." Triunfo, no. 846 (14 April 1979): 14-15. 
———. "La tormenta de septiembre." Triunfo, no. 815 (9 September 1978): 10-11. 
———. "Los falsos errores." Triunfo, no. 718 (30 October 1976): 6-7. 
———. "Los infelices setenta." Triunfo, no. 884 (5 January 1980): 20-24. 
———. "Los limites de la amnistia." Triunfo, no. 706 (7 August 1976): 4-5. 
———. "Triunfo: Nacimiento y muerte." In Triunfo en su época: jornadas organizadas 
en la Casa Velázquez los días 26 y 27 de octubre de 1992, edited by Alicia Alted 
Vigil and Paul Aubert, 55-57. Madrid: École des hautes études hispaniques; Casa 
de Velázquez; Ediciones Pléyades, 1995. 
———. "U.C.D. no está sola." Triunfo, no. 841 (10 March 1979): 14-15. 
———. "Unas elecciones positivas." Triunfo, no. 751 (17 June 1977): 8-16. 
Heredero, Carlos F., José Enrique Monterde, Ramón Alquézar i Aliana, Institut Valencià 
de Cinematografia Ricardo Muñoz Suay, Filmoteca Española (Madrid), and 
Festival Internacional de Cine de Gijón. Los "nuevos cines" en España: ilusiones 
y desencantos de los años sesenta. Valencia: Institut Valencià de Cinematografia 
Ricardo Muñoz Suay, 2003. 
Hernández Ruiz, Javier, and Pablo Pérez Rubio. Voces en la niebla: el cine durante la 
Transición española (1973-1982). Barcelona: Paidós, 2004. 
Higginbotham, Virginia. Spanish Film under Franco. Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1988. 




Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: 
Continuum, 1995. 
Huneeus, Carlos. La Unión de Centro Democrático y la transición a la democracia en 
España. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1985. 
Iglesia, Eloy de la. Navajeros. Figaro Films. 1980. Film. 
Jackson, Gabriel. The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1967. 
Jaime, Antoine. Literatura y cine en España, (1975-1999). Madrid: Cátedra, 2000. 
Jameson, Fredric. A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present. London; 
New York: Verso, 2002. 
———. Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 
———. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1991. 
———. The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998. London; 
New York: Verso, 1998. 
———. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981. 
Jay, Martin. Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to 
Habermas. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 
Jordan, Barry. Writers and Politics in Franco's Spain. London; New York: Routledge, 
1990. 
Juliá, Santos. "Echar al olvido: memoria y amnistía en la transición a la democracia en 
España." Claves de razón práctica, no. 129 (2003): 14-25. 
 
198 
———. "España en tiempos de Triunfo." In Triunfo en su época: jornadas organizadas 
en la Casa Velázquez los días 26 y 27 de octubre de 1992, edited by Alicia Alted 
Vigil and Paul Aubert, 27-37. Madrid: École des hautes études hispaniques; Casa 
de Velázquez; Ediciones Pléyades, 1995. 
———. Historias de las dos Españas. Madrid: Taurus, 2005. 
———. "History, politics, and culture 1975-1996." In The Cambridge Companion to 
Modern Spanish Culture, edited by David T. Gies, 104-20. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
———. Origines sociales de la democracia en España. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1994. 
Kaes, Anton, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg. The Weimar Republic Sourcebook. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. 
Kinder, Marsha. Blood Cinema: The Reconstruction of National Identity in Spain. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 
———. "Documenting the National and Its Subversion in a Democratic Spain." In 
Refiguring Spain: Cinema, Media, Representation, edited by Marsha Kinder, 65-
98. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. 
Koselleck, Reinhart. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004. 
Kracauer, Siegfried. History: The Last Things Before the Last. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1969. 
"La legalidad y el reformismo." Triunfo, no. 684 (6 March 1976): 6-7. 
Labanyi, Jo. Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain: Theoretical Debates and 
Cultural Practices. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
———. "Narrative in culture, 1975-1996." In The Cambridge Companion to Modern 
Spanish Culture, edited by David T. Gies, 147-62. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
199 
———. "Postmodernism and the Problem of Cultural Identity." In Spanish Cultural 
Studies: An Introduction, The Struggle for Modernity, edited by Helen Graham 
and Jo Labanyi, 396-406. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Laclau, Ernesto. "Democracy and the Question of Power." Constellations 8, no. 1 (March 
2001): 3-14. 
———. On Populist Reason. New York: Verso, 2005. 
———. "Why Constructing a People is the Main Task of Radical Politics." Critical 
Inquiry 32, no. 4 (Summer 2006): 646-80. 
Lang, Robert. American Film Melodrama: Griffith, Vidor, Minnelli. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989. 
Lefebvre, Henri. Introduction to Modernity: Twelve Preludes, September 1959-May 
1961. London; New York: Verso, 1995. 
Lewis, Tom. "Aesthetics and Politics." In Critical Practices in Post-Franco Spain, edited 
by Silvia L. López, Jenaro Taléns and Darío Villanueva, 160-82. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1994. 
Lluch, Ernest. Transición económica y transición política: la anomalía 1978-1980. 
Edited by Javier Tusell and Álvaro Soto Carmona, Historia de la transición, 
1975-1986. Madrid: Alianza, 1996. 
Lukács, Georg. The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms 
of Great Epic Literature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971. 
———. "Thoughts Toward an Aesthetic of the Cinema." Polygraph, no. 13 (2001): 13-
18. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir. Paris: Éditions 
de Minuit, 1979. 
———. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984. 
 
200 
———. The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence, 1982-1985. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993. 
Maier, Charles S., and Santos Juliá. Democracia y España. Madrid: Voz de los sin voz, 
1995. 
Maravall, José María. La politica de la transición. Madrid: Taurus, 1982. 
Márquez Reviriego, Víctor. "Apuntes parlamentarios: De tributos y pactos." Triunfo, no. 
771 (5 November 1977): 8-10. 
———. "La gran estrella de la pantalla (pequeña)." Triunfo, no. 771 (5 November 1977): 
10. 
Marsé, Juan. Si te dicen que caí. Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1976. 
Mateos, Abdón. "Una transición dentro de la transición: Auge, unidad y 'conversión' de 
los socialistas." In Historia de la transición, 1975-1986, edited by Javier Tusell 
and Álvaro Soto Carmona, 216-35. Madrid: Alianza, 1996. 
Mayer, David. Review of Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensationalism and Its 
Contexts, by Ben Singer. Modernism/modernity 9, no. 2 (April 2002): 345-47. 
Medina, Alberto. "Sharing Loss, or the Ethics of Discontinuity: The Republican 
Imaginary in Haro Tecglen and Haro Ibars." Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 
6, no. 2 (July 2005): 227-38. 
Mercer, John, and Martin Shingler. Melodrama: Genre, Style, Sensibility. London; New 
York: Wallflower, 2004. 
Monterde, José Enrique. Veinte años de cine español (1973-1992): un cine bajo la 
paradoja. Barcelona: Paidós, 1993. 
Morán, Gregorio. El precio de la transición. Barcelona: Planeta, 1991. 




Moreiras Menor, Cristina. Cultura herida: literatura y cine en la España democrática. 
Madrid: Ediciones Libertarias, 2002. 
Morodo, Raúl. Los orígenes ideológicos del franquismo: Acción Española. Madrid: 
Alianza, 1985. 
Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Mujal-León, Eusebio. Communism and Political Change in Spain. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1983. 
Mulvey, Laura. "'It will be a magnificent obsession': The Melodrama's Role in the 
Development of Contemporary Film Theory." In Melodrama: Stage, Picture, 
Screen, edited by J. S. Bratton, Jim Cook and Christine Gledhill, 121-33. London: 
British Film Institute, 1994. 
Nicolás Marín, María Encarna, and Alicia Alted Vigil. Disidencias en el franquismo 
(1939-1975). Murcia: DM, 1999. 
Nowell-Smith, Geoffrey. "Minnelli and Melodrama." Screen 18, no. 2 (Summer 1977): 
113-18. 
Olea, Pedro. Pim, pam, pum... ¡fuego! . José Frade P.C. 1975. Film. 
Payne, Stanley G. Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1961. 
———. Franco y José Antonio, el extraño caso del fascismo español: historia de la 
Falange y del movimiento nacional (1923-1977). Barcelona: Planeta, 1997. 
———. The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936: Origins of the Civil War. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 
Portabella, Pere. Informe general sobre algunas cuestiones de interés para una 
proyección pública. Pere Portabella para Films 59. 1977. Film. 
Preston, Paul. Juan Carlos: Steering Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy. New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2004. 
 
202 
———. Spain in Crisis: The Evolution and Decline of the Franco Regime. New York: 
Barnes & Noble Books, 1976. 
———. The Triumph of Democracy in Spain. London; New York: Methuen, 1986. 
Proust, Marcel. Le Temps retrouvé. Paris: Gallimard, 1989. 
Rancière, Jacques. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999. 
———. Hatred of Democracy. London; New York: Verso, 2006. 
———. On the Shores of Politics. New York: Verso, 1995. 
———. "Ten Theses on Politics." Theory & Event, no. 3 (2001), 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.3ranciere.html. 
———. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. London; New York: 
Continuum, 2004. 
Rancière, Jacques, and Davide  Panagia. "Dissenting Words: A Conversation with 
Jacques Rancière." Diacritics 30, no. 2 (Summer, 2000): 113-26. 
Resina, Joan Ramon. Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the 
Spanish Transition to Democracy. Amsterdam; Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000. 
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. 
Said, Edward W. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf, 1993. 
Sánchez Vidal, Agustín "El cine español y la transición." In Del franquismo a la 
posmodernidad: cultura española 1975-1990, edited by José B. Monleón and 
Carlos Blanco Aguinaga, 85-98. Torrejón de Ardoz: Akal, 1995. 
 
203 
Sastre García, Cayo. Transición y desmovilización política en España (1975-1978). 
Valladolid: Secretariado de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico, Universidad 
de Valladolid, 1997. 
Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1976. 
Semprún, Jorge. Autobiografía de Federico Sanchez. Barcelona: Planeta, 1977. 
Simmel, Georg. On Individuality and Social Forms: Selected Writings. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971. 
Singer, Ben. Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 
Smith, Paul Julian. Desire Unlimited: The Cinema of Pedro Almodóvar. London; New 
York: Verso, 2000. 
———. "Homosexuality, Regionalism, and Mass Culture: Eloy de la Iglesia's Cinema of 
Transition." In Modes of Representation in Spanish Cinema, edited by Jenaro 
Talens and Santos Zunzunegui Díez, 216-51. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998. 
Soto Carmona, Álvaro. La transición a la democracia: España, 1975-1982. Madrid: 
Alianza, 1998. 
———. Transición y cambio en España, 1975-1996. Madrid: Alianza, 2005. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the 
Vanishing Present. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Subirats, Eduardo. Intransiciones: crítica de la cultura española. Madrid: Biblioteca 
Nueva, 2002. 
Talens, Jenaro, and Santos Zunzunegui Díez. "History as Narration: Rethinking Film 
History from Spanish Cinema." In Modes of Representation in Spanish Cinema, 
edited by Jenaro Talens and Santos Zunzunegui Díez, 1-45. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998. 
 
204 
Tierno Galván, Enrique. Democracia, socialismo y libertad. Madrid: Paulinas, 1977. 
Tönnies, Ferdinand. Community and Civil Society. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001. 
Torreiro, Casimiro. "Del tardofranquismo a la democracia (1969-1982)." In Historia del 
cine español, edited by Román Gubern, 341-97. Madrid: Cátedra, 1997. 
Torres, Augusto M. Diccionario del cine español. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1996. 
Trenzado Romero, Manuel. Cultura de masas y cambio político: el cine español de la 
transición. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas; Siglo XXI, 1999. 
Tropiano, Stephen. Out of the Cinematic Closet: Homosexuality in the Films of Eloy de la 
Iglesia. Edited by Marsha Kinder, Refiguring Spain: Cinema, Media, 
Representation. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. 
Tusell, Javier. Historia de España en el siglo XX. Madrid: Taurus, 1998. 
———. La transición española a la democracia. Madrid: Historia 16, 1991. 
Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. Cómo liquidaron el franquismo en dieciséis meses y un 
día. Barcelona: Planeta, 1977. 
———. Crónica sentimental de España. Barcelona: Lumen, 1971. 
———. Crónica sentimental de la transición. Barcelona: Planeta, 1985. 
———. Los Mares del sur. Barcelona: Planeta, 1979. 
Vernon, Kathleen. "Melodrama against Itself: Pedro Almodóvar's What Have I Done to 
Deserve This?" Film Quarterly 46, no. 3 (Spring, 1993): 28-40. 
Vilarós, Teresa M. El mono del desencanto: una crítica cultural de la transición 
española (1973-1993). Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 1998. 
 
205 
von Moltke, Johannes "Sympathy for the Devil: Cinema, History, and the Politics of 
Emotion." New German Critique 34, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 17-43. 
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Los Angeles: Roxbury, 
2002. 
Williams, Linda. "Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and Excess." Film Quarterly 44, no. 4 
(Summer, 1991): 2-13. 
———. "Melodrama Revised." In Refiguring American Film Genres: History and 
Theory, edited by Nick Browne, 42-88. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998. 
Zizek, Slavoj. "Against the Populist Temptation." Critical Inquiry, no. 32 (Spring 2006): 
551-74. 
———. "Ethical Socialism? No, Thanks!" Telos 129 (Fall-Winter 2004): 173-89. 
———. "From History and Class Consciousness to the Dialectic of Enlightenment...and 
Back." New German Critique 81 (Autumn, 2000): 107-23. 
———. "From Politics to Biopolitics... and Back." The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 
2/3 (Spring/Summer 2004): 501-21. 
———. "Holding the Place." In Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary 
Dialogues on the Left, edited by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek, 
308-29: London, 2000. 
———. "Intellectuals, Not Gadflies." Critical Inquiry, no. 34, supplement (Winter 2008): 
21-35. 
———. "The Ongoing "Soft Revolution"." Critical Inquiry 30, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 292-
323. 
 
 
